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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

Volume Four · · Spring 1944 · · Number One

. . . Featuring . . .

SERIOUS BLUNDER ON THE RIGHT
—J. Donald Kingsley

ROMANTICISM: A RE-EVALUATION
—Eric Russell Bentley

THE C.E.D.: WHAT IS IT AND WHY?
—Robert A. Brady

WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT JAPAN?
—Allan B. Cole

PROBLEM OF A UNIFIED COMMAND
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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

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EDITORIAL

THE PLAIN QUESTION has not yet been answered. It has not been answered by our action in Spain, in North Africa, in Italy. It has not been answered for Germany or for Eastern Europe. It is not answered in the Near East—and in the Far East the full question has never been put. More than two years after Pearl Harbor we do not yet know why we fight. Not anywhere in the world. And the shape of the peace is still a will-o'-the-wisp.

In the beginning there were the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. These have never been clarified, interpreted, or applied. Later came the conferences at Moscow and Teheran, of which the chief results were united support of Marshall Tito in Jugoslavia—and a free hand for Russia in Eastern Europe. So little, so good. But what of our positive policy? Is Germany to be dismembered? How far do we agree with Russia and Britain in the rehabilitation and reorganization of Europe? Where is the people's peace?

If our actions speak louder than our words, then our record in Southern Europe is black indeed. In Spain we still do business with the fascist Franco—more business, in fact, than we did in 1937. (And this infirmity toward Spain has its reflection in an infirmity toward Argentina and the Sinarquistas in Mexico.) In North Africa the French National Committee still awaits our niggardly, reluctant recognition. And in Italy we prop up a "moronic little king," fend off all democrats, and let our men fall on the field of battle for they know not what.

Of late we have taken steps to bring Jewish refugees out from the death and persecution of Hitler's Fortress Europe, but in Palestine we contradict ourselves by moving the other way. We must not let Congressmen pass a resolution urging that Palestine should not be closed to Jewish

migration. Why? Because across Saudi Arabia the War Department plans a pipeline for oil, which will take two years in the building—and because the Arabs must be appeased in advance. For oil that is two years away and that drags us into the dubious rivalries of the Near East, we are willing to scrap a human war aim.

At Cairo we set an aim for Japan. But what of the war aims for China, for India, for Burma and the Indies? General Stilwell, in charge of Chinese troops, wishes to reopen the Burma Road. But the British, fearful of Burmese and Indian opinion, do not want the Chinese to enter Burma, which must be done if the Road is to be opened once more as a supply route. Meanwhile the war in Southeast Asia goes nowhere as the Japanese for the first time set foot in India. Recent observers say that if the peoples of these lands ever had illusions about the aims of the war, those illusions are now gone.

And in China? The Chungking government has plainly become more of a dictatorship. Some reports have it that the government does more to blockade Chinese Communists than it does to fight Japan. Were it not for the larger conflict today, there would be civil war in China just as there would be civil war in India. Here, too, the people's war aims have not penetrated.

If in Europe many of our sins have been those of commission, in Asia they have been mainly sins of omission.

This is the cold, bare record, and we should do well to face it. Because of that record the present administration could lose the election. And with the loss of the election might well go any last hope of vigorous American participation in the peace.

Strong remedies are called for. We need, first of all, a new statement of war and peace aims. In view of the peace of 1919 and of the changing face of this global war, it is easy to see why our leaders have hesitated to describe the present conflict in broad, idealistic terms. But that hesitation grows less understandable day by day. The lines of battle are now drawn; Pearl Harbor and the defense of Russia are now behind us. It is time to bring order out of confusion. If this means reinterpreting the Atlantic Charter, then let it be reinterpreted. If it means a new policy, a new set of aims, then let that be undertaken. But a policy we should have, and the people should understand it.

If we are to have a vigorous policy, then we must have a more vigorous, more enlightened State Department. This means more than the reshuffling of personnel which has already taken place. It means more than reiteration of an aim "to win the war." It means more than consultation with congressional committees although that is a step in the right direction. The State Department needs new blood, men who are more than time-servers, men who tread more solidly and who by inclination interpret this war more forthrightly.

We need a vigorous Permanent European Committee to implement and work out the problems on the Continent with others of the United Nations. The snarl of Italian politics should be unraveled; the particular policies of postwar economic activities as affected by Lend-Lease should be formulated; we should collaborate with Russia on a more practical basis and let England know more clearly and forcefully what we expect and are willing to give in exchange. These problems call for men of democratic faith who know their own mind and who know their way around.

We need, too, a Permanent Asiatic Committee to handle similar but even more complicated problems in the Far East.

Above all, we need public pressure to bring these changes to pass. It becomes clearer day by day that if there is to be a people's peace, the people are going to have to demand it—and keep demanding. That peace is not a prize package to be carried around in a diplomat's hip pocket—not if we can help it. It is something far larger, something which we must fight for now, during the war.

That peace, to be plain, is the extension of the rights and duties of democracy all over the world—in China, in India, in the Near East, in Europe, in America. Some of the boys engaged in bloody battles halfway around the world will never see it. But we shall let them down if we do not fight for it, bit by bit, wherever there is opportunity, from now on.

ROMANTICISM — A RE-EVALUATION

By ERIC RUSSELL BENTLEY

Dramatic unities; laws of versification; ecclesiastical systems; scholastic doctrines. Bah! . . . those who do insist that the ideal and the real are dynamically continuous are those by whom the world is to be saved.

WILLIAM JAMES.

THE PUBLICATION of Jacques Barzun's *Romanticism and the Modern Ego* last fall reopened the discussion of Romanticism and possibly to some purpose. After demonstrating that the word Romanticism has been used with great inconsistency, Mr. Barzun goes on to remark the limitations of the interpretations which we are used to, namely Romanticism as:

1. A return to the Middle Ages.
2. A love of the exotic.
3. A revolt from reason.
4. A vindication of the individual.
5. A liberation of the unconscious.
6. A reaction against scientific method.
7. A revival of pantheism, idealism, Catholicism.
8. A rejection of artistic conventions.
9. A movement back to nature.
10. A glorification of force.
11. A preference for emotion.

For Mr. Barzun historical Romanticism may involve many of these things but is not to be identified with any one. The Romantic Movement was an attempt to solve the problems created by the *dis*solving eighteenth century. The barriers of Classical correctness were down, and broader human horizons were revealed. No longer confined to a prescribed nobility or a prescribed melancholy, man became freshly aware of the range of possible joy and possible sorrow, strength and weakness, good and

evil. Hence the energy and robustness of the Romanticists, their moral enthusiasm, their belief in the potentialities of original genius.

Mr. Barzun's refreshing and new analysis has impelled me to reconsider the whole subject. In the following sections I shall discuss the modern ultra-classicism in which my generation—that of the past few years—has been reared and the possibility of an alternative.

II

Modern critics of literature have often disagreed, but in their dislike of Romanticism they are almost unanimous. T. S. Eliot writes an essay on Irving Babbitt but shares Babbitt's preference for Classical culture. Yvor Winters takes issue with the Kenyon Reviewers but is anxious only to show himself more *truly* Classical. Marxists protest against Allen Tate's agrarianism but with him disapprove of the Romantic movement. Outside the boundaries of literary criticism, theologians, musicians, artists, historians, and journalists have expressed their hatred of Romanticism. Maritain shows that Rousseauism is a further step from Catholicism to paganism. Stravinsky sees with alarm the growing "impurity" of musical forms, the disintegration of music into extravagance.[1] Albert Guérard regards "the romantic rebellion against discipline, measure, and sanity, that is to say against civilization" as "the chief problem in European culture."[2] Peter Viereck is one of many who find "the key to modern German psychology in nineteenth-century Romanticism."[3]

The critics of Romanticism have of course varied considerably in their interest and emphasis. T. S. Eliot stresses the breakup of certain traditions (usually equated with tradition itself) and the lowered status of the church. His American followers—the school of Allen Tate—are more interested in the culture which the Old South would have had if. . . . Maritain has his strictures on Luther, Stravinsky his strictures on Chopin, virtuosi, and dictatorial conductors, Albert Guérard his theme of the decline of classical France, Peter Viereck his explanation of the "hidden roots of Nazism." These are particular themes. Certain general

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[1] *Poétique Musicale.*

[2] *The France of Tomorrow.*

[3] *Metapolitics.*

and agreed objections to historical Romanticism are common to all its critics, and chief among these are:

1. That Romanticism hurried to its close an era of superior culture.

2. That the Romantic Revolt was the beginning of an era of disintegration and decline.

These objections have become stereotypes of modern historiography, for have not historians—Marxist and Nietzschean alike—"established" that modern culture reached its zenith in the seventeenth century, declined in the eighteenth to rationalism and rococo, and fell in the nineteenth, the century of chaos and industry? For Marx the curve of these centuries is the rise and fall of modern economy; for Spengler, the summer, autumn, and winter of modern culture; for Egon Friedell, the noon, evening, and night of the modern soul.

What is the validity of these large generalizations? Can one—to take the case in hand—justifiably maintain that the nineteenth century is inferior to the eighteenth? Such blanket assertions surely result from the too easy acceptance of Spenglerian or other patterns which are snap judgments upon whole epochs. History has of course known periods of decline and fall—of which the decline and fall of Rome has remained an archetype to fascinate the mind of man. But the idea of decadence which has obsessed the historical mind since Nietzsche tends to lead to an underestimation of less catastrophic change and to a gross oversimplification of difficult and complex phenomena. "Decadence" is a term to use warily. It may be one of many aspects of an age, it may characterize this author or this book or that, it is not necessarily an adequate description of the whole culture, for autumn, to follow Spengler's metaphor, is also seedtime, and in so-called ages of decadence the seeds of the future are sown. One might even suggest that history is constant and simultaneous growth and decay and that the rigid separation of the two processes into distinct periods is a misleading distortion of the truth.

Once such distortions have imposed themselves on a generation they are at the disposal of every dilettante and every snob. Most of us know the young man who thinks all music since Beethoven somewhat regrettable, all philosophy since Spinoza lacking in greatness, all poetry since 1800—with the exception of his own coterie—rather vulgar. The Renaissance, the seventeenth century, the eighteenth century have all been cham-

pioned by the fastidious, the clever, the cynical, the fatalistic, the ultra-modern, but the critic who champions the nineteenth century—as many have now begun to do—still risks the charge of Philistinism. Material progress, I recently read in a coterie journal, is undeniable but progress in terms of happiness can only be measured by men's expectations—Chaucer who didn't expect too many comforts was as happy as a lark! To this sort of historian the fact that our expectations are now greater means *only* that our total of satisfactions has not increased. Despite economic depressions and wars men are growing to make greater demands on life and more men are growing to make the demands; yet in a democratic country a man can write that this means *only* that the sum of happiness and misery remains the same. What, then, is the meaning of the whole American experiment?

Those who are so disappointed that universal happiness is not our lot usually turn about and cease to set any store by happiness at all. In all this one observes little real criticism but much pose, and indeed in the works of many of our most respected critics we find chiefly attitudes and gestures. The attitude which the anti-Romantic historian likes to strike is best illustrated from the writings of Albert Guérard, who says:

> Yet after our orgies of Rousseau, Romanticism, and pure Scientism, we long at times for a quiet evening under the cool and distant stars; for well-bred voices discussing great themes without pedantry and without passion.[4]

Without pedantry Mr. Guérard must be if the reading of Rousseau was to him an orgy, and one can sympathize with a Frenchman in California who longs to hear "well-bred voices" again, suburban as the phrase sounds. But what of the yearning for the cool and distant stars? Were we not always given to understand that such a feeling was "typically Romantic" in the Classicists' use of the word—escapist, nostalgic? And is there not a pathetic antiquarianism in the wish to call back the day before yesterday? Anyway: Mr. Guérard has had his orgies and he is disenchanted. That is the authentic voice of anti-Romanticism.

III

Anti-Romantic critics, one is inclined to say, regard the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as decay without growth. But this is not quite

[4] *The Rise and Fall of an Ideal.*

exact. In fact they attach little value to growth—that vulgar, pragmatist criterion—and by decay they only mean change so rapid that it is hard to follow and impossible to grasp. Theoretically growth is to them neither good nor bad but neutral; actually they fear it because it introduces into history that which they fear most—real novelty, which, *ex hypothesi,* cannot be comprehended by prevailing notions nor assimilated to prevailing values. It creates new notions and new values. For most anti-Romanticists, however, values are fixed, and fixity is their faith, their touchstone, and their panacea. What is it that Babbitt, Eliot, Tate, Stravinsky, and the rest really want? A faith that is systematic and certain, a society that is hierarchic and static. What is it they most dread? The world of contingency, flux, and diversity. As there is an inner connection—to be analyzed below—between Romanticism and pragmatism, so there is between neoclassicism and philosophic idealism.

The fixity demanded by the anti-Romanticists is of three kinds: Fixity of religion and philosophy; fixity of social and political outlook; fixity of aesthetic standards. President Hutchins of Chicago, Jacques Maritain, and T. S. Eliot are among the most celebrated advocates of such fixities. Among themselves—it is the perpetual paradox of the religious—they are not quite agreed as to which dogmas should be generally accepted. Each has his own version. Hutchins is apparently satisfied with any sort of Christianity that is high; Maritain with nothing but Rome; Eliot recently explained that the golden mean is midway between nonconformity and Rome—that is, the Anglo-Catholic community.[5] Indeed Eliot and his American followers may be taken as representative of the modern passion for fixities.

One of Eliot's basic ideas is that an artist should, like Dante, be able to take his ideals for granted. The theme runs through his critical essays like a leitmotiv ("The problem of drama was simpler for Aristotle and for Dryden and for Corneille than for us. They had only to take things as they found them")[6] and we see at least that Eliot has built up a con-

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[5]All citations of Eliot are based on *The Idea of a Christian Society* except where expressly stated otherwise.

[6]"A Dialect on Dramatic Poetry," in *Selected Essays.*

sistently anti-Romantic view of life. "The difference [between Classical and Romantic]," he writes, "seems to me . . . the difference between the complete and the fragmentary, the adult and the immature, the orderly and the chaotic." For the Romanticists did not take their ideals for granted. They searched for ideals. They were so far pragmatists that in two of their greatest works—*Faust* and *Also Sprach Zarathustra*—they even tried to create values. The "idea of a Christian society," on the other hand, is, according to Eliot, to produce "reliable behavior on fixed principles persisting through changed conditions" and the means to this end are "an underlying political philosophy, not of a party but of a nation . . . a certain uniformity of culture in education," and a "positive distinction—however undemocratic it may sound—between the educated and the uneducated." Eliot defines a Christian community as one with a "unified religious-social code of behavior"; he has defined his position as Royalist, Catholic, and Classicist; he has expressed the hope that not "too many free-thinking Jews" will be admitted to his Christian society;[7] he wrote in September, 1939: "The alignment of forces which has now revealed itself should bring more clearly to our consciousness the alternative of Christianity and paganism."

Allen Tate's contribution to political thought is less sinister but more quaint. Tate has professed a certain sympathy with Hilaire Belloc whose superficiality is conspicuous even among Catholic historians and whose chidings of Protestantism and longings for the Middle Ages can never be taken quite seriously. Belloc and Tate are as much against "industrialism" and "monopoly" as any communist but, following the tradition of a certain type of aesthete, they place their trust in the Land. And great as is Tate's dislike of factory-owners, his attachment to the Land is coupled with a firm faith in landowners for: "Property in land was the primary medium through which man expressed his moral nature; and our task is to restore it or to get its equivalent today."[8] The logic is interesting. Property in land *was* the primary medium through which man expressed his moral nature (whatever that means). *Therefore* it should again be so.

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[7] *After Strange Gods.*

[8] All Tate references are to *Reason in Madness.*

Tradition—meaning, in Tate's curious usage, a return to what no longer exists—is offered as a desired antithesis to communism:

> In modern societies which are rapidly moving through finance capitalism toward collectivism—the archetype of non-traditional life—the means of livelihood are more and more divorced from the moral agency of men. Maxim Gorky said: "We have liberated men from the burden of property."

By a roundabout route Tate comes to the trite reactionary conclusion.

The word Tradition as an emotive breeze blowing an odor of sanctity is one of a group of words to which anti-Romantic critics have appealed as words like Romantic, Naturalist, Positivist, Marxist, Liberal, Democratic acquired sinister overtones. (The name of Rousseau was a red rag to Babbitt, that of Beethoven is distasteful to Stravinsky, that of Goethe to Eliot. Tate's favorite whipping boy is Liberalism. Eliot declares with satisfaction that Liberalism is on the way out and that Democracy has become a useless word.) Instead of these outmoded conceptions we are offered Tradition, Order, Dogma, Form, and Discipline. Stravinsky, whose manner is that of an undergraduate eager to parade his superiority to Tchaikowsky and Swinburne, is the most naive. He declares his intention of restoring to the word Dogma its favorable connotations (though when he finds authoritarianism actually at work in Russian culture he cavils). Eliot coolly considers who should be excluded from the Christian society; Mortimer J. Adler considers who should be excluded from the neo-Thomist college. We would be inclined to dismiss these things lightly if we did not live in a society where such exclusions had become a major problem.

To attack Eliot and Tate is of course a dangerous undertaking if one does not wish to be classed with the Philistines. For both are poets of the first rank and are consequently considered authorities on all subjects—at least by their radio listeners. More serious critics, however, should distinguish between their poetic talent and their gifts as critics of society. In literary criticism one must speak of levels of taste and meaning, but the situation in social philosophy is different. Highbrow art is an unfortunate necessity of our time if there is to be any high achievement at all, but highbrow politics is no more required than highbrow medicine or highbrow engineering. Not only are the politics of the poet unworthy of attention at a hypothetical higher level, they are in fact susceptible to

peculiar errors: notably the infusion of aesthetic standards into history. It is to be feared that the despised Romantic Movement with its hero-worship, its glamorized history, its love of particular past ages, gave an impetus to this tendency. Carlyle and the hero-worshippers saw the hero aesthetically not politically and socially; Sir Walter Scott saw the Middle Ages thus, and Nietzsche the Renaissance. These men are great Romanticists yet the anti-Romanticist of our times with his idealized thirteenth or seventeenth century is of the same ilk.

We are entitled to bring the social philosophy of Eliot and Tate into the open and submit it to the same common-sense scrutiny as we would a *New Republic* article. When we do this, when they are deprived of the privileges of their Higher Level, they are revealed as reactionaries of a very familiar pattern, American or Anglo-American counterparts to the professors of Hitler's Germany. It would be crass to call them Nazis; it would be crass to call many a Heidelberg professor a Nazi. The Heidelberg professor may well be much too highbrow for the Nazi party but the party has no objection to the existence of professors who call for hierarchy, fixed order, uniformity, authority, or the exclusion of "free-thinking Jews," who find the word Democracy a semantic blank, who despise alike the tradition of Enlightenment and the idea of popular government, who look with horror on the machine and the city and with misgiving on "the masses." Eliot's Christianity enjoins love of the common people; his actual attitude, however, is seen in a passage where he denounces the idea that inspiration derives not only from tradition but from an "inner voice," an idea by no means strange to many Christians. "The possessors of the inner voice," says Eliot, "ride ten in a compartment to a football match at Swansea, listening to the inner voice, which breathes the eternal message of vanity, fear, and lust."[9] One recalls Barbey d'Aurévilly's remark: "I chose Catholicism as a balcony from which to spit down on democracy." Eliot is an admiring reader of Charles Maurras and a friend of Ezra Pound.

For Pound no friend could be held responsible, of course, but kinship with the antidemocratic thinkers of the continent is important and unmistakable. It is important also to note that Eliot and Tate are rather inferior at the game, not at all in the same rank as apologists of reaction

[9] "The Function of Criticism" in *Selected Essays*.

with Ortega y Gasset, Friedrich Gundolf, the Thomas Mann of the last war, or even Knut Hamsun and Léon Daudet.

IV

So much for the anti-Romanticists as critics of modern society. It remains to consider them as men of letters.

Here too they wish for fixed standards and are full of contempt for "relativism," "historicism," and that assumption made by all historical critics which Tate calls the Doctrine of Relevance. Setting aside the question whether Tate's nonrelativist, nonhistorical criticism is possible and, if possible, satisfactory, we ask: what is this "inadequacy of relativism"? Professors, we are told, who spend their time at bibliography rather than criticism are secretly jealous of science, which encourages "relativistic" thinking. They refuse to evaluate poems, so the theory goes, because they have lost confidence in literature and have come to respect scientific collection, arrangement, and correlation of data more than the prime business of estimating the importance of the work itself. Is this not an overelaborate explanation of a very simple phenomenon? Why assume that the professors of literature are troubled with so strange a jealousy? Is it not evident that they refrain from the evaluation of works of art from incapacity as much as from unwillingness? In any event the subtle process by which a Tate or a Blackmur analyzes and evaluates a poem is unfamiliar as well as difficult, and professors have never been quick to adopt new methods. That they are now adopting Brooks and Warren textbooks in increasing numbers indicates not so much a trend away from relativism as a trend toward poetry. Relativism, here as so often, is a red herring. Relativists are actually just as much against arid academicism as the most ardent agrarian. The lamentable state of literary culture at present is no argument for absolute standards. When one says: This is a good poem, the word "good" is just as relative as when one says: This is a good steak.

Allen Tate is true to type when he disapproves of the genetic or historical approach to literature, for that approach, it is true, is linked both causally and historically with the Romantic Movement and with those changes in human consciousness and attitude which made the nineteenth century so different from the eighteenth. Tate tells us he hates "historical method" but approves historical imagination, so that when

we approach his own dealings with history, which are surprisingly bold for one so indifferent to historical learning, we are anxious to see wherein lies the superiority of imagination to method. How for instance does Tate deal with the history of Romanticism? Here is a characteristic sentence:

> The trouble goes far back, farther even than the Romantic movement when for the first time in Western art we had the belief that poetry is chiefly or even wholly an emotional experience.

In a sense of course all experience is "emotional" but this cannot be what Tate has in mind. Exactly where in Romantic literature is the theory he cites actually stated? No such statement would, of course, be the first in Western art, since many writers including Molière had suggested that the pleasure taken by simple folk in art was its true goal. Had the Romantics—Wordsworth or Coleridge or Shelley, Novalis, the Schlegels, Hugo, Berlioz—gone further than this? If one can generalize about such diverse minds it could only be to state that they agree in attributing to art a function primary not merely in the nervous system but in the intellect of man. Tate blames the Romanticists for precisely the things they openly repudiated and eschewed (e.g. " . . . the Romantic movement taught the reader to look for inherently poetical objects and to respond to them emotionally in certain prescribed ways. . . ." Cf. Wordsworth's Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*) and it is in the end impossible to avoid the conclusion that, when historical knowledge cannot tell him how something arose, historical imagination tells him that the Romantic Movement is to blame. Discussing for example the secret jealousy of poets for scientists, Tate says "I suppose one may say—if one wants a landmark—that it began to prosper after 1798. . . ." How precise he is—especially after "I suppose" and "one may say" and (best of all) "if one wants a landmark"! A similar rhetoric is at work in the following passage: "Not being a literary historian I do not know when the literary profession lost confidence in literature; I suppose it was a gradual loss; we see its beginnings in the English Romantics. . . ." Note the way in which Tate begins by saying: I despise literary historians, therefore it doesn't matter if I don't know literary history, and ends by saying: But I *really* know literary history—the trouble began with the Romantics. Thus it comes about that the one work of historical criticism produced by the Tate school, *Modern Poetry and the Tradition* by Cleanth Brooks, dedicated to Tate and described by Tate as "an epoch-making critical

synthesis," packs all its history into a chapter of "notes for a Revised History of English Poetry." For history based on imagination without method, history based on "I suppose," "one may say," and "if one wants a landmark," can only be impressive in the form of "brilliant suggestions," a superior tone, and a willingness to juggle with whole centuries in a spirit of more than Spenglerian irresponsibility.

The position of our anti-Romantic poet-critics is ambiguous. On the one hand, they depend upon an *avant-gardiste* public in search of ultra-modernity and ever New Directions. On the other their pose—the pose of most artists since Théophile Gautier (unhappily but not accidentally a Romantic)—is that of antimodernity, the correct tone having been set by Eliot: "Those of us who lay no claim to being modern may not be involved in the objection, but, as bystanders . . ."[10] The antimodern modernist is one thing and would like to be another. In his creative work he is a late Romanticist, in his propaganda a rigorous Classicist. He composes a *Sacre du Printemps* and then while the public is still smarting does homage to Bach and even Haydn. He writes a *Waste Land* and follows it up with a preface to Dante. And if critics who meant to censure Stravinsky or Eliot find themselves assailing Bach and Dante the strategy has succeeded.

Strategy! The word is a cliché of recent criticism and necessarily so since in this field manoeuvering is all. The ego is vindicated, the opponent discomfited, and on the faces of the initiated is the smug smile of confirmation.

V

Even if the philosophy of our modern Classicists were otherwise compelling and consistent there would remain two decisive objections. The first is that one cannot accept a particular dogma merely because one regards dogma as socially and artistically useful; to do so would be to accept a crudely pragmatic justification for a fiercely antipragmatic philosophy. The second objection is that neither the past nor the future can be fixed up to suit the poets. Neoclassicists have always "romanticized" certain past ages, and in their zeal for Classicism today assume that it can somehow be thrust into the world of today. But one need not follow any deterministic theory to see that an aesthetic such as Classicism or

[10] *The Humanism of Irving Babbitt.*

Romanticism can only flourish within a suitable form of society. Is not the hope of restoring Classicism as vain as the hope of restoring the Old South? Is it not indeed very much the same thing? The man who starts with a "poetic" attachment to the soil and an ancient aristocracy usually ends as a fascist or a victim of fascists.

Moreover, the only form of Classicism which seems a real possibility in the modern world is Classicism through fascist authority, for the fascists are the only people who offer any quick solution to the problem of the half-literacy of the masses (or to many pseudo-problems such as the excess of "free-thinking Jews"). How does Romanticism, on the other hand, fit into the historical picture?

A hundred years ago men were already aware that a process of rapid change was transforming the world. The human side of the change might be called Democracy, embodying as the word does the idea of government by the people and the idea of possible progress. The non-human side of the process might be called Industrialism, meaning the economic and technological changes which destroyed the agrarian economies and gave to man an infinitely greater control over nature. There were two extreme attitudes to the whole process. The optimist school saw an imminent Utopia in universal suffrage, universal literacy, and the progress of applied science, and took heart at the construction of every new factory chimney. The pessimist school saw in the political change the handing-over of power to the illbred, the immoral, and the unintelligent, while in the technological change they saw the mechanization of life, the extinction of the soul of man, and the destruction of beauty and values generally.

Since the days of the Benthamites and the Utopian socialists the optimist philosophy has taken hard knocks. Europe met with revolution after revolution, yet each revolution created not a New Harmony but a new group of disillusioned intellectuals. Almost all intellectuals of modern times are disillusioned—if not in 1848 then in 1870, if not in 1919 then in 1939. Optimism is of all discredited philosophies the most discredited; aspersions upon the decadence of modern times are of all critical routines the most regularly performed. Hence a great deal of modern thought is rationalization or even open expression of disenchantment. Our contemporary pessimists are followers in the train of Schopenhauer, Wagner, Nietzsche, Gobineau, or another of the bizarre enemies of the post-

industial world. Not all of these had personally ever entertained any hope for democracy, but out of disgust at a world which strives after democracy despite repeated failure, they propose the alternative of aristocratic privilege, racial superiority, dictatorship, and the like.

We do not have to choose between the extremes of optimism and pessimism, yet it is evident that the pessimist school is utterly antidemocratic whereas the optimist view is only a too naive, unqualified statement of our own democratic beliefs. Many antidemocratic writers of today assume that democratic thinkers have not moved very far from Bentham and James Mill in a hundred years. Doubtless this is a just criticism of some liberal idealists but it is no fair account of the history of democratic ideas generally. It ignores the vast strength that came to democratic ideas from Marxism with its emphasis on hostile economic interests, the necessity of struggle, the power basis of politics. And among the many other factors it ignores is the one which is our present theme: the nature of historical Romanticism.

The negative function of the Romantic Revolt was to discredit the Classicism of the previous epoch, a Classicism which meant the Newtonian universe, Newtonian physics, pleasure and pain psychology, in fine an outlook that had grown increasingly rational but which remained narrowly mechanistic. The positive function of Romanticism was to fill the gaps which Classicism had always ignored and also the gaps created by the destruction of Classicism. It is natural that the Romanticists were themselves much more aware of the negative than of the positive side of their task. It is natural too that some interpreted their task as more restorative than creative, that others used the new freedom from prescribed correctness and dogma to set up their own private correctness and dogma, a response still common in our time, as we have seen. But it is a mistake to imagine that Romanticism stopped with the first generation of Romanticists or only lingered on in Celtic or Maeterlinckian twilights. In the second half of the nineteenth century came a renewal of intellectual activity so vast that it is just as much entitled as Romanticism to be regarded as the beginning of a new era. I refer to the generation that produced—among so many others—Nietzsche, Tolstoi, Dostoevski, Strindberg, Manet, Cézanne, Bergson, and Shaw. Perhaps the best single symbol and example of this renewed activity, its meaning, and its relation to Romanticism is William James.

It is nearly twenty years ago now since Professor Whitehead suggested than just as Descartes opened the epoch of Classicism, William James has opened a new epoch, as yet unnamed, in human thinking. That was a brilliant and original formulation. But an alternative way of looking at the same phenomenon is to take James as the culmination of Romanticism, as the man who made articulate what the earlier Romantics were groping after, as the man who built into a philosophy and a method what had previously been a series of hints, images, and intuitions. It is not simply that James translates into the terms of ratiocination what Goethe's *Faust* had symbolically presented. In James we find fully articulated an attitude as expressive of modern life as Descartes' was of the century of Louis XIV. He reconciles the contradictions of earlier Romanticism. He is "positivist" in a broad sense but not mechanistic; he refuses to relegate science to a merely ancillary role, not because he ignores values, but because he does not regard science as neutral to values; he stresses the importance of superior brains but remains a democrat; he gives status alike to Baconian experiment and to Cartesian reason but surpasses earlier rationalism and earlier empiricism in his pragmatic method. He is also the middle point between two contemporary extremes, the extremes reached by Tolstoi and Nietzsche who found the new world disgusting and saw only the alternative of outright neobarbarism or outright neo-Christianity—activity without value or values without activity. James tied activity and values together.

William James is important to the psychologist, the philosopher, the teacher, the practical man—also, though it seems to have been overlooked, to the critical historian, to the exponent of the historical method which philosophic idealists so much dread. He is important to the historian because, first, he sees with the correlating intellect of an artist and, second, his pragmatism is the historical method, that decisive implement of the modern mind, made systematic and pervasive. In philosophy, pragmatism has not meant the replacement of one metaphysical system by another but the adoption of a nonmetaphysical method in which experiment is not regarded as a needless departure from known truth but as a necessary way of facing new problems. Pragmatist history therefore is not merely another philosophy of history to set against previous philosophies. Pragmatist philosophy is the historical method applied to philosophy, pragmatist history is the historical method applied to history. It has all the

hard common sense of Marxist historiography without being bound to particular dogmas. It rejects the main tenets of idealist history yet is not bound to a crudely materialistic explanation of ideas. It is bound to nothing except the record.

The writings of James and other pragmatists are, moreover, part of a much larger historical process. The development of a pragmatic attitude, a thing that goes far beyond the range of pragmatist philosophy, is one of the major phenomena of our era; and one's judgment of it will determine one's judgment of Romanticism too. For the breakup of the Classical order was a challenge to the nonpragmatic (or dogmatic) outlook; and the "chaos" which modern friends of dogma condemn is not simply that of fascism but the "chaos" of freedom. Like pragmatism, Romanticism was not a new dogma in place of an old. The Romanticists could run after so many different dogmas—Catholicism, pantheism, anarchism, racism—precisely because none of these was imposed upon them; since the Romantic Movement, every man of imagination has had to work out his own salvation. Hence it is not surprising that some men, suddenly vouchsafed a new sort of freedom, should abuse it, that some should follow very strange gods. The question is: must we take the attitude of the Grand Inquisitor to freedom? The yearnings of T. S. Eliot and Allen Tate for the fixed and given supports of Classical society may be wise; but if so, democracy is not.

THE C.E.D.—WHAT IS IT AND WHY?

By ROBERT A. BRADY

IT ISN'T PLOTTERS ON THE LEFT who constitute the real hazard to free society here but rather pressures stemming primarily out of widespread idleness."[1] Clearly, Mr. Hoffman continued, "If collectivism comes to America, it will come by default on the part of the good citizens rather than design on the part of revolutionaries."[2] This grim economic determinism supplies its own answer. In a little while the war will be over. Millions of discharged servicemen and war workers will be looking for jobs. If they do not find them there will be social upheavals to pay.

The antidote, therefore, is to "find the jobs." But how? According to the "American Way" jobs and prosperity turn on the capacity of business enterprise to find profitable opportunities. The thing to do, reasoned the founders of the C.E.D. (Committee for Economic Development), is to organize a gigantic nation-wide hunt for the profitable use of men and money. To this end, the better to streamline and facilitate the effort, the Committee for Economic Development was brought into being.

I

The new organization was announced to the world from the offices of the Department of Commerce during the summer of 1942. Behind its inaugural lay a series of conferences amongst business, political, and educational leaders conducted by the Business Advisory Committee of the Department of Commerce under the auspices of its Secretary, Jesse Jones. Leading participants included a Chicago group, a Harvard group, and a New York City group. Prominent amongst the first were Mr. William Benton, Vice-President of the University of Chicago and formerly of the Benton and Bowles Advertising Company (Chester Bowles is now head of O.P.A.), and Paul Hoffman, trustee of the University of Chicago and President of the Studebaker Corporation. Somewhat more in the background were Robert Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago,

Footnotes will be found collected at the end of this article.

Neil Jacoby, Professor of Finance at the same university, and others in that area who had for some time been toying with ideas for persuading "business men to look ahead."

The second group emerged from the Harvard Club on the initiative of Mr. David C. Prince, Vice-President of the General Electric Company, and included amongst others, Professor Donald David, Dean of the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard and active in a number of business ventures including a directorship in General Foods, and Professor Sumner Slichter of the Harvard economics staff. The third group appears to have been led by Beardsley Ruml, author of the tax-forgiveness plan, Treasurer of R. H. Macy, Chairman of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Chairman of the Chairman's Committee of the Federal Reserve System, and Director of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Included in this group were a number of persons drawn from Columbia and Pennsylvania Universities, and from the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Active behind the scenes, also, were a number of leading corporate and trade association executives whose organizations were not, for one reason or another, to be formally identified with the C.E.D. Chief amongst these were the N.A.M., and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (C.C.U.S.). Absence of formal identification, however, did not prevent leading officers from participating in the new organization. Thus Eric Johnston, President of the Chamber is one of the leading members of the C.E.D. Board of Trustees. Two former presidents of the N.A.M., Walter B. Fuller and Fred Crawford, are members, respectively, of the Field Development Division and the Research Division. Charles R. Hook and others actively identified with important N.A.M. committees play prominent roles in the new organization.

Cross-fertilization between the C.E.D. and the government is equally marked. Jesse Jones, Secretary of Commerce, named the Board of Trustees. Charles E. Wilson and other prominent officials of W.P.B., O.P.A., the National Resources Planning Board, the Federal Reserve Board and many other agencies—both old-line and war emergency—participated in the discussions and helped shape the program. Until recently the Department of Commerce furnished C.E.D. with space for its headquarters.

The outlook and emphasis of the C.E.D. reflects quite faithfully the trinity which had participated in the planning work. Business, government, and education were to co-operate in a common endeavor, that of "planning" for a high level of postwar prosperity. "Co-operation," however, was not to mean independent representation. Only business men might be members of the new Committee, and only business men might participate in its programmatic discussions, its policy declarations, and its efforts at implementation.

The reason for this, as a C.E.D. pamphlet[3] put the matter, is that the Committee is "not intended to be representative of all groups in the economy. Its members are business men; its purpose is to interest business men in tackling their postwar problems, leaving to others the job of solving their own relations to postwar issues." They were to "tackle" these problems, furthermore, not by resort to centralized direction, whether emanating from government or not. That way, as Beardsley Ruml was at pains to make clear, lies "regimentation." In contrast, the C.E.D. is to promote postwar prosperity by encouraging planning by individual companies. The "C.E.D. [is] in no sense a planning organization except through its efforts to stimulate businesses to plan for themselves," Mr. Benton has replied to a pointed question.[4] The C.C.U.S. has explained the C.E.D. to its members with a similar emphasis, "The Committee for Economic Development is not an over-all postwar planning organization. Its activities are keyed to the one objective of jobs in private industry."[5]

II

To accomplish the broad objectives of "maximum employment and high productivity"[6] by these means, the C.E.D. has developed an elaborate machinery to reach every major and minor business in the country. Policy formation and central direction are vested in the Board of Trustees. The Board, supposed to be broadly representative of all types and sizes of business, seeks to carry out its purpose with the aid of an executive secretary, an executive committee, and three divisions, Research, Finance, and Field Development.

The Finance Division, under the chairmanship of Carle C. Conway, Chairman of the Board of Continental Can, has collected close to a million dollars for promotion of C.E.D. activities. "The method of raising the money is to invite 50 or 60 executives from important industries

to be members of the Finance Committee and to raise quotas from each industry. . . . Solicitation will be limited to national corporations, leaving local C.E.D. committees free to raise money for local purposes from local firms."[7] Thirty-four such industry chairmen had been selected by October last. The task of raising the necessary money seems to have been greatly facilitated by the fact that funds used for this purpose are tax deductible.

The Research Division consists of three groups, a policy formulating Research Committee under the chairmanship of Ralph E. Flanders, President of Jones and Lamson Machine Company, an Advisory Board of university people under the chairmanship of Sumner H. Slichter of Harvard University, and a Research Staff under the direction of Professor T. O. Yntema of the University of Chicago.

> Approximately one-half of the budget of the Committee for Economic Development will go into the proposed program of the Research Division. . . . The Research program will probably break down into two broad areas for exploration and study:
>
> *First:* Government and business policies growing out of the war itself—such as rationing, price controls, ownership and operation of war plants, et cetera—many of which will call for action and decision immediately on or shortly after the cessation of hostilities. . . .
>
> *Second:* The long-range policies of government and business which should constantly be kept in view during the postwar transition period, and which, in a peacetime economy contribute most to optimum employment and high productivity.[8]

The Research Committee is responsible for the approval and budgeting of all projects, the Advisory Board for assisting in the planning and direction of all studies, and the Research Staff for conducting the actual investigations. Amongst the studies already started are to be found the following:[9]

> 1. A study of incentives for business enterprise and the impact of taxation on these incentives. Directed by Dean C. E. Griffin of the School of Business, University of Michigan, assisted by: Harold M. Groves, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin; W. A. Paton, Professor of Accounting, University of Michigan, and Henry Simons, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Chicago. Three reports are expected. The first two, already due, have apparently not appeared:
>
> (a) Summary report on changes in the tax structure with particular reference to the postwar transition period, by Harold M. Groves.

(b) An appraisal of the incentives and deterrents to business enterprise, by C. E. Griffin.

(c) Final report on changes in the tax structure which will help business provide jobs, by Harold M. Groves. (To be completed by June, 1944.)

2. Studies of the economic problems of postwar reconversion and expansion.

(a) A survey of postwar reconversion problems—T. O. Yntema and staff.

(b) Lessons from World War I and its aftermath—T. O. Yntema and Martha Jane Marshall.

(c) Liquidation of War Production—A. D. H. Kaplan, Professor of Economics, University of Denver—including:

(1) Cancellation and settlement of war contracts.

(2) Disposal of government-owned plants.

(3) Disposal of government-owned surpluses. In addition to the general survey, a study of the procedures and methods by which war contracts should be terminated has been undertaken by John F. Fennelly, Executive Director, C.E.D.

(d) Removal of wartime controls—J. M. Clark, Professor of Economics, Columbia University.

(e) Monetary and banking policy in the transition period—John C. Langum, Assistant Vice-President, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

(f) Summary report on changes in the tax structure with particular reference to postwar transition (also listed under "incentives" above)—Harold M. Groves, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin.

(g) Financing reconversion and expansion of businesses—Charles Abbott, Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard Business School.

(h) Postwar problems of agriculture—Theodore Schultz, Head, Department of Economics, Iowa state College.[10]

(i) Postwar problems of international trade and finance—Calvin B. Hoover, Dean, Graduate School, Duke University.

(j) Transfer of workers to peacetime jobs.

(k) Provision for unemployed workers in the transition period.

Several names and projects have since been added to this list. One of the new men is Robert R. Nathan, formerly Director of the Planning Committee of W.P.B.

Before turning to a discussion of the program outlined for the Research Staff, a few words might be said about the Field Development Division which expects to turn the findings of research to practical account. This division is under the chairmanship of Marian B. Folsom, Treasurer of the Eastman Kodak Company, who has appointed regional chairmen for each of the twelve Federal Reserve Districts. The latter

have, in turn, "named District and State and County Chairmen" who, finally, "are appointing Community Chairmen" for the 1000 or more principal employment centers of the United States. It is at "the *community level* where the important job of stimulating *company by company postwar planning* is done."[11]

Community committees may be set up in any city, town, or district, however small. The model committee is to set up five main divisions:

1. *The Action Division for Manufacturing* which encourages individual companies to follow the "Four Steps for Postwar Planning" sketched out for them in the *Handbook for Industrial Employers,* prepared for them under the direction of the C.E.D. Industrial Advisory Board by a "group of business men with plenty of 'know-how'—in connection with postwar planning." The four steps are:

1. Organizing for postwar planning.
2. Appraisal of postwar markets.
3. First figures for the postwar period.
4. Review and action.

The better to facilitate this "company-by-company planning" the Field Development Division supplies "case studies" of "flesh and blood" companies "already far advanced with postwar plans." Several such have already been made.[12] These, it is hoped, will serve as models for local company planning.

2. *The Construction, Distribution and Service Division* is to work out local company percentages of nationally expanded output and plant on the assumptions laid down by the central headquarters of C.E.D. on postwar market potentials, and as fast as the data may be supplied to their local Action Divisions.

3. *The Community Research Committee* has "the job of making a complete survey of their community. They will collect and make available information about engineering and laboratory facilities, product designing, and planning services which can be hired by those . . . who may want them."

4. *The Liaison Division* will undertake "to see that responsible civic leaders and important groups engaged in phases of postwar planning outside the objectives of C.E.D. are kept thoroughly informed of our activities."

5. *The Public Relations Division* has the job of seeing "that all groups in the community hear about the practical 'grassroots' plan of business to provide jobs . . . when the war is over" including war workers and the armed forces.

Several hundred of these "community committees" have apparently been established. The more successful are located in the larger cities. Such a one is the Cleveland Committee for Economic Development, described at length in the C.E.D. *News* for June, 1943. This committee, in effect, combines features of the organization of the national C.E.D. and its community committees. Under a chairman, Elmer Lindseth, Vice-President of the Cleveland Electric Company, appointed by the district chairman, W. T. Holliday, President of the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, there is an executive committee, the five standard community committees, and a series of subsidiary committees including a "Postwar Clinics Commttee." The latter involves a special feature sponsored by the Field Development Division, and will consist of occasional "get-togethers" on the regional or local basis of C.E.D. members in conference having a regular agenda, reports, roundtable discussions, and so forth.

Similar committees are functioning in Louisville, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, Buffalo, and elsewhere, and are reported, region by region, in the monthly medium, the C.E.D. *News*. One of the most highly publicized is that of Philadelphia because of its elaborate research committee.[13] Another is the town of Albert Lea, Minnesota.[14] While these local committees are to function autonomously, their activities are serviced, and to some extent, co-or 'inated by state and district committees. These, in turn, are serviced and co-ordinated by the Field Development Division.

The Field Development Division, finally, has a Field Director, a Community Advisory Board, and an Industrial Advisory Board. The latter is the dominant body within the Division, and is headed up by Mr. David C. Prince. Its work is implemented by a series of 11 "Action Committees" whose function is to grind out the "know-how" and roll it "down the assembly line of C.E.D.'s Field Development Division through the hands of top ranking executives and organizations" and out through the regional districts. The 11 Action Committees are to function as follows:

1. *The Manufacturing Committee,* "headed by T. V. Houser, Vice-President of Sears, Roebuck and Company . . . will (a) contact and work with approximately 900 postwar planning executives in the country's largest corporations, and (b) obtain material for case studies based on the experience of these companies."

2. *The Marketing Committee,* under T. G. McGowan, research director of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, will attempt to estimate the total market of 400 to 600 types of finished goods at the potential level of 140 million gross annual national output, and to estimate the sources of consumer incomes and the manpower requirements by occupations required for such production.

3. *Consulting Management Engineers Committee,* made up of "six past presidents of the Association of Consulting Management Engineers is to work out a handbook for smaller manufacturers employing 500 workers or less, and having a capitalization of $1,000,000 or less."

4. *New Materials and Design Committee,* under G. F. Nordenhold, editor of *Product Engineering,* is to prepare a sound film on new products, a handbook showing possibilities of new types of materials and processes, and to encourage newspapers and magazines to write articles on such subjects.

5. *Trade Association Committee,* under Pyke Johnson, President of the Automotive Safety Council, is to promote C.E.D. activities in trade associations.

6. *The Retail Committee* "will submit suggestions for more than a million retailers."

7. *The Finance Committee* "will supply facts on postwar financing."

8. *The National Society of Sales Training Executives,* under Henry Porter, Sales Promotion Manager for the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, is the C.E.D. sales promotion committee. It has prepared a handbook, *Postwar Sales Personnel,* dealing with methods of selecting and training sales executives "to meet tough postwar competition."

9. *The National Federation of Sales Executives* under K. N. Merritt, General Manager of Public Relations of the Railway Express Company, is to help C.E.D. "set up a network of operation, radiating from the 56 cities in which these clubs function, to reach sales managers in all leading centers," hold "full sales clinics" in these areas, and so forth.

10. *The American Association of Advertising Agencies* under L. D. H. Weld of the McCann, Erickson advertising agency, and having a membership of 126 firms, is the third trade association to become a C.E.D. action committee. Its purpose is to help advertising agencies "to help postwar preparations of the clients they serve" by preparing "case studies on the work of advertising agencies in the postwar field." One such has already gone out, being the C.E.D. Case Study 4 on Servel, prepared by Batton, Barton, Durstine and Osborn.

11. *The Advertising Federation of America* is the fourth trade association to become a C.E.D. Action Committee. It directs the "work of 56 member clubs

and 33 co-operating groups in 89 principal cities in America" so as to make clear "the vital part that advertising will play in moving postwar products."

So much for the general organization of the C.E.D. While the above sketch does not exhaust the picture, it does indicate the imagination and vigor which have been poured into the promotion of this swiftly proliferating network of promotion and propaganda. Each new issue of the C.E.D. *News* tells of new committees, subcommittees and activities undertaken on national, regional, and local levels which serve to further widen the influence of the Committee.

How much of this is paper work, and how much the "real McCoy" it is difficult, if not impossible, to say. Organizationally, it represents in effect a fusion of activities of the system of Chambers of Commerce tied in with the Chamber of Commerce of the United States with the affiliates of the N.A.M. as these are supplemented by other national and local chambers, trade associations, management and professional associations, Kiwanis, Rotary, and other business and promotional organizations. It focuses the attention of these groups at the various levels on the postwar, and seeks to guide them with respect to their attitudes toward, and plans for, that period. Policy direction at each level is in the hands of a co-optatively recruited Committee which enables the C.E.D. to assume the role of general expert, "idea," and ideological counsel to all American business, at least so far as postwar planning is concerned.

III

The program of the C.E.D. might be said to proceed on two closely related levels, a "formal level" and an "informal level." The first is explicit and fairly clear-cut—at least on first view. The second involves a series of assumptions, arguments, and procedures which appear on first acquaintance to be solely concerned with the first, but which reflection shows go so far beyond the immediate issues posed on the "formal level" as soon to dwarf them to relative unimportance. The two together constitute an extraordinarily far-sighted, carefully thought out, unified, and shrewdly formulated program. Only the formal argument is new in any significant respect. Viewed against the background of the informal argument, the whole program appears as a logical outgrowth of business organization and thought which reaches back beyond the turn of the century, but whose major patterns were fixed during the interlude between the two World Wars, and which have been brought to program-

matic focus by the New Deal policies of the '30's and fear of further extension of New Deal policies in the postwar world.

By the "formal level" I refer to the immediate and highly publicized "postwar planning" program of the C.E.D. This program has been revealed to the public—perhaps to the members of the C.E.D. itself—as yet only in part. The revealed portion is, for all practical purposes, contained in its entirety within the covers of *Markets After the War,* a remarkably compact pamphlet written by S. Morris Livingston of the Department of Commerce, and reprinted for circulation by the Field Development Division of C.E.D. The unrevealed portion consists of the results of the work of the Research Division now in process and yet to be undertaken. Some small parts of this latter portion are revealed in statements of policy on these matters by the C.E.D. at the time the research was undertaken.

The formal argument of *Markets After the War* contains two sets of propositions. The first, which might be referred to as the *Primary Propositions,* state the conditions that define the actions necessary to achieve postwar prosperity instead of postwar depression. The *Secondary Propositions,* on the other hand, state the conditions that define the actions required to achieve a national level of prosperity of 135 billion or more within two years after the end of the war. Typically the *Secondary Propositions* are placed first in the C.E.D. literature partly, perhaps, because they are by all odds the more spectacular, and partly for reasons that appear only when we examine the larger program of C.E.D. as a whole.

The *Primary Propositions* run somewhat as follows: peace will face America with the closely related problems of (1) transition from military to civilian production, and of (2) maintaining full employment once reconversion has been completed. Both problems will be greatly complicated by the much larger number of persons who will be seeking employment than before the war (estimates vary from 5 to 20 millions). Through individual business planning on a nation-wide basis which visualizes moving quickly at the same *time* (or in some satisfactory sequence?), in the same *direction,* and to the same *degree* (or in some adequate proportioning?), a general movement can be generated which will cause all business to act in unison. Such a movement, once begun, will provide its own justification, regardless of the original stimulus, for general action on the belief that markets can be obtained which will pro-

vide the payrolls and profits that supply the incomes to purchase the goods as fast as they are produced.

The case for such a movement need not rest entirely, however, upon pure faith and tautologies of logic. There will be in the postwar world, in addition, a very real and quite large backlog of consumer purchasing power accumulated in the form of war bonds or savings accounts that will be matched by a pent-up demand for goods—particularly durable goods and housing—which have been worn out and could not be replaced or which have or will have become (because of changes in fashion, new products or materials, etc.) largely if not wholly, obsolete. Meanwhile, general liquidation of instalment payments and other consumer credit accounts during the war will release a larger percentage of current income for purchase of goods, while greatly expanding the capacity of credit institutions to finance further consumer purchases. When to these factors is added the unusually great materials, goods, and services demand that will arise in the investment field from reconversion and expansion, it would seem possible that goods demand will result in an employment demand large enough to sustain high wartime levels for both.[15]

This result can be achieved, the C.E.D. continues to argue, only provided business men move rapidly to convert and re-employ as fast as wartime production tapers off and lays off. Quick action, that is to say, may—to employ a figure—result in shifting from a "war-production high" to a "peace-production high" instead of, as shortly after the last world war, to a "peace production low." Or, if not to a "high," then at least to a "peace-production intermediate." If this latter, on account of time required in retooling and so forth, then a number of measures lie readily at hand for shifting back into "high": war production may be tapered off less rapidly; resumption of peace production in many lines may begin somewhat earlier; the government may stand prepared to fill in temporary gaps with necessary public works employment, and so forth.

At this point there is only one fly in the ointment. But that fly is no "can't see 'em"; on the contrary it looms as big as a super flying fortress. It is the problem of what to do with the much larger number of persons who will be looking for jobs after the war. The *Secondary Propositions,* referred to above, are those which relate these new job seekers (5 to 20 million) to the new level of national income. The approach is a mixture of hope and fiction on the one hand, and of simple arithmetic on the

other. The arithmetic consists of (1) projecting for the country as a whole, for industrial groupings, and for individual classes and types of commodities the ratio of increased output in 1946 over 1940, and (2) advising each individual business man how he should go about planning (would not "scheming" be a technically more accurate word?)[16] to get his "share" of the projected increase.

The hope and fiction is found in the belief that if each will act on the assumption that all the others will act in the same way, then iridescent promise can be transmuted into the most matter-of-fact gold. But what is that "same way" apt to be in the flesh? If we are to stay within the limits of real business incentives as defined by the C.E.D., will it not be to the interest of some to expand and others to contract, or to pitch their policies to as many different keys as any given movement of business—up or down, or merely "stable"—implies for the several classes of investment and consumers' goods and service industries?

Certainly more is at stake than just cutting, *fairly,* a great big pie. Since we assume that the C.E.D. is not asking some business men to wait patiently while the others eat—or, as appears to be the case, willingly give up their pieces to the more hungry in order to eat better and more later[17]—one might be led to believe that this is where the Research Division comes in. Yet a perusal of preliminary statements of research projects and of the past writings of members of the Research Staff sheds no light on the subject whatsoever.

An examination of the projects undertaken, supported, and interpreted by statements made on interview with leading members of the Research Staff,[18] will show that studies thus far projected are concentrated on subject matter that has little if anything to do with determination of either the level of prosperity or the problem of stability at the "full employment" level.[19] The studies are predominantly concerned with (1) the issues and mechanics of transition from war to peace, and (2) problems of "freeing business" from "restraints" and "restrictions" that are said to lame "free enterprise" and thus to prevent it from acting in such a way as to provide jobs for all who wish them.[20] Thus far there has not appeared much even of the various discussions which provide the regular stock in trade of economists who specialize on problems of business cycles, and practically all problems which relate to regional, national, and industrial planning on any comprehensive basis are largely, if not

wholly, by-passed. Even where such matters appear to be touched upon, the approach is that of the National Bureau of Economic Research—which does not yet feel that it has done much more to date than state what the problems of economic stability are, and which certainly has developed no consistently rounded out theories as to how business cycles are to be overcome, nor how any given level of prosperity is to be achieved, or, once achieved, held. The "pragmatic approach" of the National Bureau, in fact, prevents such issues from being raised.

So likewise does the attitude of the Research Staff of C.E.D. All those interviewed agreed with pride that the research work for C.E.D. was to be throughout realistic and practical, and that it was not to be hamstrung by efforts to disprove theses, arguments, theories, or hypotheses —however interesting these may be in themselves—relating to prosperity or planning unless they dealt directly with tangible issues and pointed to definite possibilities of corrective action. But what is "realism" in this connection? At this point all replies are as yet vague—where their manifest differences, unfortunately, remind one of the parable of the several answers given by the blind men engaged, through the unsteady aid of the sense of touch, in sizing up the leading characteristics of the elephant. The experts here are not blind; in fact they are amongst the most imaginative and wide-awake to be found in the United States. But the trouble appears to be that "decision and policy" are wholly up to the business men—who need the light, not yet vouchsafed and without which, as all agree, decisions and policy cannot add up to significant action—and yet who insist on stating at the outset the areas in which light is to be found and the qualities of the answers which may be found acceptable.[21]

Yet such replies as caution permits do not leave the outsider entirely in the dark. They reveal two general answers: (1) free "free enterprise" from "arbitrary" restraints and restrictions, public and private, and (2) let business men plan individually, though with benefit this time of the best and most expert counsel available.

The latter—guidance by experts—is felt by C.E.D. to be something new. It is new, however, only with respect to the specific focus and the apparatus for disseminating results. The declarations of purpose and intent here are in large part, if not wholly, identical with those which guided the establishment of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the National Industrial Conference Board, the Department of Commerce

under the leadership of Herbert Hoover, and many other private and public research agencies. Only the specific focus on the postwar era remains new.

As for prosperity through planning by individual businesses, consider the conclusions of Professor Mitchell written some 16 years ago!

> The business economy provides for effective co-ordination of effort within each business enterprise, but not for effective co-ordination of effort amongst independent enterprises. . . . The two schemes of co-ordination differ in almost all respects. Co-ordination within an enterprise is the result of careful planning by experts; co-ordination amongst independent enterprises cannot be said to be planned at all; rather is it the unplanned result of natural selection in a struggle for business survival.

And why do we have business cycles? Because of the failures, not of the former type of planning which the C.E.D. promotes, but *of the latter which it repudiates!*

Since Mitchell wrote, the mounting evidence of research and investigation—greatly re-enforced by considerations of monopoly controls, "administered prices," and the like—has run to the effect that "co-ordination amongst independent enterprises" on a most extensive scale there must be if we are to have either higher levels of prosperity or economic stability. Here the program of the C.E.D. seems not a forward step, but a positive anachronism. Since the C.E.D. personnel is definitely not of that type—since, in fact, it is one of the most intellectually vigorous and adventurous yet to appear in American business circles—it is hard to believe that this argument is intended to be taken seriously.

One member of the C.E.D. research staff surmises "that business men of the thoughtful and open-minded attitude represented by the top men of the C.E.D. would naturally have learned something since 1932." But if they have, it relates not to co-ordination amongst businesses—except with respect to the exercise of monopolistic controls which worsen rather than better the situation—but to a "more hospitable attitude toward large governmental outlays" than would have been the case in the Hoover era if and when these are needed to supplement business employment. This seems pretty weak support for so mighty a program. But even on this point, the most optimistic supporters of government spending on public works have never held them out as more than a partial alleviative for business depressions. They promise, in this role, nothing much toward heightening the secular level of national income.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the position of the C.E.D. on this score comes out not as something new, but actually as a mere repetition of the trite prosperity postulates of the Hoover era. In fact, with minor exceptions, the whole of the program to date can be found in the recommendations of the President's Conference on Unemployment, published in 1923 with a foreword by Herbert Hoover under the title of *Business Cycles and Unemployment.* Most of what cannot be found there can be traced through the pages of the two-volume *Recent Economic Changes* published in 1929 under the joint auspices of Herbert Hoover and the National Bureau. The points, the emphasis, even much of the phraseology, are similar to those of C.E.D. when not, to all intents and purposes, identical.

It is difficult, consequently, to believe that the C.E.D. expects either to achieve stability or high levels of prosperity through individual business planning, however intelligently guided. What, then, of the second reply, "freeing business" from "arbitrary" restraints, public and private? These are identified, somewhat vaguely, and largely by inference, as those of (a) government, and (b) monopoly.

With respect to the first, no one is, apparently, willing to spell out precisely what is meant, but the very great emphasis placed upon "business incentives" and the removal of certain types of government war controls would seem to point to controls over excess profits, corporation taxes, controls on investment such as those embodied in the S.E.C. and the Holding Company Act, and perhaps many others. The inference is very broad that the "restraints" and "restrictions" of which the C.E.D. would be rid are those which have been introduced by the New Deal to protect investors, little business, labor, and the general public. An examination of the activities, policies, and publicly announced programs of leading associations and corporations supporting the C.E.D. would seem to allow no other interpretation. Contrariwise, there is little if anything in the statements issued thus far by the C.E.D. to lead one to believe that it would have federal or state governments renounce that vast meshwork of laws and machinery for promoting "fair trade" and similar "administered price" controls which have permitted, where they have not indeed made well-nigh compulsory, the cumulative expansion of cartel-like controls, and of which, in the main, only the business giants are in a position to take advantage. Since when has water risen above its

source? And if it cannot, then is the answer to the conundrum, not less "government in business," but more "government for big business"?

The C.E.D. answer would appear to be no for the reason, as one of the research staff put it, that the C.E.D. "is definitely opposed to monopoly type controls and in favor of strengthening the hand of small business and competitive forces." This opinion is supported by numerous and categorical statements made from time to time by leading officials of C.E.D. How seriously is it to be taken?

IV

Who, to begin with, makes up the C.E.D.? A rough checkup shows that the personalities in the national headquarters are able to speak in an official capacity for more than $20,000,000,000 worth of corporate resources and/or net assets. About half of this is held by nongovernmental institutions. The network of effective control within the corporate groupings represented which extend beyond 5 percent of voting stock would probably include corporate resources close to double the above figure. The smallest firm represented on any of the C.E.D.'s leading committees listed in Moody's for 1941 was the *Chicago Daily News* with assets at that time of $73,589. Aside from the *News,* the two smallest were Jones and Lamson Machine Company, and George A. Hormel Company, with net assets, respectively, of $2,596,667 and $2,603,182. Some of the private holdings of C.E.D. members are surely smaller in size than these figures would indicate. Yet it is difficult to see, on this basis, how the C.E.D. can feel that its organization is, by virtue of its membership, able to speak for large, medium, and small business. Nor is the picture relatively much different for such of the regional and local divisions of the C.E.D. as I have been able to obtain reliable data on.

This does not mean, of course, that the C.E.D. may not represent the more vigorous, imaginative, and liberal figures in the big business world. It does mean, however, that it is primarily—if not for all practical purposes exclusively—a big business proposition. There is also a very active cross-fertilization with the N.A.M., the N.I.C.B., the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and via these with the dominating national trade associations, regional and state business federations, and employers associations, which cover the entire United States, and which, in their national headquarters, are dominated—with few exceptions—

by the giants in their respective fields. Trace through the prominent personages in the C.E.D. at each of these levels, and you will find the leading figures in these associations and federations.

Given the stated method of procedure in organizing C.E.D., it could, of course, scarcely be otherwise. But if so, what then is to be said for the position of the C.E.D. on monopoly? One member of the Research Advisory Board has referred with disgust to the "cynical attitude of the British," uncovered following a trip to Europe of C.E.D. representatives for the purpose of discussing postwar problems with leading British business and political figures. The British, he found, were expecting to enter the postwar world—as the authoritative *Economist* has repeatedly charged—as the *residuary legatees* of the Germans with an extensive and rapidly spread-eagling network of national and international cartels for reconquest of old and conquest of new markets. Official C.E.D. spokesmen have repeatedly rejected that approach, publicly and privately.

Without questioning anybody's honesty or sincerity, it is pertinent to ask, do they really mean it? Let us take an example or two. One of the leading personalities in the formation of C.E.D. was Mr. Prince, Vice-President of the General Electric Company. Mr. Prince is an associate of the very able Mr. Charles Wilson, now second in command at W.P.B.—a war agency which has, incidentally, routed the vast bulk of war production—in rather sharp contrast with British practice—to a small group of the industrial giants. These two officials of G.E. represent a company which has long been distinguished for the high quality of its executive leadership, and they speak for corporate policies which have exercised a very great influence upon the conduct of American business affairs and which have unfolded over the past quarter century without a single significant break in continuity or emphasis.

In that unfolding Mr. Owen D. Young and Mr. Gerard Swope played extraordinarily significant roles. One of the side activities of Mr. Young was the founding of the National Industrial Conference Board in 1916 to serve as a sort of brain trust for big business on matters relating primarily to labor relations. Co-operating in its formation were the leading national corporations and trade associations of the United States. It served as a brain trust while the N.A.M. conducted its nation-wide open shop campaign during the '20's, and while it and other associations began a series of widespread practices which the Senate Committee on

Education and Labor (LaFollette Committee) has investigated at such great length and which it has condemned as the very quintessence of un-American discrimination against labor. Mr. Young is not, thereby, to be identified, on the principles of *contact magic,* with the policies which the LaFollette Committee laid bare, though I have combed his speeches for expressions of disapproval of these tactics without success.

Mr. Young may have overlooked such issues in such a busy life, but his equally able colleague, Mr. Swope, did not. The famous Swope Plan considered the "social question" by making bold provision for a wide-ranging "social security" program which on some points, at least, still goes far beyond anything now in existence. And the plan jelled—*in the form of N.R.A.* A series of changes were introduced between the first announcement of the Swope Plan and the final edition of N.I.R.A. as it emerged in 1933 from the hands of General Johnson, Bernard Baruch, Averill Harriman of the Chamber of Commerce and others. To Mr. Swope's solution of the "social question" had been added, under trade-union pressure, the famous Article 7a—an article which was never willingly accepted by American business, and which was one of the principal reasons why the Blue Eagle's original backers eventually turned against their own creation. But it did emerge with something which most American business liked, and that was a plan which called for wholesale cartelization of American industry, trade, commerce, and finance.

As has been amply demonstrated since, the cartel features of the Code Authorities were the features which the dominating business corporations wanted and which the New Deal elements in the Roosevelt administration did their best to eliminate. In turning against N.R.A. at the end it was the *New Deal restraints on monopoly restraints* which organized business attacked, and not the restraints themselves. In dropping the phraseology of "self-government in business" with the demise of the Eagle, every effort was made to keep the substance of the new controls. As early as 1936 the Institute of Distribution was able to say that new legislation, lobbied through by the very business pressure groups who had originally supported, and were now condemning, N.R.A., had brought back two-thirds of N.R.A. controls. After 1936 the trend widened out to envelop ever more American business in a vast and centralized network of federations, associations, compacts, and agreements which have—detail by detail—shown them to be steadily transmuting them-

selves into Americanized versions of European cartels. Paging back through a couple hundred recent Anti-Trust Indictments against these practices, one finds trade associations named about as frequently as individual business corporations. And the leaders throughout are typically the larger, more powerful, better organized, and better informed corporations.

I have before me (1) an Anti-Trust Indictment returned October 21, 1941 against the General Electric Company, Friedrich Krupp (the leading German heavy munitions concern), et al; (2) an Anti-Trust Final Decree entered April 10, 1942 against the General Electric Company, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, et al; and (3) an Anti-Trust Complaint filed December 9, 1942 against the General Electric Company, et al. Behind these lies a long history of similar complaints, indictments, and decrees affecting the same companies. They show no narrowing down, to employ the queer and stilted jargon of the courts, of "attempts to monopolize, combinations and conspiracies to monopolize, and contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states and with foreign nations. . . ." The very reverse is true. The General Electric, Westinghouse, and many others, no less than the leading German firms, stand at the center of vast and steadily radiating networks of control, leverage, and influence so complicated and versatile in the methods employed as to exhaust the lexicon required to describe them. If records of these American concerns be compared with those recorded by the German Cartel Court, or the data summarized in leading German corporation and cartel commentaries (e. g. Rudolf Callman, *Kartelrecht* and *Unlautere Wettbewerb*), it will be found that removal of the place identifying nouns and adjectives would make it extremely difficult to tell when the General Electric, Westinghouse, Standard Oil of New Jersey, were being discussed and when Siemens and Halske, A.E.G., Krupp, I.G. Farbenindustrie, or any of a number of others that might be mentioned.

The point is not that the General Electric should be singled out for criticism, for similar economic, business, and political forces in Germany, England, and the United States have encouraged—if not, indeed, from a strictly business point of view made necessary—similar types of growth in the same industrial fields. The C.E.D. concedes that some monopolies may be "good." The lead seems to have been provided here by Thurman

Arnold's famous three criteria—though what could not be combined under one or another of the three it would be difficult to say. Particularly is this true when those who are suspected of violating both the letter and the spirit of the law are allowed to define the boundaries of legitimate action.

A bull in a china shop is "free"—far too "free"—and is apt to be full of "enterprise." But his "free enterprise" deprives all others of freedom and his activities bring ruin in their wake. So likewise with the totalitarian dictator and his self-styled "elite." What does "free enterprise" mean as defined by General Electric?, Westinghouse?, U. S. Steel?, the house of Morgan?, General Motors?, the Standard Oil of New Jersey?, Standard Oil of Ohio?, Standard Oil of Indiana?, Du Pont?, Continental Can?—to cite but a few names associated with policy-forming powers in the inner councils of C.E.D.?

V

The C.E.D., all its officers agree, is realistic. It hopes for another and better postwar world. So do we all. And that the C.E.D. knows too, and knowing asks only that each consider first his own individual interest, and that of the group to which he belongs. Its officers ask no more of themselves, and hence no more of the rest of us. This may seem a grim and savage "realism" to a lot of people, but it has the very great virtue of being forthright and aboveboard. And in the testaments of history the underlying thesis has untold support.

Then suddenly, and without change of pace, the C.E.D. announces that the business men of the country wish to "plan" on behalf of the "common welfare." All men, quite naturally, wish their actions to be socially acceptable, but the justification for this lies in the realm of pathology, not of logic or on the field of action. Under the guidance of business men when they had the most to say about economic, social, and political matters (the Hoover Era) we reached what some people hoped to describe as Elysium only to follow the will-o-the-wisp into the hopeless swamps of the great world depression, and now we are reaping the harvest of wholesale disregard of the "common welfare" which business men believed, no doubt sincerely, they need not concern themselves with since the laws of economics would take care of the rank and file. It does not help to repair matters now, nor augur more for the future, that the

phraseology should be transmuted to fit a situation which denies or is apt to deny to the many an opportunity to participate in the decisions that affect vitally that "common welfare." The pages of history are studded with generous minds and great benefactors of the human race, but there are few lovable "trustees of the common welfare," St. Thomas Aquinas or the C.E.D. to the contrary notwithstanding, and a world that wants to remain truly democratic can well afford to dispense with the reality and the ideology alike of caste society, however modernized and benevolently postured.

What does the C.E.D. propose for labor? Social security, the abandonment of "monopolistic practices" such as "featherbedding," and possibly employer recognition of "collective bargaining." So well so good; but I hope I do not have to remind its officers that all of this is to be found in the program—at times with benefit of somewhat different phraseology—of the N.A.M. during the years of its most bitter attacks on trade unions. The C.E.D. program contains nothing as yet which goes as far as the program of Prince Bismarck announced in his famous speech on "Practical Christianity" on April 2, 1881, when the intention clearly was to destroy the economic and social foundation for the socialist parties. Nor does it at bottom go beyond the famous Papal Encyclicals of Rerum Novarum and Quadregisimo Anno which, rightly or wrongly interpreted, provided the basis for the "clerical Fascism" of Mussolini's religious supporters, the "Corporate State" of the ill-fated Schussnigg, and the theses behind the reasoning of the supporters of General Franco in Spain.

Which does not argue, and should not be taken to imply that the officers of C.E.D. share, of necessity, any such views. But labor has thus far not been asked to share in policy formation on issues that vitally affect its future, and the C.E.D. seems strangely silent on an issue that has rocked the industrial world over the past century from center to circumference. And this for a postwar world in which the United States will have for the first time a politically potent and really large-scale labor movement.

What more does the C.E.D. propose for the farmer, the consumer, little business? Does the presence on its policy-forming committees of food processors, packers, Continental Can and similar groups of people whose organizations have come to dominate "farmer" organizations in

recent years so completely that many of them no longer represent farmers at all—does this promise much to the farmer? What of the consumer, and the rising cost of distribution? What basic changes have we a right to expect from policies formulated in this area by the Advertising Federation of America, the American Association of Advertising Agencies, and similarly allied groups? Elimination of resale price maintenance? Price fixing at the manufacturing, the wholesale, or the retail levels from central headquarters? Lowered residential construction costs? Are consumers and consumer groups to have nothing to say about these matters —matters that affect them where they live and have their being in a thousand and one ways?

So far there is no answer on these points. But for one group it has made an effort to prepare a program, "little business." Real and significant aid is to be given this group. But let us see. The C.E.D. speaks of firms employing less than 500 workers and with capital of $1,000,000 or under. This is a curious concept of "little," even for a Paul Bunyan. The German census, in a country equally sensitive to the indelicate magic of gigantism, lists as "large establishments" (*Grossbetriebe*) all firms employing more than 50 workers; the C.E.D. includes firms up to ten times this figure as "small business." Has C.E.D. any program for really "small" business?

The census data for 1936 showed some 60 per cent of all retailers in the United States doing a gross annual business of $10,000 or under, on which they averaged a net return before paying themselves wages of under $400. This was, of course a depression year, but even at that it was not too far out of line with the facts of "normal times." For manufacturers the situation was not quite so bad, but for personal services it was no better. Consider what is happening to this "enterpreneurial proletariat": they are being pushed from the cash-and-carry into the credit fields, from perishables to durables, from the profitable centers out to the fringes and into the unprofitable interstices, from the fields in which depression risks are low into those in which they are high, from circumstances where windfall gains are their own to circumstances where only windfall losses are brought on the wings of uncertain fortune. In manufacturing and in many fields of distribution, the small are being linked to the large in a relationship which is the equivalent of subcontractor where the large exercises more and more control over the small without

accepting any of the risks the small man incurs in so doing. In many fields, such as parts manufacture, various furniture and clothing lines, and much of retail—e.g. gasoline retail in several sections—the small business man is rapidly becoming a sort of entrepreneurial Charlie McCarthy. He must sell only certain commodities at a certain price at a certain place, advertise in a certain manner, expand no more than so far, provide certain free services, and so ad infinitum.

The C.E.D. has every right, of course, to say that they have not yet had time to get around to these matters, that they are of secondary importance, or that they are not set up to handle them at all. But if any one of these replies is given, then they must reject two points which they have stressed over and over again: (1) that they favor "free enterprise," and (2) that it is their purpose to promote the "common welfare." They must reject these, that is to say, unless they are to permit of two other possible interpretations, neither of them in the least bit complimentary: (1) that business men have suddenly gone Utopian, and that in a fashion to make the "wildest" of the Washington "longhaired boys," upon which defenseless game it has long been "cricket" to practice the modernized weapons of propaganda Blitzkrieg, sound like mere amateurs in Elysium, or (2) that the C.E.D., knowingly or not, is mastering a new type of double-talk.

VI

Or would it be new? Interpretation of motive is always certain to be inaccurate, and it is equally apt to be unfair. But admitting this, the substance of what we find here seems strangely indistinguishable from the content and outlook of the arguments of those who have long been pioneering in methods of presenting the public relations case for giant politically- and propaganda-minded American enterprise. All, or very nearly all—the exception is found in the postwar emphasis—is clearly in line with the swiftly evolving public relations activities of Ivy Lee, Edward L. Bernays, T. J. Ross, Carl Byoir, Bernard Lichtenberg and other experts in opinion making. It is in line with the public relations activities of the N.A.M. under Walter Weisenburger after 1934,[23] the National Machine Tool Builders' Association,[24] the Machinery and Allied Products Institute,[25] and with public relations campaigns conducted on their own by countless financial, manufacturing, and distributing corporations and business pressure groups from the middle '20's on.[26]

Any of us may speak, to be true, in the beautiful archaisms of the King James version without suffering from Job's boils or indulging in Messianic fantasies. And then, there is always the postwar emphasis. In matters such as these, how much difference does that make? Certainly this much, that it offers a positive program instead of a negative one. And well nigh everything is to be said for that in this fear- and despair-wracked world.

Yet the C.E.D.'s hope, to all intents and purposes, sicklies over fear of the quaking depths. What is offered is the antidote for what is feared. And what engenders these dire prophecies of the alternative and more dreadful way if it be not further extension of the New Deal program which proposed to secure a little something to the millions at the base of the social pyramid, and once again to offer them a share in shaping their own precarious destinies? I have no doubt but that the leading figures in C.E.D. are amongst the most progressive who populate the front offices of American big business. Yet if this be true, they have at best placed only a first hesitant foot upon the ladder from the top rung of which they might be able to point toward the Promised Land.

If a bit of advice might be offered this early in the game, they might, if they really mean what they say, gain much by dropping the stilted clichés and stock phrases of the public relations counselor. "Education" that is really education does not trade in the glittering generalities and symbols of high pressure, and it never begins by asserting dogmatically that that is true which is itself in most bitter dispute. And last of all, it does not seek to support its contentions by resort to media which it can command to do its bidding, while denying their use to all others. Such "education" fears its own shadow, and instead of following the muses employs the whiplash of indoctrination And down that road, as we are all learning from the bitter experiences abroad, lies disaster.

And disaster being the thing which the C.E.D. has set itself to head off, I can only hope most fervently that it will move quickly to clarify a situation which is, to put the matter mildly, at the moment quite hopelessly muddled.

REFERENCES

[1]Indirect quote from a speech by Mr. Paul Hoffman delivered before the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York. *New York Times,* May 3, 1943.

[2]*Idem,* direct quote.

[3]*The Chamber of Commerce and the Committee for Economic Development, a Manual of Co-operation,* published by the C.C.U.S., and circulated by C.E.D.

[4]Wire from Mr. William Benton, December 24, 1943.

[5]*Manual of Co-operation. op. cit.*

[6]*Handbook for Employers,* Preliminary Draft, Prepared by the Field Development Division, C.E.D., p. 6.

[7]C.E.D. *News,* October, 1943, Vol. I, No. 7.

[8]*Handbook for Employers, op. cit.,* p. 6.

[9]*Telling the C.E.D. Story, Chairman's Manual,* Speakers Division, C.E.D.

[10]Professor Schultz, running afoul of the "butter interests" of Iowa, who objected to his recommendations on the butter-margarine issue, has since joined the faculty of the University of Chicago.

[11]*Telling the C.E.D. Story, op. cit.* (Italics in the original).

[12]See *Case Studies,* 1, 2, 3, and 4. Also *The Story of Peoria,* Community Progress Report No. 1.

[13]See C.E.D. *News* for November, 1943, p. 9.

[14]*Ibid,* pp. 1, 8.

[15]It would appear on the evidence submitted so far that the increased investment required to produce the increased output anticipated and give employment to the numbers which the C.E.D. says must be employed would result in income disbursements so far out of line with the flow of goods as to begin a new inflationary movement.

[16]Have the business men of the country suddenly "gone soft"? Are "contacts," alliances, "pull," the multifarious tactics summarized in Burns' *The Decline of Competition,* or in the Department of Justice Anti-Trust Indictments, suddenly to be abandoned? And this in a world more organized, more "power" and "propaganda" conscious with every passing hour?

[17]This was tried a half dozen times in N.R.A. days, and always with dismal results. It may be assumed that the C.E.D. is not so naive as to repeat those experiments.

[18]Two members of the Research Staff and two of the Advisory Board in reply to a questionnaire, to which answers were free, full, and very frank.

[19]In a recent address in San Francisco, Raymond Moley heavily underscored the point that, for better or for worse, it must be realized that full employment and the business system are irreconcilable concepts. Business men want a reserve pool. and they will be opposed to whatever measures dry up that reserve, for, once dried up, it takes the initiative in control over their most important cost out of their hands. The reserve referred to here is not "turnover unemployment."

[20]This is close to being a complete *non sequitur.* The logical and historical correlate of such freedom has been periodic depression, and "jobs for all" has been the exception and not the rule.

[21]Other than this there are no strings tied to the research staff! This is not enough if the C.E.D. would get the best there is available—the staff must be allowed to raise issues that relate to the major assumptions, and if their present staff has no questions on that score, the C.E.D. would gain insight, whether pleasant or not, from contact with some *advocati diaboli* which it will surely lose in the absence of such question raising.

[22]*Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting,* 1929, p. 172.

[23]See, in particular, the "You and Industry" series, seven pamphlets prepared under the direction of Mr. Weisenburger in 1936. For his success along these lines Mr. Weisenburger was given the 1941 award of the National Association of Publicity Directors, "for his success in promoting a better understanding of industry by the public and a keener appreciation by industry of its responsibilities." *Newsweek,* February 2, 1942.

[24]A series of pamphlets including such titles as *More Goods for More People* and *Youth and the Machine Age.*

[25]A series of pamphlets including such titles as *Capital Goods and American Progress* and *Machine-Made Jobs.*

[26]For an interesting summary see *Business Finds Its Voice* by S. H. Walker and Paul Sklar, Harpers, 1938.

THE NEGRO CULT OF THE PRIMITIVE

By CHARLES I. GLICKSBERG

THE NEGRO has made a genuine and important contribution to American letters; potentially he is capable of doing even more fruitful work. Everything depends on the direction his energies take, the critical vision he pursues, the creative goals he sets for himself. Theoretically he is confronted with one of two choices: he can write for his people who are bound together by color consciousness and by a community of traditions born of racial suffering and ostracism; or he can transcend the racial theme by writing for the world at large, in his own idiom and of problems peculiar but not limited to his group. The first choice ends in parochialism; the second tends toward the universal. For a number of reasons, Negro writers in the '20's were obsessed with the dream of racial identification. The race motif reigned supreme. Despite the lofty aesthetic theories of critics both colored and white, the hope of a literary renaissance based on racial exclusiveness amounted to no more than this: the accentuation of racial to the neglect of other values. Alliances, cultural and political, with other black peoples throughout the world was the professed aim. The movement thus represented a return to origins, a glance backward toward Africa; whether consciously acknowledged or not, it marked in part a repudiation of American civilization, an extreme swing of the pendulum in the complex process of alienation.

Psychologically and culturally this was an unusually interesting phenomenon. The tragedy of rejection was countered by a gesture of repudiation—which was resolved in the synthesis of a desperate affirmation: fusion with other black folk regardless of cultural, linguistic, and historical differences. The motives behind such a policy of repudiation were strictly similar in their dynamism to the proletariat's renunciation of capitalistic society. It symbolized an outburst of wounded pride, the conversion of losses into profits.

This aesthetic philosophy, however understandable as psychological mechanism of recoil, is utterly indefensible in practice. Just as the nineteenth-century plan of having the Negroes migrate en masse to a land of their own in Africa was utopian and fantastic, so was the present cultural ideal impossible of fulfillment. It was a suicidal reaction. Suicidal because it attempted by a brave flourish of rhetoric to remove the Negro from the social context in which, for better or worse, he found himself. There is no use in quarreling bitterly about the injustice committed in the past. What is required now is understanding, not furious indignation. The Negro is in America to stay; this is his country, his people. This is the axiom that must be raised to the level of a categorical imperative. There must be no dream of escape, no schizophrenic withdrawal. The Negro's background of slavery, the persecution, social and economic, he still suffers in various parts of the United States, the battle he still has to fight for realizing the democratic ideal of equality—these are facts that must be realistically accepted. And so must the fact of his identification with the United States of America. He is as much a part of its vital historical and cultural tradition as any descendant of the Mayflower, and he has as much right to pride of ancestry as any.

To divorce himself from the American past and the challenging present in the interest of a mythical alliance with the black folks throughout the world is as mistaken and regressive an effort as trying to overcome the evils of industrialism by wrecking factories and returning to the simplicity of the medieval guild system of handicrafts. Once this elementary but basic truth is understood, the Negro writer can enter freely upon the task of self-expression. As a citizen of the United States he does not forego his identity as a Negro. He must speak intrepidly for himself, for his character has been grossly distorted by the mediation of white interpreters; he will defeat his own ends if he indulges in the hara-kiri of racial self-consciousness. Negro-Americans must work in co-operation with the main trends of American culture, influencing it, shaping it, but also drawing vital nourishment from it—until such time when there will be no trace of differentiation between Negro culture and American culture. Segregation, cultural or geographical, is out of the question. And so is the romantic glorification of the Negro as exotic, primitive, childlike. He must be accepted as a man, potentially or actually creative, the seed-bearer of culture. He must learn to know himself; his

limitations and his strength, his obligations and his rights, his privileges and his responsibilities.

Some Negro writers went wrong in frantically pursuing the "artificial" cult of the primitive. By doing so they unwittingly lived up to the white man's conception of Negro genius and denied their own native integrity. That hothouse conception bears about as close a resemblance to the original as the Indians of the Wild West show in Coney Island do to the pure-blooded Indians of the past. What the jaded taste of the white intelligentsia craved was excitement, and the excitement was provided in abundance by the pounding rhythm of jungle drums, the fierce tempo of jazz music, the mad glee of tap dancers, the element of sinister magic in the ancestral religion of the Negro. Through the atavistic literature and art of the Negro, might it not be possible to recapture the lost quality of the spontaneous, the instinctive, the primitive? That was the substance of the aesthetic hope.

The Negro cult of primitivism is known psychologically as regression and historically as archaism. Rough contemporary equivalents to it may be found in such disparate but ideologically not unrelated phenomena as agrarianism (the return to a simple handicraft economy and the revival of attachment to the soil), the theory of "pure" race and the myth of Nordic supremacy, the dream of Zionism (the resettlement of the ancestral homeland, the dwelling place of God and the ancient pieties), the intensification of nationalism. In short, every escape from the challenge of reality by means of flight to the past is an example of archaistic regression. In the case of the Negro, it is exaggerated to the point of absurdity. That he should for a time seriously have accepted this doctrine, not only accepted it but acted on it, is proof positive that no doctrine is too fantastic for the credulous mind of man. The dichotomy, black and white, is unfortunate both culturally and socially; it is a man-made and man-enforced division eminently useful for purposes of imposing a caste system upon the arts as well as upon the people.

In all this trafficking with the primitive, there was undoubtedly an element of fascination. Here was the glamorous yet sinister cult of the exotic, which is so appealing to the romantic imagination. Civilized man could once more re-establish contact with the elemental passions. Once more there was a revival of the Rousseauistic dualism between Nature and Civilization, the spontaneous and the mechanical, the pure and the

decadent, the passionate and the sophisticated, the instinctive and the cerebral.

Mixed with the fascination was an unconscious but unmistakable condescension. It was more than condescension; it extended and reinforced the role traditionally played by the Negro, a role alien and invidious, in the white man's society. Here was a foreign but picturesque ingredient in the body of our civilization: an ingredient which was made to stand out conspicuously by emphasizing its strangeness, its uniqueness, its sheer primitivism. The eulogy was but a rationalization. The wild talk about a renaissance of Negro literature and art was but a camouflage on the part of white critics who were going a-slumming exploiting the Negro for their own impressionistic purposes. The cult was synthetic, deliberately manufactured by a few ingenious litterateurs who labored under the sentimental illusion that primitive man is uninhibited and free to indulge all his instincts at will, and that the American Negro was the exemplar of primitive man.

The cult was a sham. The Negro writer who surrendered to it was himself shamming—pretending to emotions that he did not feel, whipping himself into a frenzy of fake primitivism, denying his real nature, his acculturated ego. Ironically enough, the best work in the "primitive" vein was contributed by white "fellow travelers."

The rationalized aesthetic on which the cult of the primitive was based should instantly have made it suspect, but the appetite for novelties was too strong. Besides, it was not a question of logic; it was not even a question of expressing fundamental psychological needs. Since the caste-conditioned stereotype of the Negro made him out to be childlike, carnal, inferior in intelligence, predominantly emotional, he would have to conform to that role. The affirmation of the irrational could take the place of aesthetic insight and understanding. The movement could be justified, made holy and fruitful, by invoking the mysticism of the blood. The tom-tom was brought back to life; the grotesque masks of the Congo became inordinately popular; the obscene, orgiastic dances and eerie tribal cries of the jungle were resurrected in Harlem night clubs. The voices and visions of the limitless unconscious were jubilantly unleashed.

No one stopped to ask: What is there in the blood to give birth to such a monstrous issue? Since when is blood a creative principle? Since when does it harbor within itself a racial memory, atavistic traces, arche-

typal images? These questions were never asked because the cult of the primitive was a regression not only sanctioned by civilization but generated by its inherent conflicts: the tempo of industrialism, the strain of mechanical toil, the hysterical urge to break the domination of the machine and escape the shackles of reason. The Negro thus became the Savior—the Black Christ: childlike, simple, naive, creature of unspoiled appetites and instincts, the orginal and authentic primitive.

Take the case of the Negro spirituals, the pure poetry of the race. In 1934, Paul Robeson declared: "The white man has made a fetich of intellect and worships the God of thought; the Negro feels rather than thinks, experiences emotions directly rather than interprets them by roundabout and devious abstractions, and apprehends the outside world by means of intuitive perception instead of through a carefully built up system of logical analysis." One wonders what empirical grounds support the thesis that the white man suffers from excessive cerebration, the curse of intellectualism, while the Negro is alive with feeling. This is a dangerous as well as fallacious generalization. For even if the Negro experiences emotions directly and deeply, he is not cut off from the complex and vital influences of Western culture. To persist in this neoprimitive strain in the face of all the mounting evidence to the contrary is to brand more indelibly the stigma of anti-intellectuality into the flesh of the colored race. For the Negroes who have for good or evil settled in America will have to adjust themselves to and make the most of that civilization. They must build upon the foundations provided and utilize the cultural material that lies ready to hand. They must share in the enlightenment of the West without falling into the fatal mistake of damning Western culture as decadent and turning their backs upon it. In the last analysis, they must choose between Africa and America, and they really have no alternative. They must beat the white man at his own game. Let them beware of looking askance at the conquest of culture as if knowledge meant ruin, expulsion from the primitive Garden of Eden, and the critical use of intelligence implied the destruction of their racial individuality. Let them seek the light. They must eschew the primitive road of escape.

Racial ancestry is important, but it is not so important as some critics imagine. When one speaks of Negro culture and art in the United States, one is thereby automatically excluding primitive Negro art,

African art. The two may have some points of similarity, but these are adventitious, not fundamental. To speak, as does Benjamin Brawley in *The Negro in Literature and Art in the United States,* of "something very elemental about the heart of the race, something that finds its origin in the African forest," not only misses the point completely. It is a bit of anthropological nonsense: the rhapsodic but spurious theorizing which judges the Negro in advance as weird, mysterious, the incarnation of primitive black magic.

Culture divorced from its social setting is an artificial, abstract construction. Both psychologically and sociologically it must be studied within the environmental context, in vital relation to all the forces that shape it in a given direction. After more than three centuries of assimilation in the United States, the American Negro is culturally distinct from the Negro who remains in his native African habitat. As a writer he uses the language that Shakespeare spoke and Milton wrote, the language of Abraham Lincoln and Walt Whitman. He has absorbed the culture of this land as faithfully as the English colonists who settled this country.

In rejecting the cult of the primitive, the Negro writer is not repudiating his heritage. One can repudiate only that which he once possessed. The American Negro writer was never a part of it. To argue that he must return to his primitive racial past for material and inspiration is as absurd an argument as to maintain that writers born of hyphenated German ancestors must revive the worship of Wotan. There is, of course, nothing to prevent a poet or novelist from drawing upon the past for his creative substance, though the past, except for the antiquary, is important only insofar as it illuminates and interprets the crucial problems of the present. Thomas Mann went back to the Old Testament for the Joseph story; Feuchtwanger has written memorable historic fiction. Both Shakespeare and Goethe levied tribute upon the folklore of their land and people. But to demand that the Negro writer should regress to a past utterly foreign to the life he has known simply because the atavistic impulse is strong within him or because the genius of the race is mystically potent in his blood, is to make him the victim of a myth. A myth originated and propagated by white writers and naively taken over by the Negroes because it seemed to give them a monopoly on an art that would be peculiarly their own. Unconsciously

they were adopting a religion of art that had been prepared for them by the whites. Here, under the guise of a new system of aesthetics, we have trumpeted forth a muddled mysticism of race, a philosophy of the blood that abhors science. As long as the Negro subscribes to it, he is being culturally disenfranchised and cast out of the republic of letters. He is caste-ridden in literature as well as social life, only this time the exclusion is justified on the ground of his racial affiliation with the primitive.

The first World War, in which hundreds of thousands of Negroes served, ushered in with its close, a new era of humanitarian protest. The Negro was not only a man but he was as good as the white man if not better, and he would prove it not by catering to the white man's depraved interest in the neoprimitivism of Harlem but by creating his own literature, his own art. He would put an end to his state of servitude; he would fight back and win his economic and cultural freedom. Unfortunately few Negro writers attempted a realistic presentation of the material growing out of this attitude. Objectivity, realism, detachment—this is what Negro literature stood sadly in need of, but there were few clear-eyed and gifted workers in the field. Then appeared *Uncle Tom's Children,* by Richard Wright, a work which is important both as promise and achievement. Starkly realistic in method, it represents a triumph of art: the writer beholds objects, personalities, and events in proper perspective, without subjective distortion or sentimentality. "Long Black Song" is a tragic story expressing the suicidal hatred of a good, hard-working Negro who believes that the white man's law is the black man's undoing. After he has killed a white man he cries out brokenly: "Gawd, Ah wish all them white folks were dead!" The story that approaches nearest the propagandist technique is "Fire and Cloud," which preaches the message that the colored people must stand united; alone they are helpless.

Richard Wright performed an even more difficult feat in *Native Son,* when he made Bigger Thomas a sympathetic character, transforming him into a symbol of the colored race, discriminated against and brutally oppressed. Intrinsically the novel is not an indictment of Bigger Thomas the murderer but of the white society which so conditioned him, the ruling class which segregated him in the slums of the dark belt, denied him opportunities for growth, cast him out from the body social as a thing unclean. This is the cry the novelist keeps dinning in our ears;

this is the rationalization Bigger Thomas himself arrives at in his cell. Bigger contended he had not intended to harm anyone; he struck out vengefully because he had to fight a whole world of enemies. At the end he cries out: "But what I killed for, *I am.*"

Richard Wright's fiction is important because it signalizes the awakening of a revolutionary consciousness neutralizing the glorification of the Negro as primitive and barbaric. The Negro writer cannot gain his freedom as long as he is still enslaved by his racial complex, a haunting sense, forced upon him by society, that he is not only different but inferior. Under such conditions his mind cannot achieve the creative autonomy which would enable it to observe and enjoy the world with the careless, joyous rapture of Browning's thrush. The racial problem, the subordinate status of his people in a white-dominated culture, the rankling injustice of a life which is not of his making: this is the pole and pivot of his problem as an artist. Not until he solves it, not vicariously and alone in terms of art but actually in terms of communal living will his emancipation as a writer begin. Not until then will he realize the equality and achieve the spontaneity which are basic to the development of a wholesome, integrated literature—a literature no longer invidiously or proudly labeled Negro but autochthonous in its roots and universal in its outlook. For in the final analysis a free art is produced by free men, men whose dignity is respected and who respect themselves, men whose human worth and creative contribution are given full recognition. When this happens, the angry note of alienation will become a thing of the past: the memory of an ignoble and incredible nightmare of persecution.

Finally, if the Negroes are to create a literature distinctively their own, they must not be led astray by the false lure of the primitive. Every art, it is true, has its cultural antecedents. But the past of the Negro—the vibrantly memoried, functional past—does not go back to the African jungle, or if it does, then the white man too is a descendant ultimately of the primeval forest. No, the past of the American Negro is identical in the shaping quality of experience, language, and tradition, with that of America. It covers the period of colonization and pioneering, the dark age of slavery, the struggle for freedom with its bloody climax in the Civil War, the tragic post-bellum years, the twentieth century with its subtle but none the less painful racial discrimination. The Negro truly

belongs to America, just as America belongs to the Negro. His fate, both as writer and citizen, is bound up with assimilation, not with alienation; with digging deeper roots in the soil of his land, not in escaping to a paradise of the primitive.

He must write honestly of his own experiences. Hence he will report the pain he has suffered, the humiliations he has undergone, the irreparable damage to his dignity as a man. Alain Locke, writing in *The New Negro,* is correct in saying that up to the present the Negro's "inner objective" represented an "attempt to repair a damaged group psychology and reshape a warped social perspective." The new Negro writer will dwell broodingly on the theme of racial persecution, the iniquitous caste system, but in time, as these conditions are remedied, he will overcome his racial obsession. (The Negro problem is basically the white man's problem. The fear of Negro uprisings, of Negro domination and terrorism in the South, the myth of the Negro running sexually amuck—all this testifies to the paranoiac streak of the ruling class, especially in the South. This white man's civilization is neurotic, diseased. The struggle of the Negro for true freedom and social equality thus marks an effort to bring back wholeness and health to this society. The assertion that the Negro is uncivilized, a primitive at heart, is further confirmation of this paranoiac streak.) When the Negro writer comes into his own, he will transcend the racial complex by a preoccupation with the more normal and recurrent patterns of human experience on the plane of universality. In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the implications of this problem extend beyond the Negro; it is part of a general retreat, a regression to the lawless primitive, a revival of the cult of the daemonic and the Dionysiac, and its manifestations are to be found in the sphere of politics as well as that of art.

THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR MOVEMENT

By C. HARTLEY GRATTAN

AUSTRALIA has long had a world-wide reputation as a "labor country," and not without reason. Today its trade-union membership is over a million out of a total population of a little more than seven million. Its political labor party is solidly in office in the Commonwealth and also in four of the six states. In the other two states it is the Official Opposition. The Labor Party's victory in the recent Commonwealth general election was the most spectacular in its history. The war period has seen organizational triumphs for the unions which, in spite of voluntary relaxations of rules to assist the war effort, have brought them to an unprecedented peak of power. This remarkable situation has arisen chiefly during the war, for in 1939 labor was not in anything like as favorable a position, though a political trend toward the party was beginning even then to show itself. The current developments stand in striking contrast to what happened to labor during the First World War when it lost office in 1916 and entered upon a period of internal dissension, in both its main branches, which continued long enough to make it relatively impotent during the Great Depression over a decade later, even though it won office in 1929. However, adversity was not unprecedented in labor history, nor dissension either, and the fundamental toughness of the movement gave it the powers of survival and revival which account for its success today.

The Australian trade-union movement is conventionally dated from 1850 and the political labor movement from 1890. Both have had ups and downs of a startlingly dramatic character. Periodically the movement has thrown up leaders of extraordinary ability but, as Dr. Lloyd Ross has noted, no permanent heroes. Great leaders have changed sides, going over to the conservatives either in mid-career or late in life. To the laborites this movement to the right is "ratting," and famous examples of it are the careers of William Lane, William Morris Hughes,

and W. A. Holman. Australian labor history,[1] therefore, is not so much a matter of great leaders who have devoted their lives to the cause—though many honest and talented men have done just that—as a matter of the constancy of the numerous rank-and-file members who have stuck to the cause through thick and thin. In fact the solidarity of the masses of the trade unionists and Labor Party supporters is really a more important factor in explaining the durability of the movement than its leaders, great and small.

A good biography of any Australian labor leader[2] is necessarily in large part the story of the movement in his time. If the great leaders have acted on the mass following, as all leaders of human enterprises do, the mass following has in no instance failed to act on the leaders.

The structure of the Labor Party provides for this intimate relation. There is a tight organizational control over the leadership, for all labor parliamentarians take a pledge to abide by the decisions of caucus on matters of party policy and caucus is controlled by the party's annual conference. The leaders are therefore what they are in considerable measure because they are never, even at the peaks of their careers, really "bigger than" the movement. Those who have imagined they were, have eventually been "broken" and often expelled from the movement. When they have abandoned labor, or been abandoned by it,

[1]There is no full-dress history of Australian trade unionism, or of labor-in-politics, nor any collection of labor documents. However, all students must consult two brief books, *A History of Trade Unionism in Australia* by J. T. Sutcliffe (Sydney, 1921) and *A Short History of the Australian Labor Movement* by Brian Fitzpatrick (Melbourne, 1940). As a general background book I suggest my own *Introducing Australia* (New York, 1942), especially since it elaborates some of the points made in this article. Brian Fitzpatrick has written an invaluable economic history of Australia, with constant attention to labor: *British Imperialism and Australia, 1783-1833* (London, 1939) and *The British Empire in Australia, 1834-1939* (Melbourne, 1941).

[2]Biographies of Australian labor leaders are exceedingly uncommon. To date the most important biography of a leader is *Australian Labour Leader: The Story of W. A. Holman and the Labour Movement* by Herbert Vere Evatt (Sydney, 1940). This book should be read by every student of Australian labor. Dr. Lloyd Ross's biography, *William Lane and the Australian Labour Movement* (Sydney, 1938), is also a "must" book. Lane is, in spite of his eventual translation into a conservative journalist, as near to a hero as anyone in labor history. He it was who launched labor's "socialism."

they have sometimes, but not always, made distinguished careers as conservatives, but the movement has also gone strongly forward.

The composition of the loyal body of Labor followers is not easy to specify. The relationship between the trade unions and the Labor Party is close but the two are not entirely identical. Nevertheless the bulk of the thick-and-thin supporters of political Labor are unquestionably trade unionists. But the party also has loyal supporters who are not members of unions. This is especially true of its middle-class supporters. Nor is the leadership of the party exclusively of trade-union origin. Mr. Curtin, the present Prime Minister, to be sure, is an old trade-union journalist, but Dr. Evatt, the Minister of External Affairs, was in the early days of his career a labor lawyer, and later a distinguished member of the High Court. It was from that post that he resigned to enter politics in 1940. Above all it cannot be shown that the trade unions dictate the policy of the party in all particulars on all occasions, though that allegation is often made and though the unions often appear to aspire to such a dictatorial relation. Naturally Labor cannot long hold office if it systematically affronts the unions. It must expect constant pressure from them and when it comes from the leftist unions, pressure for policies of a character more radical than the party can be expected always to accept. After all, the political laborites can only win office when they can appeal to the "floating voters" who, more often than not, are not unionists and would be alienated by a government standing for the more radical ideas of the union leftists, or the narrow particularist views of any union. Thus it happens that while both the unions and the party have right and left wings, the left wing of the unions is always farther to the left than the left wing of the party. Because of the role of the "floating voters" in determining Labor Party policies, the party has always shown a distinct leaning toward middle-class liberalism, and this has been a source of its political strength.

* * *

Although trade-union history is usually dated from the formation of the Operative Masons' Society in Melbourne on November 16, 1850, there were small unions in Australia before that date, and strikes for better wages and conditions occurred. But in the decades between 1788, when the first Australian settlement was planted, and 1850, conditions

were highly unfavorable to organized working-class activities. Not only were the laws of England, which operated also in the colonies, of a repressive character, but the structure of Australian society was such that the free workers were hardly in a favorable position to challenge their employers. For the conditions of work and wages were determined by the existence of a large convict labor force. Convicts were "assigned" by the government to private employers of all kinds from the great pastoralists, who were the dominant group in the economy, to printers, and paid little above maintenance. The methods required to control a convict labor force, and the low cost of convict labor, both reacted very unfavorably on the situation of the free workers who, in any case, were not especially numerous in the early years. Not until "transportation," as the system of sentencing British convicts to exile in Australia was called, was abolished, beginning in the 1840's, did it become possible for the free workers to make much headway, and organized activity came slowly even then.

If 1850 is the watershed between the period when convict labor dominated and the rise of free labor trade-unions, it is nevertheless a fact that for two decades thereafter little solid organizational progress was made, although a remarkable campaign for an eight-hour day won some notable victories. For one thing the great Australian gold rushes intervened and while their influence on labor was very great, they did not encourage unionization. They covered, roughly, the decade from 1850 to 1860.[3]

The rushes multiplied the total population, helped bury the convict past in eastern Australia under a vast increase of the free population, raised wages far above pre-rush levels, and generally transformed the position of the working class. When alluvial gold petered out Australia found itself with a vast, restless working population consisting largely

[3]See Fitzpatrick's second volume. During the rushes an event occurred which has immense symbolic significance to Australian labor. Miners on the Ballarat field rebelled against the arbitrary actions of the authorities and presented general political demands as well as demands for redress of immediate grievances. This is known as the Eureka Stockade rebellion. See, for a conservative view, *Our Own Little Rebellion: The Story of the Eureka Stockade* by Henry Gyles Turner (Melbourne, 1913) and for a labor view, R. S. Ross's *Eureka! Freedom's Fight of '54* (Melbourne, 1914).

of disappointed miners. These men were in a difficult situation. They were adventurous, hardly prepared to accept the pre-gold rush position of labor, and yet employment of any kind was not at first easy to come by. They were, to an extent difficult to define, influenced by the ideas of the English Chartists—this had emerged at Eureka—and the struggling English trade unionists.

As the situation worked itself out, the employment problem was eased by political action to "unlock the land," held by the great pastoralists, for farming operations, the development of deep gold mines, the opening of base-metal mines, and the expansion of local manufacturing either under the "natural" protection of distance from the source of supply or, in the colony of Victoria only, behind a tariff. But if the men found work they did not find wages and conditions to their liking and it was to unionization that they turned to correct them. During the 1870's and 1880's there was a remarkable outburst of union building. Luckily the country was in a period of prosperity and the employers could meeet union demands without seriously hurting their profits. This is the time when the real foundations of Australian trade unionism were laid. The unions got a strong foothold in mining, the pastoral industry, and waterside and water-transport occupations.

That the unions should conquer the first and last groups of occupations is not surprising and that these unions should have a history of militancy which extends unbroken to the present day is also not surprising. But that the Australian unionists should in the early days have succeeded in organizing the pastoral industry requires comment. The pastoral industry is Australia's characteristic frontier industry, both historically and today. But it allows only a "big man's" frontier. The usual sheep (or cattle) station is either owner-operated, or in the hands of a company with an employed manager. Below the manager or owner the employees are divisible into two groups: the permanent hands, and the seasonal workers, the latter chiefly shearers and their associates (like wool classers) and helpers. It was these two groups that were unionized, and the approach was made through the shearers. In the early days many of the shearers were struggling small farmers and it was possible to unionize them while they were at home, before they scattered for shearing over the vast "out-back" pastoral area. Moreover, the shearers and their associates traveled in working gangs which had a natural solidarity

and formed a stable unit for presenting and policing the union contract. Even though the farmers would, as they became more firmly established, develop a psychology unsympathetic to labor, at that time they were, vis-à-vis the station owners, workingmen and therefore readily accepted labor's outlook. When labor went into politics, they voted the labor ticket.

As remarked, the labor unions rose on a tide of economic prosperity. When the prosperity declined, as it did beginning around 1890, the unions entered upon difficult days. From conciliation and accommodation the employers turned to violent opposition. Singly and in association they took up the slogan "freedom of contract" in opposition to the workers' principle of unionism. Out of the contention great strikes developed in the mining, pastoral, and waterside industries. As often as not they were precipitated over wage issues or the conditions of work, but behind every one was, it is clearly evident from the record, a straight-out struggle for survival between unions and employers. In the short run the unions lost. The strikes, widespread and violent, went against them, especially when the employers were supported by the colonial governments. But from the disaster the workers drew two important conclusions: (1) that to succeed they must go into politics and at least win concessions from the dominant conservative parties and at most themselves take over the task of governing; and (2) that direct action alone could not support the workers' cause, so perhaps in addition the intervention of the state in economic affairs might be the desirable solution. These conclusions dominate Australian labor history since the 1890's.

* * *

When labor went into politics Australia was still divided into six independent colonies. The federal Commonwealth was not instituted until 1901. The history of labor-in-politics is, in its beginnings, a complex matter of establishing labor parties in each of the colonies and as in every colony conditions were different, so the party history is also different. Here the differences will be ignored and an attempt made to concentrate on essentials. For when, after a decade, a federal Labor Party was formed to deal with the political situation federation created, the basic character of the party had been pretty much determined by the colonial experience. After 1901, of course, the old colonial parties

became the state parties of today. Thus political labor has a tradition which antedates federation. It is, moreover, the only political party in Australia which has such a lengthy tradition, the only one which has survived the chances and changes of the last five decades. The conservatives have formed, reformed, and renamed their parties with extraordinary frequency during that time in order to face the electorate with some prospect of success, shuffling off a disadvantageous past the better to face the future. Labor, for its part, has accepted the burdens along with the benefits of its past and continued to do business under a single name.

On entering politics labor's fundamental strength was presumed to be the solidarity of the union membership which had survived the strikes. But that irreducible minimum was insufficient for political success and at the very beginning an effort to gain middle-class support was made. The Australian middle class was not happy in the 1890's. It was alarmed by the violence of the social struggle, and while it was hardly prolabor in the ultimate sense, it had as little liking as labor for anything savoring of employer tyranny. Moreover political reform was overdue. The bulk of the middle class, almost equally with the working class, was without power in politics. If labor could evolve a political platform correctly compounded of reforms desirable to the middle class (and itself) and economic reforms desirable to itself (and the middle class), it would have a sure-fire political appeal. It was assisted in making this effort by the fact that then as now it lacked an ideology of Byzantine rigidity. Ostensibly it was, and has remained, vaguely socialist in outlook. But Australian socialism is not Marxist, though there are Marxists in the labor movement. Many writers have contributed to the unique amalgam which is Australian "socialism": the reformist fiction writers of Victorian times like Dickens and Kingsley, literary socialists like William Morris, dogmatic social moralists like Carlyle and Ruskin, popular agitators like Robert Blatchford, utopians like Edward Bellamy, and the great land reformer Henry George, not to mention Marx himself, the English Fabian writers, and later radical theorists like those of the American I.W.W. (which had quite a run in Australia before the First World War) and the followers of Soviet Communism in recent years. Out of such a range of influences, from literary humanitarianism to logic-chopping leftist sectarianism, it has never proved difficult at any time for

Australian labor to work out political platforms appealing to more than trade unionists.

The effort of the '90's has been succeeded by numerous equally astute efforts since. Particularly has this been possible by segregating the ultimate objective of "socialism" as a far-distant guiding star, while conducting political campaigns on the basis of less disturbing immediate objectives, embodied in a "fighting platform." Only a minority of Australians seem to get very excited about the socialist objective of labor. Any argumentation over the matter arises chiefly from the allegations of the right at a time when it needs a bogy to stir antilabor prejudices, and from the left which dislikes the vague position of the doctrine in the political affairs of the movement.[4] Most of the time Australian labor-in-politics appears to be accepted for what it is and has been; at times a left-liberal party (usually more liberal than left), at other times a mottled ideological something that defies precise definition.

Nationalism has played a vital role in Labor's political history. Many conspicuous laborites have been as much nationalists as "socialists." In its Labor expression, nationalism has meant many things, some admirable, some dubious. In 1905 this became item number one of the party's objective: "The cultivation of an Australian sentiment based upon the maintenance of racial purity, and the development in Australia of an enlightened and self-reliant community." Other than the reference to "racial purity," this is an unexceptional statement even today.

The words "racial purity" refer to the "White Australia" policy, which Labor has always supported, or the policy of denying the right to settle in Australia to black, brown, and yellow peoples, an objective now accomplished by a language test administered to intending immigrants and occasionally extended to exclude political "undesirables" as well. The policy is no worse than our own immigration policy (and no better) and today it is as likely to be modified as ours in the direction of liberality. It is, in fact, a defensible policy, though a red rag to those who inter-

[4]There are many illustrations of these points, but two books stand out as well epitomizing the whole situation. In spite of its age I think Senator A. St. Ledger's *Australian Socialism* (London, 1909) just about sums up the conservative objection, while E. H. Lane's *Dawn to Dusk: Reminiscences of a Rebel* (Brisbane, 1939) similarly sums up the point of view of the intransigent leftists, usually called "the red raggers."

pret racial equality as including unrestricted rights of immigration anywhere in the world. It can be rigidly or flexibly administered. In the past rigidity has been characteristic; in the future flexibility is likely.

The objective has also meant a concern for the development of a distinctively Australian culture in literature, painting, and ideas, a concern less active in recent years than the more intelligent laborites would like. It has meant—though Labor has hardly been consistent on this point—the cultivation of a Commonwealth-wide point of view, as opposed to state parochialism. It has meant an unusual concern, for a labor party, with military and defense problems. Australian laborites played a large role in bringing in compulsory military training before World War I, in establishing the Australian Navy, and in planning a local, as distinguished from an Imperial, defense program. It has meant economic nationalism, especially between wars. It has meant a greater concern for the full realization of Australia's prerogatives as an autonomous dominion than is characteristic of the conservatives, though not as keen an interest as has been shown in Canada and South Africa.

But it has never, except for limited groups, meant isolationism as Americans understand the word. With a few eccentric exceptions, no sizable labor group has ever sought to contract out of the international obligations Australia's association with the British Commonwealth has implied, though Labor has on occasion interpreted the obligations in ways true-blue conservatives have found distasteful. The party as a whole has never been truly isolationist, and the accusation that it has is simply a denigrative catchcry of its opponents. Australia was an original member of the League of Nations. Today Labor is evolving a general world policy which will harmonize with the recently increased international stature of the country. The Federal Labor Conference of December 14, 1943 declared by resolution "that Australia should collaborate with other peace-loving nations in accordance with the provisions of the Atlantic Charter to establish a peace which will confer on all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all may live their lives in freedom from fear and want"; and that "participation in further development of co-operation between members of the British Commonwealth, the nations of the world at large, and the Pacific nations in particular should be subject to the

sovereign control of the policy of Australia by its own people, parliament, and government."

Labor Party "socialism" began its political history in 1891. By 1905 it had risen to second place in importance in the party platform and was phrased: "The securing of the full results of their industry to all producers by the collective ownership of monopolies and the extension of the industrial and economic functions of the State and Municipality." In 1921, on an upsurge of postwar radicalism, it became even more clearly socialistic. It will be interesting to see how it emerges from the rewriting of the party platform which will shortly be undertaken to deal with problems arising from the present war.

In practice Labor Party socialism has meant a strong emphasis on the establishment and elaboration of the social services and ventures in state ownership. The practice of having the state own and operate public utilities antedates the rise of labor to political power, and this fact predisposed the public to accepted extensions of it quite apart from Labor's advocacy of the policy. The Australian railways were, with unimportant exceptions, state enterprises practically from their beginnings. The telegraph, telephone, and radio technical facilities were almost automatically associated with the Post Office. There is nothing revolutionary in this, and no true move toward socialism. What then has the Labor Party reckoned as victories? A valuable source of information about the early history of both the trade unions and the Labor Party is William Guthrie Spence's *Australia's Awakening* (Sydney, 1909). Chapter XXVIII is entitled "Socialistic Enterprises." Spence begins with a reference to the railways and telegraph, and then goes on to emphasize other "socialist" enterprises: tramways in the towns and cities, the Sydney Harbor Trust, the Metropolitan (Sydney) Water and Sewerage Trust, the Hunter District Water Supply and Sewerage Trust, the workshops for the manufacture and repair of railway rolling stock, state-owned freezing works to handle farm produce, cold-storage plants and killing yards, a pipe foundry, state agricultural colleges and experimental farms, state coal mines (tied to coal-consuming state enterprises like the railways), and electricity supply (not universally state-owned in Australia even today). In these things, and others closely allied, Spence saw the beginning of the socialist millenium. This shows clearly that Australia's socialism was in its genesis, insofar as it was not utopian as with William

Lane, the quintessence of Fabian gradualism or "gas and water socialism." It moved confusedly among the public services, some of which not even the Americans have ever turned over to private enterprise.

Subsequent developments followed similarly haphazard lines. All kinds of enterprises have been started from retail butcher shops to brick works, woolen and timber mills, and overseas shipping lines. But no plan has yet emerged. A notable proof of the lack of any plan is the story of the establishment of the modern steel industry in Australia, the basic importance of which in an industrial economy is not subject to dispute. Yet when private enterprise proposed to enter steel production in a big way just before World War I, it was assisted by the Labor Government of New South Wales, in spite of the fact that the state party platform had a plank favoring a state steel industry. This was a major error of judgment from the socialist standpoint.

Time has also revealed something of equal importance as the lack of a plan and a will to follow it. That is that state enterprises, once established, need not be continued. Either they can fail and be liquidated by Labor itself, as has happened, or a non-Labor government, hostile to the program, can liquidate them on general principles as inimical to private enterprise. This too has happened. The result is that Labor's socialization program has not been cumulative in its effects. At the outbreak of World War II private capitalism was far stronger in Australia than it was when Labor's belief in gradualism was greatest, or about 1910. In 1939 state enterprise was confined, except for a few odd deviations here and there, to the public services. But the seed of "socialism" remains and it might put forth vigorous shoots if circumstances should favor, as they may in the postwar period.[5]

[5]On February 19, 1944 it was announced that a recommendation that the federal government be asked to carry out immediately the Labor Party's program for the socialization of industry, starting with the coal mines, would be discussed at a conference of the Australian Council of Trade Unions opening at Canberra on February 28. This at least shows that the idea is still alive. But Prime Minister Curtin recently stated that the government had not yet fixed a policy on the disposition of the government-owned plants built in connection with the industrial war effort; and on February 23, discussing proposed Constitutional amendments, R. G. Menzies, leader of the opposition, declared that no general clause should be included which would allow the government to engage freely in industrial and commercial enterprises. Each one should, he asserted, be specifically authorized.

Another odd lapse in Labor strategy, somewhat different in character though ultimately related, occurred a little earlier, in 1907-08, when Labor accepted an idea called the "New Protection" from Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, a liberal-conservative who was one of the fathers of the Commonwealth and a distinguished political leader for many years. Free trade versus protection was a keenly debated, highly divisive issue in Australian politics before federation. The colony of Victoria was the center of protectionist sentiment, while New South Wales was the center of free-trade ideas. The coming of the Commonwealth made it politically obligatory to settle the argument. Labor had entered politics "fiscally agnostic"—neither protection nor free trade was an item of party orthodoxy. What happened in 1907 was that Deakin, a protectionist, astutely offered Labor a stake in the tariff system, by offering jobs at good wages guaranteed by the state in return for support of the tariff system. The offer was accepted. In 1908 the Australian Commonwealth became protectionist, as it has been ever since.

Oddly enough Deakin's method of delivering the reward to labor was eventually declared unconstitutional. But Labor stuck to its bargain. If anything, it has been more firmly wedded to the tariff—and to a high tariff—than its opponents. It remains protectionist because it identifies the tariff as a mechanism for creating jobs. And even though Deakin's specific scheme was destroyed, the arbitration courts were an acceptable alternative. The fetish of jobs has, however, prevented Labor from dealing forthrightly with the question of high costs in protected industry and, more importantly, with the undoubted fact that the tariff has helped create an owning class, dedicated to private enterprise, which is on all issues save the tariff usually against Labor. This is the nub of the problem as far as Labor socialism is concerned. But I nevertheless conclude that it was better for Labor to get something concrete for accepting the protectionist system than to let the country go protectionist, as it probably would have sooner or later, without such an understanding. Nevertheless the trade landed Labor in a paradoxical situation.

Of course this would open up endless debate as each proposal was laid before parliament; and it shows that the conservative opposition to Labor will fight socialization tooth and nail. Mr. Menzies has recently made speeches in favor of free enterprise reminscent in tone and content of those by the more liberal American businessmen.

Equally paradoxical are Labor's relations with the farmers. Labor played an important role in getting the Australian farmers on their feet and was, for a time, supported by them in return. But as the farmers gained strength they turned from Labor and, especially between wars, were a constant headache to it. The small Country Party, which asserted the right to speak for the farmers, was if anything more antilabor than the other conservative party to which it was constantly allied in holding office. To gain any support from the farmers Labor had to outbid its opponents with favors, not an easy thing to do. And in doing so, Labor confesses that it has no truly original farm policy, but can only administer more generously a policy which, in essence, it holds in common with its opponents. Moreover, as experience in all countries shows, the hard-boiled farmers cannot be permanently appeased. Sooner or later they will go over to the other side.

The situation across the Tasman Sea in New Zealand beautifully illustrates this. There Labor has given the farmers as fair a deal as any government on record, according to conventional notions (which personally I do not accept). And yet today the chief political menace to Labor is precisely those same farmers. What they want, frankly, is to administer the New Zealand schemes for farm stabilization themselves in their own self-defined interest—to turn the schemes into statutory rackets for the benefit of the owner-producers—a "solution" of the farm problem which no political party concerned with the general welfare can possibly accept. The "farm problem" (better called the "farmer problem") is as far from solution in New Zealand and Australia as elsewhere.

The social services are a different matter, but here too, Australian Labor has not succeeded in going as far as was hoped in the first flush of its optimism. The war situation has, however, definitely encouraged the elaboration of the services. It is almost certain that Australia is going to have, in the postwar period, a system of social services as comprehensive as that of any nation in the world, including New Zealand. But social services have long since won general acceptance in Australia and Labor's task is not so much to establish the principle as to see to it that the system is comprehensive and the benefits liberal. Traditionally it has favored noncontributory services, paid for out of the general revenue, with the opposition favoring insurance schemes. Probably the finished

structure will be, in its original form at least, a combination of the two, with greater emphasis on noncontributory features than is characteristic in other countries, including the United States.

After five decades of hard work Australian Labor seems, therefore, on the verge of realizing its program for the social services, but as far as ever, barring a cataclysm, from anything resembling the socialism of the handbooks. What it has achieved is best described, I think, as a social democratic state. Has the Australian Labor Party been a success? In spite of all the occasions for irony, I think it has. If it were possible to keep books on an organization as complex as a political party, I think the balance sheet would show the Australian Labor Party is as solvent as any political party in the world today.

With all the vagaries of its program, and the even more astonishing vagaries of its practice, it has at least tried to win justice for the wayfaring man and, within the socio-political framework of Australia, has done so in remarkable measure. It has struggled with every handicap to which political parties are heir. It has been burdened with careerists, turncoats, hypocrites, outright scoundrels, stuffy functionaries devoid of sense and imagination, bellowing enemies of critical intelligence, irritatingly self-righteous clowns bent on enforcing suburban points of view, pussyfooters, demagogues, stooges for hostile outside groups and interests, aged and decayed hacks, and ordinary blatherskites. Every party falls heir to these. But it has outlived them all and still stands for something: it stands for a social democratic Australia. Today as yesterday it is easy to criticize Australian Labor, easy to show that party policies are not always in harmony with its logical objectives, easy to criticize its representatives in parliament and outside, but given the conditions of Australian society, it is an infinitely better party than Australians of limited experience with politics in other countries are prepared to admit.

How has it accomplished its aims? When the Labor Party members first appeared in the Lower House in New South Wales, one of them—George Black—declared: "We have not come into this House to make and unmake Ministries. We have come into this House to make and unmake social conditions. Nor have we come here for the purpose of vengeance. . . . . We want legislation; we do not want mud-throwing." It wanted laws and was prepared to trade votes with either regnant conservative party to get them. Nevertheless it soon forced the conservatives

to close ranks and present a united front to Labor. From a group trading votes for laws, Labor was transformed into the Official Opposition. And from being the Official Opposition it inevitably moved to the government benches. Labor has won its victories through pressure, through being the inevitable successor party to a conservative Ministry which rejected Labor proposals commanding wide popular support, and through forming Labor Ministries. This account short-circuits a good deal of extremely interesting political history, colonial, state, and national. But it conveys the essential progression.

There is no magic element in the story. It conceals no secret formula which American laborites could use in forming a viable party of their own. It is, rather, a story in which hard work and political astuteness played determining roles. But it is not a story of continuous success. Labor has risen to office and fallen from it to a very low estate indeed. It is incorrect to imagine that Labor in Australia has been uniformly successful, as we have seen. In some states its office-holding record is very good, in others poor. In the Commonwealth its record has been ragged, with only two really strong ministries out of seven, those of Andrew Fisher (1910-13), and John Curtin (1941-).

But in office or out, Labor has furnished the base-line from which *all parties* have had to calculate their courses. Its aims and wishes, its current condition—whether unified or rent by faction fights—its voting strength, actual or potential, have decided in large measure what the conservatives were able to do. They have long since ceased to be able to ignore Labor and win and hold office. Because it has achieved such a central position in Australian politics, it is possible to describe Australia as politically a labor country, and Labor as a political success.

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When Labor turned to politics in the '90's it did not abandon trade unionism. Rather it sought ways and means of rebuilding the unions on firmer foundations than ever. This effort was favored by the strong feeling of solidarity among the surviving unionists and by the fact that Australian workers almost universally have a sense of belonging to the working class, and hence are powerfully inclined to support working-class organizations. Perhaps because the gap between the wages of skilled

and unskilled workers is very small, no aristocracy of labor, with a feeling of separateness from the rest of labor, has ever emerged. But the basic factor in the reconstitution of the unions as powers in the community was the development of conciliation and arbitration courts designed to prevent strikes by being forums where negotiations between workers and employers over wages and conditions could take place with the government represented by judges acting as arbiters.

The courts were the answer of the Australian middle class to the strike problem. In the beginning it was the liberal middle-class politicians who put the necessary laws on the books and who modified them as practice revealed imperfections. Both labor leaders and employers were skeptical of the courts in the early days. But when it became clear that unionization was a prerequisite to successful court procedure, the labor leaders fell in line. More reluctantly the employers also saw the light. For some years now both groups have been, generally speaking, pro-court. There is a constant undercurrent of grumbling about them on both sides, but a serious proposal to abolish them brings even the grumblers to their defense. They are, any candid observer must conclude, an integral part of the industrial scene, and certainly *one of the principal props of Australian unionism*. Only a social earthquake will wipe them out.

By far the most important function of the courts is the determination of the basic wage. This is a floor under wages. It is varied upward to reward skills, and in response to union pressure, but it cannot be varied downward. The wage for women has been 60 per cent of the male wage but it has shown an upward trend toward equality for equal work during the war. All wages are varied up and down as the cost of living index changes. The unions construct their wage scales on the foundation of the basic wage, naturally seeking to get as many members as possible "off the basic." This is done, apart from general union pressure, by minutely analyzing job requirements and demanding special payment for the least evidence of skill.

The basic wage does not eliminate poverty. Irregular employment on the basic wage sees to that, if many other factors did not enter in. The unions and the Labor Party are still seeking the answer to poverty within a social democratic system. But in combination with other factors, the basic wage helps give Australia a standard of living which, on a world

scale, ranks with, but below, that of New Zealand, the United States, and Canada.[6]

It has seemed wise to emphasize the courts and the basic wage, rather than the structure of the trade-union movement, because they are the basic factors in explaining its organizational strength. The unions are both of the craft and industrial varieties, they are both Australia-wide and strictly local. An effort is made to co-ordinate them in a central body—the Australian Council of Trade Unions—but it is not inclusive.

* * *

The future of Australian labor cannot be discussed without taking into account all the factors which influence the future of Australia. Such a discussion would take us very far afield. But it can be emphasized that the position of the unions and the Labor Party in public life is such that it is impossible to imagine a successful reconstruction program being carried through "over their heads." Even should the Labor Party suddenly, and unexpectedly, be driven from office, this would still be so, for as the Official Opposition it would remain a powerful political force. There is every reason to assert, therefore, that Australia's reconstruction program is bound to have a distinctly social democratic emphasis.

If Labor retains office during the decisive postwar years that will be doubly certain. Such a program will include the development of a comprehensive social security system, schemes for raising living standards, including better wages, constant or full employment, improved housing, elaboration of the educational system, improvement of the amenities like libraries, art museums, playing fields, and so on. But because it will be a social democratic program, and not a socialist plan, it will also include efforts to improve the position of the farmers as private entrepreneurs, both economically and through soil and water conservation schemes, and

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[6]See George Anderson, *Fixation of Wages in Australia* (Melbourne, 1929), O. de R. Foenander, *Towards Industrial Peace in Australia* (Melbourne, 1937), *Solving Labour Problems in Australia* (Melbourne, 1941), and *Wartime Labour Developments in Australia* (Melbourne, 1943), D. T. Sawkins, *The Living Wage in Australia* (Melbourne, 1933), Brian Fitzpatrick, *The Basic Wage* (Melbourne, 1941), Colin Clark and J. G. Crawford, *The National Income of Australia* (Sydney, 1938), and F. W. Eggleston and Associates, *Australian Standards of Living* (Melbourne, 1939).

also to encourage the further development of manufacturing by private enterprise. The state power will also, beyond a doubt, continue to be used to rationalize overseas marketing and to assist in opening up new trade outlets for the private producers. Many of the controls developed during the war will be retained the better to direct the total program, including the controls governing prices, credits, and investments.

In short I see no grounds, at present, for supposing that in the visible future Australia will depart from the lines laid down in the immediate past. But if the international environment is favorable, then the immediate future may differ from the past in the degree to which the fundamental criterion for progress is the welfare of the masses of the people. For the war has stimulated in Australia, as in most countries, a feverish interest in ways and means for improving the conditions of life for the common man. The translation of this interest into support for practical schemes for realizing it in the everyday life of the people, has traditionally been one of the most important tasks of Labor, both trade union and Labor Party. If such support can be won today and retained tomorrow, then Labor can proceed to implement its program and carry it forward at an unprecedented tempo. It can get on with the job of making Australia a model social democracy.

THE PROBLEM OF A UNIFIED COMMAND

By JOSEPH ROSENFARB

THE APPOINTMENT of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as generalissimo of the Anglo-American forces in the invasion of Europe from the West brings to the fore once more the problem of a unified command. The nature of that problem as well as the evolution of its treatment throws interesting light on our conduct of the war as well as on the kind of war we are engaged in.

Because this war is a global war it is also a war of coalition. A coalition war therefore raises the problem of cooperation by several sovereign states for one common overriding purpose—victory. This implies that the effort against the common foe be united and organized. Hence the recurrent demand for a unified command.

In an aggressor grouping of nations there is no problem of a unified command because it is not a real coalition. It is the nature of a coalition to be defensive in character. It is true that great conquerors pick up allies on their path to conquest, but these are only satellites attracted into the orbit through fear or deception, or more likely both. One member is domineering, contemptuous, threatening, or pleading, according to the fortunes of war and the character of the aggressor. But one thing is certain: in an aggressor grouping of nations one member is dominant, and that member makes the decisions for it, has the power to impose its will on the rest. Hitler's relationship to Mussolini is too obvious for comment. Napoleon remained the cock of the walk until his defeat. This condition was even true of the Dual Alliance between Prussia and Austria. This may account for Bismarck's dictum that in any alliance one is the rider and one the horse. The weakness of the Axis is that the geographical gulf between Germany and Japan precludes one from dominating the other thus resulting in the possibility of antagonistic action. Japan, despite Hitler's pleas, has not attacked Russia.

But in a true coalition none of the nuclear members is powerful enough to dominate the rest. Common concerted action must proceed upon voluntary agreement impelled by the exigencies of the situation rather than by dictation or compulsion by any of its members. Russia has demanded the opening of a second front but could not compel one. It is the fact that allied decisions are reached by agreements which accounts for Marshal Foch's declaration that Napoleon was after all not such a great soldier—he had to face only a coalition. A coalition in international war is democracy in action, with all the advantages and disadvantages characteristic of such a system. Decisions are slower in the making of course, but they may have a sounder basis than when they reflect only one interest or one conception of that interest. Dictators are not free from error. Neither are commanders in chief. Necessity for multiple representation of interests in allied decisions is particularly imperative during a global conflict. Australia demands security; China claims help; Russia is emphatic on her viewpoint—all these have to be reconciled, and the result may not be impotent compromise, but enlightened judgment. There are probably many ways to win as well as to lose a war, and there is no guarantee that ignoring an interest is a benefit. There was some military opinion in favor of sacrificing Australia, soon after Pearl Harbor. Yet who can deny that strategically it has proved to be important. What if Australia's interest had not been represented in the councils of war?

Being aware of the cooperative or consultative nature of coalitions is particularly advisable in treating of one of the master problems of a coalition—the establishment of a unified command. Only superficially does the term unified or supreme command appear to be a single problem. It has a deceptive simplicity about it. It is a blanket term. It has many aspects as will presently appear.

War strategy, like every enterprise involves two stages: planning and execution. The function of a supreme command is to plan and execute a unified war strategy which is calculated to bring victory. Since defensive coalitions attain their completed stage in membership and strength only at some period subsequent to the start of hostilities, there cannot be any planning in advance. Hence it is improbable that a supreme command should come into being during the formative and at least during the preliminary defensive period. It was not until 1918 that Marshal Foch

was appointed generalissimo of the Allied armies. It is true that a supreme command was established in 1939 between England and France, but the fall of France set in a period of defensive fighting for sheer survival from which we have just emerged. A forced defense cannot be planned. It has to be improvised and adjusted to the extremities of the situation. Though the common menace welds the coalition into a whole during this period, the need for sheer survival on the part of the most affected members precludes that long range point of view which is essential to cooperative concerted action. Within about six months the Japanese overran the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, and the East Indies. The Allied forces that were there were dispersed. It is probable that if most of these had been concentrated in strategically defensible areas, Japan would not have had the walkover that it had and might have been stopped far short of what it did achieve. But the defense of the East Indies was a forced defense. And it is very difficult to obtain consent among allies to sacrifice some for the sake of saving others. The result of course is that all lose, but such a course, if not praiseworthy, is at least understandable. Strategic decisions must frequently be made not for military purposes but for political considerations, and properly so. Japanese bushido at Nanking and elsewhere made it imperative that Great Britain and America should come to the defense of Australia and New Zealand even if it were true, which it is not, that they were not of military importance. A contrary decision might have had disastrous consequences on our morale and might have permanently thwarted the centripetal influences in the anti-Axis coalition. A similar decision was made by Churchill when in the spring of 1941 he sent Wavell and an expeditionary force to Greece, thus dooming the victorious Libyan campaign, though he must have known that the result could not be altered. Of course even the military result was of inestimable value to us for the Greek campaign deprived the Nazis of two months of fighting weather in the Russian campaign. But irrespective of this, Churchill had to demonstrate at that turn of events England's willingness to make sacrifices for its allies. Coalitions, like the Church, thrive on martyrdom.

Only when the coalition survives the impact of attack and manages itself to pass into the offensive does planning become feasible and also imperative, for the offensive presupposes planning. Only then is the ground laid for a supreme command. What is the nature of a supreme

command? How should it be composed—of an individual or of a group, of the military or of civilians? It will be of assistance in answering these questions if we continue to keep in mind the distinction between planning and execution, that this war is global in extent, and is fought during a transitional period in the application of technology to military science.

When Foch was appointed supreme commander the battlefield was limited to a few hundred miles in Western Europe with a subsidiary front in the Near East. In point of territorial extent such a front would now be considered local in character. What priority should be given to Germany and Japan? How should the available supplies be distributed? These and similar questions germane to a global war involve possible clashing of interests and points of view among allies, and since these cannot impose their wills on each other they demand a hearing and representation. It would of course be very convenient if from the very beginning there appeared a military figure in whom every one of the belligerents had confidence that his own point of view would be given due consideration. But that is unlikely and particularly so in a global war in a transitional period. By the time Foch received supreme command the submarine menace was under control. The tank and the airplane were yet in their infancy. More or less traditional though static land warfare was involved. Now warfare is on four levels: submarine, sea surface, land, and air, and in various combinations. The submarine, tank, and airplane have revolutionized not only tactics but also logistics and grand strategy because they involve fundamental problems in regard to the composition and organization of the armed forces. The size of the army depends upon shipping capacity and naval strength. A decision in any one of the services can be made only when coordinated with an over-all view of objectives to be attained and of means available. The effect of technology on the armed forces is somewhat similar to its effect on craft unionism. It is no longer possible with safety to maintain the distinct compartmentalization of the services as of the traditional crafts. The Billy Mitchell affair is a contretemps to anyone willing to contend that we should have entrusted to any one military man the function of determining the nature and composition of our armed forces. It is most important that each of the services should be represented in the making of decisions. It is interesting to note that even the opponents

of a separate air force concede air autonomy within the older services. The submarine nemesis has been said to be due at least in part to the absence of such autonomy and concomitant publicity for the submarine service. In a democracy particularly, the builder of a better weapon should not hesitate to point out the path to his door. And the louder he shouts the better for the fate of the weapon, if he really has something. That probably accounts for the tendency of air enthusiasts to overstate their case.

This is not meant to imply that expertness is necessarily a handicap, but in time of transition in a certain field, the expert in that field is more often than not the last to appreciate the new advances. There is nothing necessarily sinister in this. Even though unconcerned about how the advances would affect his own interest, habits of mind and accumulated lore may well dull the necessary sensitiveness to new ideas. Revolutionaries are rarely recognized as prophets by their own colleagues. This is particularly true among the military profession where the test of competition operates only in wartime. DeGaulle, the advocate of mechanized warfare, was the *enfant terrible* of an army dedicated to military statics. For the task of resolving the conflicts that are bound to arise among the different services a lay but informed intelligence can therefore contribute a great deal that is useful.

There are those who may sneer at "warfare by committee" and "debating society" commands, where prompt decisions are prevented and right decisions are corrupted by the hauling and pulling of political pressure groups. They view with nostalgia the independence of commanders like Caesar, Hannibal, and Alexander, who when they left on a campaign were entirely on their own. There was no need for constant streams of supplies and munitions. The armies subsisted mainly on the lands they traversed and a spear does not need supplies. Since there was no possibility for prompt communication with the political authorities in the capital, the field commander had the function of making also political decisions including the waging of war and entering into truces and treaties of peace.

These conditions, of course, no longer obtain. The telephone, radio, and airplane have eliminated the isolation of field and fleet commanders. One can therefore regret saddling General Eisenhower even with the nominal responsibility for political decisions in North Africa in

order to give them the sanction of military necessity. General Marshall and Admiral King are in closer contact with the different commands, though globally dispersed, than the commanders on land or sea in former times were with any of their forces just beyond the horizon. Then again the problems pertaining to composition, supplies, and organization of the armed forces, are no longer routine, as already pointed out, and may well continue uppermost down to the end of the war. General Forrest's injunction to "get there fustest with the mostest" has changed emphasis from the first to the last, but in any case what in his day was accomplished by maneuver is now dependent mainly on logistics. Since the battlefields are global, supreme commands cannot, at least for the time being, be everywhere. They must therefore be centrally located and near the sources of political authority if they wish to retain an over-all view. Admiral King must of necessity refrain from going to sea. The ascendancy of the organizational tasks of the armed forces can be gauged by this contrast. Despite the presence in the armed forces of such colorful figures as General MacArthur and despite the headlines concomitant to fighting fronts, General Marshall, our Chief of Staff, has retained a pre-eminent position even in the public's attention. But how many, outside of professional soldiers, knew the name of the Chief of Staff during General Pershing's tenure?

It is only when the planning and organizational phases of warfare, rendered complicated by technological advances, have been completed or at least brought under control that the traditional functions of the military commander come into play. The organization of the troops for the particular campaign, planning of its peculiar strategy, choosing of the time and place, and particularly conduct and leadership of the actual fighting must be the prerogative of the commander on the spot. And since the battlefields are dispersed all over the globe there must of necessity be many local or regional supreme commanders, and for the same reason any unified supreme command, whether of one or of a council is likewise nominal in the execution of strategy. Of what value could MacArthur's command in Australia have been to the American forces during the battle of Midway? A supreme commander in western Europe could do very little actual commanding in Russia, or vice versa. This is particularly true of the defensive phase of coalition warfare when dispersal of forces is necessary in order to contain the enemy's attacks.

Only when the coalition itself passes into the offensive and the strangulation ring around the aggressor begins to decrease in diameter do the various dispersed fronts begin to approach and overlap each other, making coordination of commands not only possible but imperative. The Alexander-Montgomery command could remain independent of the Eisenhower command until both converged on Tunisia. Then they had to be and were combined. In the forthcoming great invasion of Europe the Anglo-American forces will be under three commands. The principal invasion scheduled from the West will be under General Eisenhower's command; the Italian front will be under General Sir Harold Alexander; and the Mediterranean front will be commanded by General Sir Henry M. Wilson. As long as these fronts are territorially separated they can remain independent commands though their timing and execution will be coordinated by proper liaison through the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff or some similar body which may be organized in the European theater of operations. But if and when these fronts begin to overlap they will probably be combined.

A similar pattern of development is obtaining in the Pacific. As the road to Tokyo becomes shorter some of the commands, such as the South Pacific under Admiral Halsey and the Southwest Pacific under General MacArthur have been combined, though temporarily. As time goes on greater coalescence of command will take place in the Pacific, though distances there will remain greater to the end than in the European theater, and some of our allies like China and the Indian forces may remain separated from our forces in the Pacific. An additional factor complicating the problem of appointing a supreme commander for the Pacific is that the operations are amphibious. The destruction of the Japanese Navy is the naval task of supreme importance and would render the command of a land general merely nominal. This factor is absent of course in the European theatre where the part of the Navy is preparatory and set apart from the land fighting except in the prospective landing operations. This of course does not mean that the various services should not be combined where necessary into unified commands for each theatre of operations. But we should recognize the existence of the problem, at least at this stage of development. The qualities of the particular individual, irrespective of the service he is in, are of course important, but perhaps the principle may emerge that the supreme com-

mand should follow the functional emphasis of the service in a particular theatre of war. It may well be that the training of officers, at least in the upper ranks, will not in the future recognize the traditional demarcation between Army, Navy, and lately, the Air Force. Some beginning is even now being made towards coalescence. An air officer, the late General Andrews, was commanding American forces in Great Britain. But whether formally recognized or not it is a fair conjecture that the technological influences which have made of grand strategy a consultative function will also tend to produce a similar, if less emphatic, result in the execution of strategy. A contributing cause will be the fact that wars tend to become global in extent and therefore coalitional in character. MacArthur's Southwest Pacific and Eisenhower's erstwhile Italian commands present interesting material for military organization on an international scope. This need not be warfare by "committee." As long as there is the power of decision, the consultative function is not dangerous, for it is not dilatory, but beneficial because it contributes to the informative character of the decision and to the betterment of the morale of the participants. Liaison is now being maintained between MacArthur's command and Lord Mountbatten's East Asia command.

It will be observed that the principles discussed pertaining to a supreme command are very largely those incorporated in the planning and management of the war by most of the United Nations. The planning of our own services is being coordinated through the Joint Chiefs of Staff composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. They have achieved a degree of coordination which would have been unthinkable a few years ago in view of the traditional rivalries between the services. The importance of this body in directing and coordinating the American war effort is attested by President Roosevelt's statement of December 24, 1943, that General Marshall and Admiral King will "direct all of our armed might throughout the world. Upon them falls the great responsibility of planning the strategy of determining when and where we shall fight." On the coalition level, the Pacific Council meeting in Washington is composed of the diplomatic representatives of the countries affected by the conflict in the Pacific. The Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Great Britain meeting also in Washington is composed of the representatives of the various

services of both countries, thus again emphasizing the need for representation of the various points of view even in the formulation and solution of technical military tasks. It is of more than personal significance that the title of full General was given to the head of the American Air Force, General Arnold, who is a member of this body. Apparently it is this military agency which formulates the purely military decisions, and makes the necessary preparations for their execution, subject to the initiative and approval of the civil chiefs of both countries. The telephone, airplane, and radio have eliminated any delays which might be due merely to the distance between Washington and London. Cairo and Teheran are only the latest of the conferences called whenever necessary to plan and set in motion the strategy of the United Nations.

Making the military subject to the control of civil authority, as exemplified by the fact that the President of the United States is constitutionally also the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, should not be considered as a democratic weakness. It is rather almost a universal phenomenon of modern government, democratic or dictatorial, as Mr. Churchill has commented in his May, 1943 address to Congress. Due to the civil war conditions obtaining in China it is not surprising that Chiang Kai-shek should be a professional soldier. But in the great states which have achieved a high degree of unification even the dictators have not been professional military men: Mussolini, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, or Hitler. It is the party and propaganda machines and the secret police, not the army, which is the characteristic weapon of modern dictatorships. Aristotle noted in his *Politics* the trend in the evolution of what he called "demagogues" or dictators from military men to propaganda experts.

No less an authority than Clausewitz has pointed with approval to examples of civilian leadership of armies. Hitler's "intuition" has become the subject of ridicule yet it was his diagnosis of the international situation, contrary to the reputed advice of the professional soldiers, which paved the way for the early Nazi successes. It is fortunate that the leaders of the United Nations possess something more than intuition in regard to military affairs combined with a more than usual fighting spirit. Chiang Kai-shek has emerged supreme from the Chinese civil wars. One may take exception to Stalin's methods, but no one can deny the obvious fact of his survival. Among the revolutionary leaders, with

the possible exception of Trotsky, the organizer and first leader of the Red Army, Stalin has had closest contact with military affairs. No one can gainsay the magnificence of Russia's mobilization for war.

Churchill's courage has been steadfast in calling attention to the German menace. His early military training, his experiences as war correspondent in the Boer War, his tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary of State for War during the First World War, and his record as a military and naval historian constitute a background entitling him to deference in matters of strategy. No one who is familiar with the last decade of American politics, one of the three most fateful periods in American history, would call Roosevelt "soft" or unable to "take it." His experiences as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the First World War and above all his preoccupation with naval and military lore are far more than one would expect from a layman.

The miracle of American production mobilization without which the Allies could not have won the war as Stalin asserted, was the result of civilian effort and direction. It is most fortunate for civilization that the highest strategic decisions are in the hands of statesmen, not of professional military men, for grand strategy is only partially composed of military problems. Political, economic, and psychological evaluations loom very large in the picture. From a purely military estimate England's chances of survival in 1940 appeared slim indeed. But Churchill, the historian and state craftsman, knew that though England could not win the war alone it could, if it only held out, serve as the nucleus for the rallying of a coalition of overwhelming force, as it did in Napoleon's day. He understood the German problem and the nature of the aggressor. He knew that the 1939 treaty between Russia and Germany was based on a false historical premise, and that Stalin would be forced into the war as was Alexander I before him once the conqueror was stymied at the Channel. History is not bunk to those who can read it. But to hold out, Churchill needed help and that assistance could come only from America. Roosevelt too saw reality and saw it whole. He too was versed in navy lore and therefore had a world viewpoint. He knew that the Western Hemisphere had enjoyed autonomous development in the past only because of British sea power. He did what he could under the existing political circumstances to prevent England's fall. And to make a people thousands of miles away from the conflict even partially aware

of its paramount interest in it and act with some measure of effectiveness during the preparatory period was a task and an achievement unsurpassed. Such decisions and functions are of the essence of strategy, but only statesmen, not soldiers could have discharged them.

In substance, though lacking in symmetry, it cannot be denied that we have what is in essence a coalition supreme or unified command both in the planning and organization of strategy and in its execution in the field. The latter will become more obvious as the coalition offensive develops. In the European theatre the various Anglo-American fronts will be coordinated in timing and execution with the Russian eastern front by the interchange of staff liaison officers. As the ring tightens around Germany such coordination will need to become closer and more intimate. The Moscow and Teheran conferences in bringing about agreement on political and military policies have served to allay mutual suspicion and thus prepared the ground for military coordination—the essence of a unified command. The same coordination of effort in planning and execution exists in the Pacific too.

Russia's nonparticipation in the war against Japan and her policy of military secretiveness have prevented thus far the greater coordination which obtains between the Anglo-American forces. But when we realize the difficulties to be surmounted in the personal as well as in the material spheres in fighting a coalition global war, we are entitled, not to cavil at the shortcomings, but to marvel at the great progress made in the coordination of the war effort of the United Nations.

WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT JAPAN?

By ALLAN B. COLE

OBSERVERS who underestimate psychological and political factors are saying that once the Japanese Empire is dismantled of colonies and armaments, once its industries have been devastated from the air, then the economic foundation of an aggressive Japan (unlike that of a defeated Germany whose inherent position is far stronger) will have been forever lost. If this were quite true, it might follow that the victors in Asia could deal with a prostrate Nippon without fear of effective *revanche;* and there might be less need, in our own self-interest, of concerning ourselves with solutions to urgent Japanese foreign and domestic problems.

Fortunately or unfortunately, such an opinion must be checked against the known characteristics of the Japanese people and against the international conditions they may face in the future. Repeatedly through history these islanders have proved themselves to be among the world's most militant, disciplined, frugal, community-conscious, patriotic people. Unpleasant as the fact may seem to us today, their rise from semi-isolated feudalism through quasi-colonial status to that of a great power within a generation, and to domination of much of Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific in another three decades, has been spectacular. Wishful thinking cannot deny that their recovery from the earthquake and fire, which in 1923 laid Yokohama-Tokyo as low as Anglo-American bombers have recently blasted Hamburg and Berlin, was impressive. The Japanese are probably still capable of recuperating from disasters whether from land, sea, or air, even though confronted by greater chronic obstacles than before.

Western exporters are again excited by a prospective opening of vast Asiatic markets. Insofar as such markets open up, Japan may eventually benefit by reason of its productive capacity, Asiatic labor costs (*i.e.,* consumption levels), and its proximity to the continent. Before Pearl Harbor, Filipinos, who were confronted with revived American tariffs, looked

more frequently toward Japan for solutions to certain commercial problems. Despite their suffering during Japanese occupation, millions of orientals will have a wartime opportunity to make shrewd estimates as to the relative advantages of expanded, voluntary trade with a "nonimperialist" Japan as compared with opportunities within prewar and probably postwar imperialist orbits. Even in the heat of war, Free China is importing more than a trickle of Japanese or "puppet" manufactures "through the lines."

While our brightest hope for lasting peace lies in the evolution of the United Nations into a firm concert of all states, we can foresee possible discords which might permit Japan profitably to insinuate its way into a new balanced system of alliances. Not only will there doubtless be conflicts of national interests, but within Pacific countries there may be depressions, struggles between Left and Right, collisions of nationalisms against imperialisms. Just across the straits, the Koreans—often called "Irishmen of the East"—will have their troubles. Can we be certain that Japan will remain impotent to exploit such turmoil for selfish advantage? No; it is more realistic to plan assistance for the rebuilding of a civilian Japanese state and economy in which citizens can see clearly the advantages of international cooperation and be able to make their will effective.

II

Defeat will not in the long run deprive Japan of the population, technological foundations or mechanical equipment (partially undamaged) of a major power. But it will be asked, are the victorious United Nations going to permit the survival of Japanese industry, heavy and light? The answer, as history shows, is that mills and yards which build rails, structural steel, and mercantile ships can quickly be converted to warlike purposes. If a commercial aviation industry is possible in postwar Japan, what is to prevent improved Zeros and Mitsubishis from launching new air blitzes in 1965?

We shall discuss preventatives later, but first it should be determined whether there is any alternative to permitting and even encouraging the peacetime industrialization of Japan. So far among the United Nations, official and most public opinion has been far more realistic in planning the treatment of a defeated Germany than of Japan. This is not only because Germany is first on the agenda. We are told that Japan will be

stripped of all colonies acquired since 1894, and we are left with the impression that the Japanese are to be crippled—permanently ruined.

Saner voices have been raised in each of the United Nations. Some advocate the frank extension of the Atlantic Charter over the Pacific, including the war aim "to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

Every reasonable observer admits that it would not be possible, desirable, or moral to reduce, by deliberate and imposed starvation, the population of Japan to the level of 1871 (about 33,000,000) when three-quarters of the people were occupied in agriculture. The Japan of tomorrow must somehow support a population of seventy-five millions which by 1950-60 is expected to level off at eighty to ninety millions.[1] For more than another decade 200,000 to 250,000 workers in excess of those retiring will swell the labor supply. These cannot be absorbed by agriculture, which is already proverbial for its intensity. The average Japanese farm is 2.45 acres in size. About 60 per cent of the citizens in wartime Japan live in booming industrial towns and cities. Upon the intensification of industry and commerce rests their only hope for livelihoods.

Permanently to destroy Japanese industries would be to condemn millions of people to, or below, the verge of starvation—a disastrous slump in standard of living and consuming power. The United States would then have to forego much of an export trade approximating $240,000,000 annually before the war. Those who have analyzed one of Japan's basic ailments as a shallow domestic market and consequent hyper-sensitivity to artificial exclusion from foreign markets would be deprived of a solution. A Japan without colonies will be even more dependent on foreign raw materials and foodstuffs to feed machines and mouths, and to employ hands. "All right," some concede, "Japan must have factories, but let them be solely for the production of consumer goods, only light industries." Japan would then have to expend a large

[1]The area of Japan proper is about equal to that of Montana (third state in size) and is less than that of California (second), yet it must support more than a hundred times the population of Montana, or about fifty times that of California. Only 16 per cent of the islands is cultivated, with a top potential of 25 per cent.

fraction of slender exchange credits on purchasing foreign machines rather than make her own. This too would depress the level of individual consumption, because employment in the fabrication of producer goods would be eliminated, and costs of many manufactures would be higher. This is *not* to say that all of Japan's heavy industries now profitable or strategically justifiable in an imperial economy will be so after the "Co-Prosperity Sphere" is replaced by internationally regulated conditions. Such industries can be destroyed with ultimate benefit to the people.

How to prevent a recurrence of Japanese aggression yet not to make life desperate or impossible for the town and garden variety of citizen—that is our central problem. Japan must be dissuaded from emulating revisionist post-Versailles Germany. We must not permit Japan to become America's hereditary foe as the Reich has been for France. If the Japanese are to be convinced that population pressure is a myth, reasonable employment in the islands must be maintained; if they are eventually to acquiesce to the loss of colonies, they must be persuaded that there is a better substitute for a Greater East Asian autarchy. We do not have to solve all Japanese problems for them, but in our own interests we have to make it possible for the islanders progressively to do so themselves.

Almost every constructive plan for stability in the Pacific proposes that Japan shall be guaranteed access to raw materials and markets on equal terms; also that Japan shall be invited to participate in settling problems of currency, credit, and exchange. These are imperatives. Yet those are not over-sanguine who recall that intense trade rivalry helped brew this war, and few victors in the past have abstained from utilizing military preponderance to promote preferential commercial advantages. These and colonies are the traditional spoils of war. Our statesmen must be unconventional. It is encouraging to read a statement of Sir George B. Sansom, a frequent adviser of the British and United States governments.

> For her own economic stability, she [Japan] needs export markets providing her with sufficient funds for the purchase of raw materials; an adequate merchant marine; some share in international air communications and other international economic enterprises, if not immediately after the war at least after a period of probation; and reasonable freedom of entry and residence for her nationals in foreign countries. I see no reason why these benefits should not be made available to Japan on condition of loyal participation in such interna-

> tional schemes as may be devised after the war for such purposes as exchange stabilization, the regulation of tariffs and similar measures tending to remove the evils of economic nationalism.[2]

But if Japan is not ruined by compulsory de-industrialization, a similar result might be attempted by the protracted imposition of money or commodity reparations. There is a strong and wholesome prejudice against this policy, however. The growing recognition of war as a complex disease, with international causation as well as results, has undermined the salience of the war-guilt and reparations questions. Even the Chinese, who were less drastically affected by radial effects of the previous German reparations problem—and who, with Russia, have suffered more from Axis aggression than any others—the Chinese know enough not to seek the permanent economic debilitation of Japan. Yuan Chen, a member of the People's Political Council, recently wrote:

> The Chinese are not vindictive, and they are also very realistic. . . . They do not want to bring Japan to economic ruin, without hope of recovery, because they realize that a near neighbor struggling with despair and bankruptcy brings no good to any one. They do not wish to have a neighbor who lives in perpetual hatred and dreams of nothing but revenge. A Japan with its fangs drawn, with its dream of mighty empire shattered along with its ruling military clique —a Japan that has undergone a change of heart—should be left to live in peace and work out its destiny. In time it may again become a member, and a very useful member, of the society of nations.[3]

So, it is commonly and wisely advised that China and the United Nations waive their claims to cash indemnities from Japan. However, Japanese development companies, major holding corporations (like the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda), the government and its services should at armistice time transfer their holdings in evacuated areas to the Chinese government and to the new temporary administrations in other freed countries. Further destruction of such property should be prevented. Properties belonging to private Japanese emigrants or their descendants should not be transferred if these properties were legally acquired. But individual Japanese nationals holding interests sufficient to

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[2] *Postwar Relations with Japan.* Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (Mont Tremblant, Quebec, Canada, December, 1942), Secretariat Paper No. 2, pp. 5-6.

[3] "Postwar Foreign Policy," in What the Chinese Think about Postwar Reconstruction. *Foreign Policy Reports,* XIX, No. 16 (November 1, 1943), 224.

effect the control of foreign industrial, mineral, or agricultural properties should be obliged to sell at a just price to citizens of the state possessing the resources enough shares to terminate such preponderance. Radio, cable, and telegraphic transmission and reception stations, together with their equipment, should come into the possession of the government or nationals of the country in which the facilities are located. The ownership of cables connecting Japan with transferred territories should be shared equitably by the countries served.

III

From economic problems of peace in the East we turn to political questions. Everyone who has attempted a rational plan for the postwar treatment of Japan has begun with a few assumptions. It is predicted that an armistice will be initiated by the "unconditional surrender" of Japanese generals and admirals to commanders of the United Nations. There is every promise that the governments allied against Japan, perhaps in accord with the Soviet Union, will have already agreed on terms to be imposed upon Japan. We count on the establishment of some improved sort of international organization, possibly with integrated regional councils, including one for the Far East and Pacific. Japan's prospective territorial losses were stipulated in the Cairo communiqué of December 2, 1943. The United Nations are expected to establish one or more agencies to act as temporary receivers of territories and perhaps of properties for disposal later by international agreement. It is just as likely, however, that the powers which are recognized by secret diplomacy to be "entitled" to possession or mandatory functions under later international direction will assume or resume control as the Japanese are expelled. Finally, the "ancient foundations of Japanese polity" can be discarded, if at all within a brief space of time, only by a popular revolution which might not exhibit important aspects of bourgeois liberalism. The extent and duration of violence, in such an eventuality, would depend considerably on policies applied by the victors.

Strategists differ in proposing methods for most rapidly compelling Japanese capitulation. Military planners must anticipate the worst, but many others predict that allied sea and overland campaigns can isolate Japan proper and by blockade plus mass bombing can achieve "unconditional" surrender without full-scale invasion of the main islands. If this

proves to be too optimistic, our governments will be faced with the inevitable problems: shall we *deliberately* occupy and temporarily administer all of Japan proper? And in any case, with whom shall we negotiate the terms of armistice?

There are precedents which suggest that when Germany is defeated and the Axis is no more, there may be a cabinet change in Tokyo. Even if this does not occur until mass bombings of Japan's great cities begin, the new government will doubtless contain fewer military officers, and probably a majority of representatives of the civilian aristocracy and the large corporations. This would not necessarily mean an immediate suing for peace but would enable the government to be in a better bargaining position. Not only will Japanese propaganda probably revive the red herring in an attempt to drive a wedge between the present Pacific allies and the Soviet Union in continental affairs, but the same arguments are likely to be invoked with regard to "dangers" from the Left within the islands. It will become more apparent that this war is not merely a conflict of wealthy nations against those which had less, but also a struggle within each country of have versus have-not classes.

It was fashionable up until 1939 to predict that Japanese fascism and expansion would collapse in a revolution precipitated by economic crisis caused in turn by military rashness. Even some Chinese indulged in this wishfulness. Since then, the pendulum has swung to the other extreme. A revolution is now regarded by many as impossible even in a defeated Japan, boiling with discontent and searching for the fundamental reasons for its national misfortunes. The people are said to be too thoroughly disciplined and patriotic; social cleavages and Shinto ideology are too deeply ingrained; the workers will be bewildered, without program or progressive leaders. While it is naive to expect a revolution to bring about Japanese surrender, we may be almost as mistaken to belittle the possibilities of drastic change once collapse has occurred.

The truth is, we are unable to estimate the revolutionary potential or to evaluate the forces competent to achieve moderate reforms. It is impossible to calculate the effects of total defeat upon Japanese psychology, society, economy, and government, because there is no parallel in Japanese history of such a disaster. The failure of Toyotomi Hideyoshi to conquer China via Korea in the late sixteenth century may have contributed to policies of self-sufficiency and semi-isolation adopted soon

thereafter. The humiliation of Tokugawa Japan by the imposition of unequal treaties by occidental powers partly explains the overthrow of the Shogunate, the Imperial Restoration, and the abandonment of structural feudalism. But these reactions seem to provide little guidance for the future. Certainly of more significance in this connection were the rice riots of 1918 and the progress made toward representative, civilian government and labor organization up to 1930.

Surely the policies followed by the United Nations will decisively affect the ratio of power between conservative and reformist elements in Japan during a crucial period (when conditions may be relatively malleable) which will probably coincide with the armistice period. Previous experience in dealing with European Axis countries may be improved upon in the treatment of Japan. However, it will be difficult during this interim to avoid steps prejudicial to the definitive settlements, to the growth of popular government in Japan, and to the foundations of the new international association.

There is little doubt that the high commands of Nippon will be held responsible for disarmament and evacuation in order to discredit them in the popular mind. The possible suicide of high officers should not alter this purpose nor the prevention of opportunity for "stab-in-the-back" excuses. The armistice period should provide time for the revision of Japan's political structure, enabling a later civilian government to sanction the terms of capitulation and to enter into lasting treaties insuring peace in the Far East. It is almost inevitable that full surrender will have to be approved initially by the Imperial government. Here may be an opportunity to undermine also the position of the Imperial cult, of State Shinto, and of cartel-ocracy.

But short-wave broadcasts from San Francisco and propaganda leaflets dropped among Japanese troops in the Solomons are seeking to separate the military leadership from the Emperor and to place sole responsibility for a disastrous war upon the former. Before Pearl Harbor, British Ambassador Craigie strove for rapport between London and Tokyo by comparing the English and Japanese fondness for tradition, monarchy, empire, and class stratification. Our well-bred Ambassador Grew has strongly hinted that the United Nations after this conflict may safely deal with the Emperor and big business. So far, this persuasion is prevailing in the State Department and in Downing Street. We are heading

for a repetition of mistakes already under way in Italy. If the new order in Italy is to be founded upon the House of Savoy, the Roman Catholic Church, and monopoly cartels; if a similar trinity is to be fostered in Japan, how can we expect more than another generation of uneasy truce in the Mediterranean and Pacific?

Proponents of these policies deny that they desire restoration of the *status quo* minus the militarists. They want immediate peace and reconstruction so that Japan may, at the earliest possible time, cope with new problems and contribute to international stability. To these ends, *order* must be preserved. They envisage rapid progress toward a truly constitutional monarchy along British patterns and the renewal of such trends as developed in Japan during the period 1918-30. They overlook the tremendous changes in Japan since 1937.

Opposed to this view are those who contend that, though the Nipponese Emperor is personally innocuous, the Imperial clan and cult as institutions contain dynamite. Destroying the militarists will simply remove the fuse. The Emperor has served as shield and gear shift (to multiply metaphors) for exploiting interests but never effectively or long as an instrument for the common welfare. Furthermore, he is the core of mystical chauvinism, irrational patriotism, and expansive imperialism. Hirohito or Prince Chichibu might become again the spearhead of revisionism. The Tenno is the keystone of semi-feudal class privileges and is a potent instrument for the regimentation of labor. His Chinese and occidental opponents, while admitting that the ousting of the German Kaiser did not prevent the ultimate emergence of a worse tyrant, reply that between the certainty of conservatism with the Emperor and the possibility of basic reform without him lies sufficient hope to satisfy determined democrats. The Emperor is also one of the wealthiest investors in a variety of national and colonial enterprises. This raises the question of corporate business and finance. Japan's capitalistic feudalism was proverbial before 1937, but few foreigners realize the tremendous consolidation of business which has occurred since war in China recommenced. There can be no turning back, any more than we in the United States can return to the free competition of small business units.

Efficiency in a poverty-stricken Japan will probably impell the further centralization of management. When the army abdicates control of these productive mammoths, who is to possess and profit from them?

The Craigies and Grews would restore them to the aristocracy of the stock exchange which has retained its claims by teaming with the militarists. May I suggest that the Japanese people be permitted to decide?

From the training being given to American military government personnel it is obvious that our strategists are preparing to occupy most of Japan proper if necessary. It is agreed by most observers that United Nations officers will at least supervise if not carry out the complete destruction of military and naval bases and installations. Occupation may be limited to certain strategic points, but victory parades down the Ginza (Tokyo's Broadway) would only weaken the liberals in their stand against revisionists. The Japanese will fully realize defeat without alien sadists to underline disaster.

If full military occupation of Japan occurs, then indeed the Allied foreign offices will have to choose the native elements with whom they shall have extended relations. Upon *our* administrations would rest a large measure of responsibility for the subsequent behavior of the Japanese government, for *they* would be the final determinants in its inauguration. The weeks and months following surrender will be decisive for the next era in Japanese political history. The great change by which most modern, industrialized countries have destroyed the social, political, economic, and military vestiges of feudalism may have its opportunity. Only if the intervening victors bungled and failed, as they did in defeated revolutionary Russia, could the basic metamorphosis occur in Japan despite them. And these reforms are inseparable from the problem of how Japan can become neighborly. So long as tanks and machine guns are available for the preservation of order (the old order) either by troops of occupation or by a Japanese army or gendarmerie, spontaneous popular movements will be smothered until the strategic time will have passed. In a compact country like Japan, with a disciplined, undernourished, and perhaps bewildered citizenry, it might not take long for counterrevolutionary forces to refortify their position. These problems should give us pause, especially in the light of our official slowness and failures to utilize democratic forces in North Africa and Italy.

IV

Immediately after surrender, disarmed Japanese troops should evacuate occupied territories and should be demobilized upon reaching Japan,

despite depressed employment conditions. If United Nations troops confine themselves to a few military objectives, native forces for preserving order should be limited to the police and be equipped with light arms only. Only such implements of war should be retained by the Japanese government as are necessary for the normal policing functions. The rest, including naval vessels, military and naval aircraft, installations and operational materials, and auxiliary units should be transferred to the United Nations for disposal according to international agreement. All armaments under construction should be discontinued; war industries should be immediately converted to peacetime production, or, in cases where this is uneconomical, they should be dismantled.

Japanese leaders in military, political, and economic affairs who were primary advocates of fascist and warlike measures should be deprived of office and of participation in making governmental changes. These disabilities should be determined by Japanese initiative if that demand arises naturally. Nationalistic societies should be required by the Japanese government to refrain from chauvinistic agitation. The Chinese may insist upon the trial by foreign tribunals of Japanese accused of atrocities and their punishment if found guilty. We must, however, guard against creating martyrs for the purpose of Japanese legionnaires. If a revolution or substantial reforms in government are achieved, presumably the new leadership will not be too lenient with past exploiters.

It is doubtful whether a country of Japan's potentialities can be permanently disarmed. A representative Japanese government of civilian mold, committed to peaceful cooperation, and the unity of the United Nations within an effective league will be far better guarantees against aggression than attempted disarmament by perpetual alien domination. After signature of definitive settlements and convincing evidence of reforms and good faith, Japan should be admitted to membership in regional and world international organizations.

V

Japan will be deprived of its colonial possessions. Division of colonial spoils among the victors, however, will not convince orientals that the United Nations have been fighting for the preservation of the Four Freedoms, but rather that might will once more have determined "right." It would be more encouraging, therefore, if by armistice time areas con-

quered or retaken from the Japanese should be administered in the name of, if not actually by, a collective United Nations agency which later could merge with a revived and more effective international administration.

All territories pertaining to China in 1894 except Korea, which was then a Manchu-Chinese dependency, should be returned directly to that republic. With respect to all other areas, the Japanese should be informed in the terms of cession what disposal is to be made of them—at least during the armistice period. Hongkong and Kowloon should be ceded to the temporary receivership, or if Great Britain insists, directly to that government with the understanding that the area will be receded to China in full sovereignty by the date of the final peace settlement between Japan and the United Nations. The same arrangement should be made for other territories formerly leased or otherwise acquired by foreign powers from China. Thailand, the Philippine Commonwealth, and Korea should be transferred to the collective agency with the guarantee that they will secure independent governments immediately after the final settlements and will be assisted by the permanent international organization.

Colonies pertaining to members of the United Nations before occupation by the Japanese at some time since December, 1941 should be transferred to their temporary mutual agency with an understanding that the world international organization shall determine their general status and forms of government according to the principle of progressive development toward independence at the earliest possible time. This should apply to Indo-China, Burma, the former British and Dutch East Indies, and the Malay States. Islands taken by Japan in the Southwest Pacific and Bay of Bengal since 1914 should be transferred to the same agency with an allied promise that the world international organization will determine their administration and use as bases for policing. Eventually a law-abiding Japan should share in the international development of dependent areas.

VI

After a stable, civilian government of Japan has concluded the definitive settlements, it should enter reciprocal multilateral, or at least bilateral, agreements concerning the use of communications, especially

radio. Guarantees should be exchanged outlawing propaganda efforts calculated to subvert national sovereignty, territorial integrity, or to incite racial animosty. The degree of freedom which Japan can be expected to permit international agencies seeking to enlist individual Japanese support for collective security and to discredit militarism depends upon the policies of other powers in this respect and upon international willingness to assist in meeting certain postwar problems of Nippon.

Cultural institutions and development in both China and Japan (not to mention the Philippines and other Asiatic battlefields) will have suffered severely before peace is reconstituted. Restored Sino-Japanese neighborliness could hasten the recuperation of libraries, schools, presses, and research facilities in both countries. Improved techniques of photo-duplication, developed largely in the Occident, can be of great assistance in this work. Of course, the Japanese authorities should be required to assist in locating and restoring to prewar owners the artistic and other cultural objects taken without adequate compensation from occupied countries. Further progress in the analysis of the cause and cure of war would result from the opening for investigation of all official archives up to the latest feasible date; this could be effectively achieved only by international agreement.

Although Japan should promise not to incite persons of Japanese ancestry against institutions in countries of their residence abroad, the same government should be included in collective minority guarantees which should be entered into by all powers harboring minorities. Japan and Korea, for example, would reassure each other by such international commitments. The United States and Canada should at least informally assure the new Japanese government that Nisei and Isei loyal to their adopted countries will be restored to former rights and will be compensated for losses. Solutions to these problems would be greatly promoted by clarification of citizenship questions, especially that of dual citizenship. If possible, an international code of state citizenship should be drafted and adopted; this would have to be flexible enough to recognize the requirements of national constitutions.

Even though Japan may not have completed the guarantees mentioned above (and to be resumed shortly), we of the United Nations should insist that this time the principle of racial equality be specifically recognized in constitutional statements of the world and all federated

regional international organizations. And when all Japan's agreements are satisfactory, those powers which by law or by practice exclude Japanese immigrants should substitute quota admissions or should negotiate "gentlemen's agreements" with the government in Tokyo.

A few other commitments should be made by the reformed Japan. New states established or reconstituted from Axis-occupied countries must be officially recognized. Former enemies will watch for Japan's faithful cooperation with the new system of collective security, and if such machinery should not adequately develop, Pacific nations will desire to negotiate mutual nonaggression pacts. Japan will be required to renounce special privileges and unequal, exclusive treaties secured in the past by threat or use of force. But this cannot reasonably be demanded unless other powers do likewise. Furthermore, Japan should renounce the use of force for the recovery of contracted debts except after refusal of the debtor to submit the matter to arbitration or to submit to an arbitral court's award. One or more comprehensive fisheries and sealing conventions are needed covering operations in the Arctic, North and South Pacific Oceans. Japan should participate in world and regional agreements concerning air transportation, landing fields, meteorological and other reciprocal services. Copyright and trademark treaties should be strengthened. One more international convention comes to mind in which Japan's cooperation will be essential: renewal of agreements providing for the strict control of the manufacture and sale of narcotics.

When the new Japan will have demonstrated a reasonable and sincere fulfillment of obligations arising out of all these agreements, it will be time to invite that nation to equitable representation and participation in world and regional organizations.

Nor should the Soviet Union be ignored in Pacific reconstruction—even if the Russians remain aloof from hostilities in that theater. Let us remember that Japan, with expanded factories in its Kinki and Kwanto[4] regions, and the recently developed Ural and Kuznetsk districts, are the two most industrialized areas in Asia. Their productivity and easier access to markets should be of major significance to the recovery and progress of the Extreme Orient.

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[4]Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto area and the Yokohama-Tokyo area.

THE PHILOSOPHER IN SOCIETY

By HAROLD A. TAYLOR

THE HISTORIC ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY in the development of civilization is said to lie in providing a wisdom of cosmic proportions to which men may turn for inspiration concerning the nature of truth, beauty, and goodness. That conception of philosophy has been accepted widely in our past culture, notably in the Greek, the medieval European, and the nineteenth century German periods, with the effect that philosophers themselves have come to believe in it. In contemporary society, in spite of a declining personal prestige, and a waning social influence, most philosophers still believe it. The pressure of popular scorn for philosophical wisdom has had only the result of forcing the philosopher to work harder at the very things which have alienated him from the living community of political, social, and economic beings who make up our world. So intent has he become upon explaining the universe to himself, that the greatest human crisis in the history of civilization now finds him absorbed in the pursuit of a rare kind of truth available only to his professional colleagues.

During the past two thousand years, the social prestige of the philosopher has been radically narrowed. His magnificent reputation as the possessor of universal knowledge has now been transformed to that of the owner of a rather dubious set of abstract principles. From the time when the prestige of the philosopher was at its height, in the acceptance by medieval society of the philosophical and scientific omnipotence of Aristotle, there has been a gradual diminution in public faith in the value of philosophers. The first heretical body to secede were the astronomers. The need of navigators, warriors, and others for accurate information concerning nature, hastened the formation of the sciences of astronomy, physics, optics, geography, and allied subjects. In quick succession, the philosopher lost control of the fields of mathematics, medicine, botany, biology, chemistry, physiology, economics, political theory, until finally, the realms of introspective philosophy and practical ethics were converted into the sciences of psychology and sociology. With this final heresy, philosophy lost its last field of empirical inquiry.

It is under the impact of these losses that the social prestige of philosophy now staggers. It suffers, on the one hand, from those of its professors who conceive its task as some version of the philosopher-king fallacy, and on the other, from those who feel that it can be saved only by retreating into a realm of problems so specialized and esoteric that nobody but a philosopher would care to follow. The role the philosopher is playing in the culture of our Western civilization seems, in the opinion of those who participate in the world's affairs, for the most part either naive or frivolous.

The reason for this can be attributed to a failure on the part of a professional class to adapt itself to a new situation which bears little similarity to the older social and intellectual environment out of which the classical philosophers came. It is only within the last few generations that it has become general practice for philosophers to be engaged as professional teachers in universities. The great English philosophers, for example, philosophized at their own expense, and were accorded the prestige and audience which formerly came to a thinker who was also a gentleman of means. The present situation of the professional thinker is due to the fact that he has been absorbed into the university as an institutionalized philosopher, and having taken up that post, has continued to deal with the same set of problems which existed for those who had no explicit obligation to the education of the young. The function of philosophy as a factor in social growth has not been sufficiently clarified. Its function in the educational process itself has never been adequately analyzed.

In the meantime, the industrialization of Europe and America has created a different set of conditions in which the philosopher lives. The older individualistic society, in which the classes were more clearly defined, made a distinction in intellectual terms between the educated and the masses, tending to equate aesthetic sensibility, intelligence, and virtue with high social position and the possession of wealth. Educators in that older society were asked to teach the ideas of our greatest thinkers to a restricted group of young men deemed worthy of receiving them. This was a satisfactory mode of education provided that the value of the possession of sheer thought was unquestioned, and society assumed that it was legitimate to educate only a fractional upper class in the higher studies. Philosophers, as well as other professors of the classical humani-

ties, were never in this social context called upon to justify their importance for society. It was merely assumed that the traditional fields of epistemology, metaphysics, logic, and ethics should be discussed historically and analytically, and be given the respect which all difficult and abstruse intellectual operations deserve.

With the development of our collective society, in which the ideals for living are formulated principally by economic and social pressure, philosophers have for the most part remained in ignorance of the social conditions which underlie their survival as a professional class. This is true as well of most social scientists, natural scientists, professors of the liberal arts, and ironically enough, true of the political scientist and the sociologist.

In American universities, until comparatively recent years, the teaching of philosophy has been in the hands of certain staunch spokesmen for respectability, retired clergymen and partisan theologians, who, as a crowning gesture of the American system of higher education, put the fear of God into students on a high-class metaphysical level. With the coming of the elective system, students were more inclined to dispense with the fear of God in favor of other subjects, and philosophy as an intellectual discipline became less important in the university curriculum. The mantle of holiness still clings to the professional philosopher. He can be distinguished by his dignified interest in the life of the spirit. In the university, the philosopher continues to occupy the position of moral supervisor, or guardian of higher values. In the academic curriculum, since students usually hold their own set of higher values without benefit of clergy, in this role he does not now fulfill any specific student need.

While a process of social change was reorganizing the environment of the philosopher, he himself was expanding his private interests in specialized ways—developing formal logic, semantic method, historical analysis, and a number of other negative disciplines which, taken together, emphasize the exposure of the flaws of systematic philosophy, rather than attempt the construction of fresh explanations. It was in a similar situation in the history of philosophy that scholasticism, and its intellectual habits, were undermined by social change and intellectual erosion. The impotence of modern philosophy has similar causes. The same professionalism, the same restriction of interest to academic and

doctrinal matters, the same acceptance of traditional methods and material, the same isolation from the world's affairs typical of scholasticism, now characterize modern philosophy. Continued as intellectual habits by philosophers today, they will produce the same effect which they had upon the scholastics.

If, therefore, philosophy is to have any active part in the cultural and social developments of our modern world, it must undergo a radical change in outlook, subject matter, and methods. Otherwise it will find that society may no longer afford the luxury of supporting a professional class which has neither utilitarian nor aesthetic value. The older generation of philosophers has now completed its task. A stage in the history of culture has ended, and we have a radically new situation of unprecedented, continuous social crisis which creates its own desperate need of new philosophers to deal with the problems of an industrial, secular, materialistic world order. These new problems are being handled intellectually by newspaper columnists, radio commentators, journalists, politicians, moving picture producers, and religious leaders. We need not fear that a philosophy is not being developed. It is. It is developed by the functioning intellectuals who speak to the people from day to day, and by the nonintellectuals whose job it is to bring into existence institutions and material conditions to suit the ends society sets for itself. What we need to fear is the very philosophy which sets those ends. At a time when the natural scientist and the executive are the two dominant types of intellectuals most in demand to save our civilization, the absence in philosophers of the characteristics of each of these types, serves to render their role in society even more ambiguous. Their refusal to create a new role, for peace and war, which will aid in the direction given to the social policies now being instituted by others, is the mark of their complete inadequacy.

There are men who, in the name of St. Thomas or of Aristotle, advocate a program of an intellectual kind which will impose upon modern society the myths and practical ideals of a past civilization which bears almost no resemblance to our own. On the assumption that the operating values of a parochial Greek and medieval society are eternal values intrinsic in the universe itself, they advocate a philosophy and an educational scheme which has only the respectability and piety of Christian dogma to recommend it. Instead of dealing with the social problems

arising from a mechanized collective world order, they prefer to condemn society itself for failing to adjust to a medieval world view. In practice, this means that politicians, and others who will listen, are urged to call in the high abstractions of morality and metaphysics in order to lend an air of sanctity to the use of power in whatever direction necessary to secure material ends. The philosopher of our new age will not be found amongst the sponsors of this kind of intellectual absolutism.

Where is he to be found? Considered as an intellectual amongst other intellectuals, each of whom has a special task to perform, what is the unique role of the philosopher? Has he remained as a vestige of a former culture? Should he give up his claim to a unique place in intellectual affairs and become an economist, a sociologist, or a psychiatrist? A great many young men, when faced with this question, have actually answered it in this way. They have concluded that philosophy has little to offer as a preparation for intellectual endeavor in a modern world. They have asserted that only innocence or ignorance can sustain the notion of its role as that of furnishing enlightened observers or philosopher-kings. When the philosopher becomes an administrator, applying his knowledge to the practical problems of economics, or personnel management, or psychiatry, he becomes, if he is wise, an economist, a personnel manager, a psychiatrist. He is not unique there as a philosopher—he adopts another role. It may be true that upon transfer of attention and energy from philosophy to economics, the philosopher may become a better economist for his earlier training, but he will improve as an economist by learning more about that area, retaining his philosophical equipment as a personal set of characteristcs useful in a new field. To do otherwise is to assume the arrogant attitude that philosophers can provide the answers to questions asked by social scientists without undergoing the intellectual discipline which they require of themselves.

However, it is to those whose knowledge includes specific areas of scientific, social, and humanistic experience that we must look for the new philosophy. To deal with our modern world philosophically, such knowledge is essential. It would be wise, therefore, to abandon immediately the notion that only philosophers can be philosophical, or that it requires a professional philosopher to summarize and synthesize the results of the special scientist. The scientist himself is in a good position

to do that task, provided that he expand his interests and his method beyond the limits of his special subject.

The uniquely philosophical aspect of the philosopher's task is to render explicit and conscious the most pervasive implications of human experiences, as they bear upon questions such as the good life, human nature, reality and other social ultimates. For the most part in the continuing life of the scientist or the citizen, these implications, inferences, and meanings are compartmentalized and unexplored. The philosopher insists that they be explored and tries to arrive at ultimate generalizations adequate to the situation, and adequate to an even wider field of explanation. What these generalizations are, and the extent to which they are adequate will depend upon the situation and the areas of human experience which they illuminate. Philosophical theories have, therefore, immense practical importance. Their practical significance will depend first of all upon the nature of the problem under examination. If the original problem is one of the traditional puzzles in the history of philosophy, it is probable that the investigation of its implications will produce little of practical significance, although it may produce intellectual satisfaction in the process.

On the other hand, if the problem be relevant to human needs, but the method analytic, it is possible that no significant ideas may be developed as a result of philosophizing. Philosophy has a creative function. In consists in choosing and clarifying for social use, those alternative ideas which have the best chance of remaining consistent with present and future experiences, and with the theories which may be drawn from them. To neglect this creative aspect is to refuse to accept the responsibilities of thought. It has its parallel in the field of social conflict where we find professional thinkers refusing to take a stand, insisting on detachment, and assuming again the role of the enlightened observer. It is in this way that thinking of all kinds becomes literally useless. Such an attitude of detachment from the implications of one's own thinking has been designated widely as purity of thought, pure objectivity, and the work of pure reason. A better name for the attitude would be moral cowardice. Detachment from the effects of prejudice and uncritical thinking is a necessary factor in reaching philosophical or scientific truth. But once that truth has been reached, one is no longer detached from it, but bound fast to it and to its consequences, by all the intellectual and

moral loyalties of which the human being is capable. The first step in establishing a new part for philosophers is to discard the notion that any mind can remain isolated from the effects of its thinking.

The next step is to discard the notion that there is a discontinuity between the world of the philosopher and that of the citizen, between the world of thought and the world of action. Amongst other intellectuals, the modern poet suffers from the same general difficulty in which the philosopher finds himself. They have each lost touch with the society from which they came, by specialization of private interest, by emphasis upon secret meanings attainable only by initiates.

Their double plight is due to the division they have made between the pure mind of the intellectual and the animal intelligence of the masses. This is another piece of folklore retained from our older individualistic society, where there was at least some empirical verification for the existence of such a social division. Our modern world refuses to support it. There are degrees of intelligence and aesthetic sensibility throughout the whole realm of animal and human nature, and the knowledge and appreciation of human values, aesthetic, scientific, or philosophic, is shared by members of all human social groups. "The poet," says Stephen Spender, "puts into words the potential poetry of other minds. If they accept it as poetry, it is because they accept it as their own poetry, something which they, given the illumination, now see, and might have said." This is true of philosophy. If citizens accept the ideas of a philosopher, it is because they accept them as their own philosophy, something which they, given the illumination, now see, and might have said. It is dangerous to attempt even a logical justification for any view of the world which distinguishes the philosopher from the rest of society by his possession of a superior kind of knowledge.

The modern world in which the philosopher lives is dominated on the one hand by a social doctrine of materialism based upon certain necessary techniques learned for the personal advancement of the individual in his society, and on the other by a religious, sentimental doctrine of the ideals of human nature, absorbed in our culture from the representatives of supernatural theories popular in the past. The intellectual will not serve his society if he is content to deplore the materialism, the spiritual poverty, or the social motivations of our world. They *are* the motivating forces behind our ideals. They point to a new theory of man's

nature which simply contradicts the supernatural views: they constitute the modern conception of man and society. In this situation, the philosopher has the task of articulating a new set of ideals which use the scientific description of human nature in society as data, not as a source of moral indignation. It is only in this way that our ideals can be rendered consistent with their natural origins, self-expanding, self-corrective, and beneficial to the spiritual and physical growth of the society from which they come. We must commence with radical notions of what is natural, or alternately, what is real. Desire for power, wealth, social respect, material comfort, co-operation, happiness is natural. Conflicts between individuals and groups to attain those ends are natural. Any ideal order we can rescue from the normal chaos of these conflicts is also natural. But only as it solves the actual conflicts and produces solutions satisfactory to the desires and interests of individuals living in society can it sustain itself as an ideal.

We have evidence that theories concerning the relation of man to nature, man's relation to the state, to his fellow men, to democratic institutions, if made comprehensible and widely available, do have important social consequences. Predominant conceptions of this sort provided by Plato, Aquinas, Locke, Kant, Marx, and many others have become embedded in our daily customs and ideals. These ideals must be re-examined philosophically and reformulated constantly, to render them relevant to the changing conditions of a shifting society.

If we accept such a breadth of view, we escape from the closed circle of tradition in which philosophy has been trapped. The problem of relating man's ideals to the material conditions of modern life contains in itself a whole welter of implications awaiting examination. Some of these implications involve other problems which have already been considered by the philosophers of the classical tradition. In that case, it may prove valuable to choose some of the solutions provided by other philosophers as suggestive of further solutions to our own. We do not begin completely anew each time we philosophize. We begin with problems suggested to us in our experience, with those which are most vital to each of our lives. We also find in the philosophical literature of our culture a rich variety of tentative solutions already suggested. The needs created by society itself state problems, and the philosopher has only to choose amongst these for his beginning. He will make an initial mistake if he

takes a problem which is only created by the needs of an intellectual class for exhibition of its dialectical skills.

Jefferson is a philosopher who fulfilled a need for the expression of American ideals for living. The Declaration of Independence is a philosophical document of great importance because it summarized a set of general beliefs and at the same time articulated an ideal for social organization. Jefferson's work was aided by the traditional body of philosophy and social thought upon which he called, and whose influence he could not help but feel. More than that however, his philosophy of life was relevant to the needs of a growing democracy, and has remained an embodiment of American ideals because it has been reinterpreted and reformulated by others in relation to new developments in a democracy which has become increasingly industrialized.

The needs of society do not restrict themselves to the creation of problems of social reconstruction. There are others just as natural, although not as pressing. There are problems connected with the appreciation of aesthetic values, created by the need for some standard of judgment in choosing among moving pictures, novels, poems, automobiles, houses, and landscapes. There is not an aesthetic problem as such for society. There is a problem of choice amongst alternatives, some productive of deeper satisfactions than others. Here the philosopher's task is to attempt to derive standards and guides which may be useful in making choices. The unique contribution a philosopher makes to this area of human experience is in his suggestion and intellectual support of an ideal of experience which he himself has found valuable.

The correlation of philosophy, poetry and science in this task consists in the mutual assistance they give each other in expressing the ideals of the society from which they come. The material of experience is common to each, the imaginative use of that common material to express ideas in their true concern. There is no aspect of human life which has not inherent in it, philosophic and poetic values. The philosopher may be said actually to create the values, in the sense that he draws them out of their social context, makes them explicit, exhibits their relation to the rest of life. In this way he may develop moral, aesthetic, or metaphysical implications and conclude with a general theory of reality or value which has an infinite number of practical applications. T. S. Eliot, as a poet, draws out of their context the varieties of ugliness in cigarette ends,

factory landscapes, gutters, or the rat's foot, and develops a poetic myth of the desolation of human life. He also develops his own solution to the problem of combatting that desolation, by a return to religious experience and religious ideals. Such a solution is unsatisfactory because badly adjusted to the further needs and problems of a secular society. Marx, on his part, begins with the ugliness of modern living, traces it to its roots in material conditions of the social order, and develops a philosophic theory of a new collective society with a new set of ideals. One may reject these ideals of Marx and Eliot or deny the validity of their solutions. The philosopher's view of life will be partial, his contribution will be made on the basis of his own knowledge and experience, and his temperamental bias will determine the kind and scope of his vision. He is, however, the creator of new expressions and ideals of man's individual and social nature. The continuing task of the philosopher is to help reveal alternatives which have greater possibilities for realizing those ideals which have the greater relevance to the essential needs of man.

That certain amongst the alternatives for solving human problems are better than others is in itself a question requiring intense philosophical scrutiny. To the degree to which any individual develops in himself the capacity for making intelligent choices amongst actions and ideas, he is being philosophical. Philosophy as a liberating influence in education and in life will thus succeed primarily by creating in individuals this capacity for intelligent appraisal of action. Since action by individuals will always involve effects upon other individuals, each action in order to be intelligent will have to take account of the context in which it occurs and its ultimate effects upon other contexts. This is the moral element in intelligence. If a professional philosopher has any advantage over the nonprofessional citizen, it lies in his awareness of more effects upon a greater variety of situations and contexts, than has the citizen. He is therefore bound to come to some general conclusion concerning the relevance of the single fact or idea to the texture of life. When he comes to this conclusion, he cannot fail to favor it as a conclusion more satisfactory than those reached by others. Otherwise, he would have come to some other conclusion.

Here is a point at which it is necessary for the intellectual to make a philosophical and moral decision. Is it sufficient merely to hold intellectually, without ardor, a particular view regarding the solution of a

problem undertaken for analysis? Professional philosophers as a class tend to assume that it is. The mere arrival at conclusions, the publication, perhaps, of certain of them in the learned journals, the insistence on purity of conclusions from contamination by enthusiasm, is considered to be the mark of the truly professional thinker.

The fact is that philosophers, in common with other men, believe their own conclusions to be true, and wish them to be accepted as true by others. But due to the kind of problems to which they ordinarily supply solutions, their beliefs are irrelevant to the lives of most individuals, and the truth they hold is important only for an extremely small group in an intellectual class which is itself a very small part of the whole of society. Within that inner group, they have agreed by tacit assent to have no literary style, and no enthusiasm for the acceptance by society of the ideas they profess. This is another aspect of that purity of mind cherished by philosophers which they feel sets them apart from the rest of mankind. It is another mark of their failure to be aware of the needs of the society in which they are living.

The philosopher of our new age must accept social responsibility for the results of his intellectual effort. Otherwise he is simply an ornament on the body of culture, rather than a factor in its growth. This means that he is socially responsible for the choice he makes of a problem for investigation. It means, in addition, that he is responsible for his conclusions and for the application of those conclusions to the areas of human experience to which they are relevant. That responsibility is of course shared by others, but the burden is his, and his task is clear. His aim must be to develop in those to whom he speaks, a capacity for philosophical evaluation of the aims of society, and a rational set of beliefs which are consistent with the available scientific knowledge concerning man, society, and the universe. His methods may vary, but they will fail unless his philosophizing begins with the existing problems and conflicts of a moral, social, and intellectual kind in which people are situated, and unless the teaching of philosophy is considered as a task to be undertaken as a common effort by student and philosopher alike, to give answers to questions which trouble them both.

The acceptance of social responsibility is not a subject for philosophical debate. It is a matter which will decide whether or not there will be any place in society for philosophers. Pure research by the natural

sciences is only possible because the bulk of science is devoted to fulfilling the needs of society. Pure research in philosophy will be possible only when the devotion of the philosopher to the needs of society has given him a functional position in the social structure.

The question of the social responsibility of art has been argued at some length during the past twenty years. There have been writers who have advocated a complete concern with the life and problems of the working class, and have denied the validity of any other subject matter for the artist. There have been others who denied the relevance of any art which was not avowedly political in its intention. It now appears clear that what was being argued was not the real point. The point is that great art has political implications, because it concerns human beings in society, and exhibits human beings as subject to social forces. The revelation of human or social ideals is a fundamental factor in the greatness of all literary art. Any art which does not concern itself with some aspect of this wider social issue will have difficulty in establishing itself as great.

A similar concern by the philosopher will have an inevitable effect upon the quality of his thought. His mode of expression is bound to change as it frees itself from the specialized abstractions used in communication between professionals in order to render its content intelligible to a wider audience. This change is sometimes made in the interests of popularization, and when made for that reason, results in a condescension toward his audience apparent in the philosopher which is even more unbearable than the technical style. The change which occurs is more likely to be an improvement if, with William James, the philosopher is conscious of the fact that his audience is composed of engineers, lawyers, workers, scientists, philosophers, and other citizens who are wrestling with problems which they all share.

If it is true that the kind of activities performed daily by individuals determines their outlook, interests, and ideals, the philosopher must regard his own occupation critically, taking care that he is thinking and writing for use rather than for private revelation. It is entirely possible that professional philosophers as now constituted may be unable to make the adjustment necessary for survival as a class. Indications at present are that philosophers themselves will continue to remain unaware of the critical state of society and of their own profession. Nor is there any indication

that a realization of the need for a fresh beginning would be sufficient to make a great many of them socially valuable. The new philosopher may come from another quarter.

He is likely to be found amongst those whose knowledge is scientific, whose interests are social, and whose temperament is at the same time imaginative and critical. The traditional problems of epistemology, for example, may find better exposition in the future by psychologists who are willing to speculate on the philosophical implications of their data than by philosophers trained in the classical humanities He is likely to be found also in that growing class of men who are now social administrators in industry and in government. Such men, by expanding into generalizations the practical experience of their administrative functions, may develop a social philosophy which has intimate connections with the daily activities of men, and wider implications for theories of human nature and conduct. Historians sometimes reveal in their ranks thinkers who can provide a sense of the direction in which society is moving. There are also those who, taking seriously the scientific information available concerning our world, and writing with a knowledge of the sweep of dominant historical movements, can provide an "active novelty of fundamental ideas illuminating the social system." In this task, the philosopher of the modern world can neglect knowingly no source of scientific information, no art of expression which can render his thought significant, and no problem which springs from the consciousness of the society in which he lives. When he is most successful in his new role, the philosopher will express ideals and means of reaching them which, in forming the core of new human institutions, will help to change the actual operating principles of his society.

LIBERAL EDUCATION FOR TODAY

By BOYD H. BODE

IT HAS BEEN SAID that the college of liberal arts is "our best-loved and most criticized institution." We love it because it symbolizes the basic and enduring values of life; we criticize it because of a disturbing feeling that these values are somehow obscured or mutilated or even betrayed. This feeling has considerable justification. It springs from the fact that the college of liberal arts is itself suffering from the confusions and uncertainties of an age which is increasingly in need of a new orientation or sense of direction. The old simplicity of outlook has been lost; the old answers to the problems of life have become inadequate. The serious-minded student can scarcely fail to sense the fact that he is not really getting what he came for. He may even arrive at the disheartening and disillusioning conclusion that he came to college asking for bread and was given a stone.

Just what does our serious-minded student expect to get from a college course? This is a question which he is naturally unable to answer. If he could answer it, he would already be an educated person, and there would be no particular point in going to college at all. To speak in medical terms, he knows that he is sick but he does not know how to diagnose his case. The source of his trouble is not primarily in himself but in the civilization or culture to which he belongs. It is a civilization which is divided against itself, which tries to give its allegiance to competing and incompatible ideals and thus, despite its spectacular achievements, breeds a sense of frustration and defeat.

The student of an earlier day was spared all this suffering. He knew quite definitely what kind of a world he was living in. It was a world which distinguished sharply between the affairs of everyday living and the immutable cosmic foundations by which these affairs were supported and maintained. This distinction provided a basis for the contrast between liberal education and vocational training. The latter had to do with the immediate and empirical problems of living; the former was con-

cerned with the trans-experiential framework of reality which gives meaning to life and which is accessible to man through reason or revelation. Each type of education thus had its own distinctive purpose and its own distinctive content. The basic purpose of liberal education was to give form and outline to a philosophy of life; its materials were drawn, in the main, from the classical tradition and from the dogmas of Christian theology. In brief, the concept of liberal education, as embodied in our denominational colleges, was expressed in the ideal of the "Christian gentleman." The curriculum in liberal arts was quite as definite in its purposes and aims and content as the present-day curriculum in engineering or agriculture.

That was yesterday. Today the picture is all askew. Under the impact of science and technology the dividing line between mundane affairs and trans-experiential reality has become blurred and wavering. Starting with an apparently innocuous curiosity in natural phenomena, science is blossoming out into an attitude or point of view which ignores the dividing line altogether. For the "music of the spheres" it has substituted the law of gravitation; as an alternative to the doctrine of special creation it offers the principle of evolution; in the presence of the mystery of conversion it talks of psychology, together with dark hints of hypnotism; instead of explaining morality and rationality by the doctrine that man is created in the image of God, it has recourse to anthropology and to the operations of the nervous system in the struggle for adaptation and for control over the environment.

All this is fairly familiar. It has bred a distinctive atmosphere, in which the old beliefs have lost much of their vigor. They are, indeed, kept going, through the inertia of tradition, and through various rationalizations, such as the innumerable "reconciliations" of "science and religion," but they are progressively becoming more anemic. This situation gives point to the school boy's definition, quoted by William James, when he said: "Faith is when you believe something that you know ain't so." What is not clearly seen is that science implies a conception of the universe and of man's place in it which is irreconcilable with the outlook of tradition. More specifically, it implies a distinctive conception of truth and of the moral life. This conflict needs to be made explicit, together with its ramifications, if we are to have a liberal education which fits the circumstances of our times.

It can scarcely be said that our colleges of liberal arts are meeting this requirement. Large concessions have indeed been made with respect to the addition of new courses, but the underlying issue is not brought out into the open. These new courses have usually been made to conform to the old pattern by the simple device of clinging to the ideal of "truth for its own sake." In other words, the old conception of truth as eternal and immutable in contrast with the idea of truth as "postulational," was tacitly assumed. The mere addition of new courses, therefore, had scarcely any bearing on the question at issue; the old dividing line between the empirical or practical on the one hand and independent or "rational" truth on the other was still maintained. The student who was in need of an integrated philosophy of life was thus effectively frustrated. The increase in the number and variety of courses on his schedule brought him no nearer to the goal, but instead was likely to increase his sense of irrelevance and defeat.

It seems to be usually taken for granted that the only alternative to the traditional point of view is "left-wing progressivism," which relies on such concepts as needs, interests, and growth as a substitute for an underlying philosophy. In its extreme form this is sheer individualism and reduces the situation to a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. One of the outstanding merits of a significant book which has just come off the press[1] is that it recognizes the fallaciousness of this disjunction. What is needed, in the view of the author, is rather a new orientation with regard to the problem of liberal education.

This orientation, so it is argued by Dr. Henderson, has become necessary because of changes in conditions. In an earlier day the college of liberal arts could claim that it was doing a good job, or at any rate that it had a reasonably accurate set of blueprints for intelligent living. It dealt directly and seriously with the problem of man's place in the universe; it provided a philosophy of life. This vitalizing purpose has evaporated; the original spiritual drive has atrophied. In our curriculum we have retained much of the old "mental furniture," but the inescapable fact remains that we are now living in a different universe. Science has transformed our attitude and outlook on life. It has shown us that there is a "new way of learning." "Truth is postulated but not accepted as

[1] *Vitalizing Liberal Education: a Study of the Liberal Arts Program.* By Algo D. Henderson. New York: Harper & Bros. 1944. 202 pp., with index. $2.50.

dogma" (p. 10). This momentous proposition changes the whole landscape. The point of reference in this postulation is not an alleged framework of eternal truth, but rather the empirical problems of personal and social living. The test of truth lies not in conformity to an immutable reality beyond the skies, but relevance to action. In effect, we turn our backs on the transcendentalism of the past and follow what William James characterizes as "the call of the wild."

> Man has available all the elements for the creation of a new era. With the coming of the age of science, knowledge became available as the basis for intelligent action. The fear of unknown consequences which fettered men's minds and bodies for untold centuries had been replaced with the possibility of confidence and courage. No longer need man be dependent upon the will and the whim of his gods. He is free to search for and build the good life. William James's statement, "The world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands," expresses the new attitude [pp. 10, 11].

This is unmistakably a new voice from the campus of the liberal arts college. What it proposes is nothing less than the reconstruction of the whole idea of liberal education. The proposal is revolutionary, because it offers a new basis for the moral life. It is agreed on all hands that liberal education is concerned with the "good life"; it is also commonly agreed that the good life requires a social context. But this agreement does not take us very far. What is in dispute is the nature or content of the good life. According to Dr. Henderson, the good life is as empirical in content and purpose as the plan for building a skyscraper or irrigating a desert. "Tentatively, the over-all objective of society might be to enable each individual to achieve the fullest development of his own personality and life consistent with, and at the same time capturing for society, as a whole, the maximum value which can be gained from group association and endeavor" (p. 31). This statement is admittedly abstract; it may, even to some ears, have a familiar and innocuous ring. If taken seriously, however, it is anything but familiar or innocuous. What it proposes is a test for moral values which has the right of way over all others in cases of conflict. It is, in sober truth, a distinctive morality. Moreover, it ties up the moral life with scientific methods and procedures. It is obvious that the only way to determine what will meet the conditions in any given problematic situation is to study the situation in the spirit of science

and in reliance on the methods which science has placed at our disposal.[2]

This general point of view naturally has important bearings on curriculum making.

> The fundamental distinction between this approach and that commonly used is that it starts not with the idea of transmitting the cultural heritage of the past, but rather with the idea of applying man's intelligence toward the improvement of our present culture. The new approach, however, does not require a radical departure from the usual curriculum, but rather gives that curriculum a different focus or orientation [p. 69].

This orientation is always to the present, "to the vital problems of society, both broadly general and specific." There are various ways of approaching this problem of reorganization, and experimentation must have the last word in deciding which is best.

> Roughly the problems can be selected for their timeliness—international organization, for instance, has become of paramount interest through the outbreak of another general war; or they can be arranged by their simplicity or complexity, their local bearing or larger significance. Possibly a combination of the two methods would be desirable allowing students to study a broader problem at the same time they are studying a number of lesser ones also [p. 73].

The possibilities for reorganization, as the author shows in extended and suggestive detail, are rich and inviting. What is of special importance at the moment, however, is the fact that we are offered an alternative conception of liberal education which is of significance in the organization of subject matter, and also for the day-by-day activities of the classroom. As the author states, liberal education "has come to a crossroads." It must choose between two conflicting philosophies of the universe and of life or else it must resign itself to a state of innocuous desuetude.

One further consideration must have brief mention. A curriculum that is oriented to the problems of the present is logically bound to give greater importance to direct and personal experience than has been customary in the past. However it may be with eternal truth, the present-day problems of society can scarcely be handled satisfactorily in a vacuum. Such handling brings to mind Dewey's illustration of the man who took a course in swimming by correspondence—and came near drowning when he undertook to apply his learning to practice. Contacts with the

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[2]For the best discussion of this topic that has come to my notice, see M. C. Otto, "Scientific Humanism," *Antioch Review*, Winter, 1943.

surrounding community, off-campus activities, and the daily life of the campus itself—these all afford opportunity to clothe the skeleton of abstract learning with the flesh and blood of living experience; and these opportunities all get serious and sympathetic consideration in Dr. Henderson's picture of the college of liberal arts as it is to be.

It is an engaging picture. There is just one comment of major import that should be made. Let us hark back for a moment to the hypothetical student who comes to college for the reason—in part at least—that his world has gone to pieces and needs to be made whole again. To put it differently, he needs to reconstruct his beliefs and attitudes all along the line. This need arises from the fact that he is trying to live in two kinds of world at the same time. As the heir of all the ages, he brings with him both the Graeco-Christian and the scientific outlook on life. To adapt a remark made by some commentator, what he has really inherited is a lawsuit. Dr. Henderson, as spokesman for the scientific point of view presents a program that is basically sound. If this program is to be made completely meaningful, however, the student must be given every opportunity to see that his two worlds are in conflict and, furthermore, that this conflict is present in all kinds of unexpected places.

To cite a few illustrations, a course in mathematics which deals with the question whether the axioms of mathematics embody eternal truth, as Euclid, for example, thought they did, or are simply postulates with limited validity and applicability, will have a unique intellectual quality and will pave the way for transfer to other areas of thinking such as are not ordinarily expected of mathematics. In the natural sciences, reflection on scientific method will bring to light the issue whether truth means the same thing in science as it did in a prescientific age. In history the same issue turns up if we examine the question whether history can be written once and for all or needs to be rewritten with each succeeding age. It turns up again in art and literature when we undertake to discuss the basis for artistic and literary criticism. The issue raised by Dr. Henderson is present everywhere. Every precaution should be taken that it becomes a clear and unmistakable issue also in the mind of the student. These comments are not so much a criticism of the program as a plea for greater emphasis on the proposition that an understanding of the fundamental and pervasive character of this issue comes somewhere near to being the meaning of liberal education in the present day and age. It all traces back

to the question of what science has done and is doing to the modern mind.

We all have some acquaintance with scientific method, which may be described roughly as the procedure of formulating hypotheses and devising special techniques for gathering the data by which the hypotheses are to be tested. The hypotheses are postulates, which are placed on trial, so to speak, to find out whether, or how long, or how far, they are supported by the evidence. The only important question that still remains is whether there is any knowledge which is "absolute," in the sense of being exempt from such a test. This is the issue which is raised by Dr. Henderson's book and which gives it the distinction of constituting a new approach to the problem of liberal education.

The significance of this approach is thrown into relief when we compare it with the position that is taken by more recent defenders of what is sometimes called the "classical" tradition in education. An excellent example of the latter is Mark Van Doren's recent book, *Liberal Education*.[3] This volume is unusually interesting, both for its literary form and for its presentation of its case. In some respects it marks a wide departure from the ideal of the "Christian gentleman." Dr. Van Doren refuses to be bound either by the metaphysics or by the connotation of "self-cultivation," which was carried by this ideal. Stated philosophically, his central position is that there is a domain of knowledge which the scientist as scientist may not enter and that it is precisely this knowledge which constitutes the special concern of liberal education. This position, as the author is clearly aware, cannot be given up without surrendering the whole tradition.

It should be stated at once that this is not the author's own formulation of the point at issue, but rather that it is implied in his assumptions and in his arguments. His general point of view stands out with special clarity in an early chapter on "The Educated Person." The basic contention here is that man has a nature of his own which is the same everywhere and at all times. It is a kind of essence; it is what all men have in common; it never changes; and it is one of the great mysteries of the universe. This is not a revelation of science but the fruit of immediate insight or pure reason. Reason or intellect can give us assurance that man possesses such a nature, even though it cannot tell us much about it in detail. "Man's distinguishing feature is his inability to know him-

[3]Holt, 1943. 186 pp. $2.50.

self" (p. 19). Yet the fact remains that man possesses this higher and unchanging nature; also that he is doomed to desire more knowledge of himself than he will ever have. "He wants to live; and yet he never lives enough; that is, he never knows enough, for in proportion as he knows he lives" (p. 19). Pindar is quoted to the effect that "our chief duty consists in 'becoming what we are' " (p. 17).

From this general premise certain conclusions are deduced. The road to "becoming what we are" is the road to knowledge; in order to become what we are we must know what we "really" are. Education centers on the cultivation of the intellect, since the intellect is the key to what is beautiful and good as well as to what is true. Such cultivation calls for the arts which are appropriate to this purpose and which are therefore called the liberal arts. These arts are to all intents and purposes the trivium and quadrivium of the Middle Ages. However, these arts are not to be taught directly in the form of special courses. They are to be cultivated in connection with the materials in which our common humanity has found its most adequate expression, i.e. in the classics. The classics are clearly the appropriate material, since the persistence of the classics throughout the ages is evidence that they embody to some degree the immutable quality of our common human nature. This common human nature is precisely what counts; the classics therefore should constitute the core of the curriculum for a liberal education, the aim of which is "one's own excellence, the perfection of one's own intellectual character" (p. 67).

A hasty summary of this kind almost inevitably involves some distortion. For present purposes this is happily less serious than usual. Our chief concern is only secondarily with the meaning of the thesis that there is a common unchanging human nature, a common "humanity," and with the deductions from this thesis; our first consideration has to do with the process by which this thesis is arrived at. It is at this point that we come upon the parting of the ways. Dr. Henderson does not even mention this common perduring humanity which for Dr. Van Doren is the cornerstone of the temple of learning. The former has nothing to say here because for him there is nothing to be said. The position in question is reached by a process that is unknown to science. The appeal is not to science but to "insight," to "reason," to "thinking," to something which shines by its own light and which is infinitely

superior to this whole sorry business of postulation. This being the case, there is really nothing to argue about; and so Dr. Van Doren does not argue; he simply tells us. The implication seems to be that if you have this inner illumination, you are one of the elect; if you do not have it—well, it is just too bad.

Those who are outside the fold, however, will not feel disposed to let it go at that without at least asking a few questions, even at the risk of proving completely that the grace of God is not in them. Is this language about a common unchangeable nature which is shared by all men the language of mysticism or the language of metaphysics? To say that it is a poetical or imaginative version of the truth is not an answer but an evasion. If it is mysticism, we at least know where we stand and we can then afford to leave the mystic to his visions. If what is meant is that we must believe in a reality or existence which is transcendental in the sense of transcending the limitation of space and time, we are entitled to retort that this is unblushing and unintelligible dogmatism. The mystery deepens when we learn that this "common humanity," while indeed a reality, is not a reality all by itself, that "there is not one thing, man, and then another thing, the world" but that "the two are somehow one" (p. 141). What makes it still worse is that our oracle assumes no responsibility for all this mess. He has the truth and this is enough for him. It is up to philosophy to show *how* "the two are somehow one." This same assurance and air of finality appears when we are told that while our common humanity does in truth require social living for its development, the nature of this common humanity is not to be understood through the study of our common social life, but through "the ordering of one's soul" (p. 39). In view of all this, the uninitiated has no alternative but to take time out in order to come up for air. What are we really talking about? To speak bluntly, this kind of thing is not elucidation but plain obscurantism.

The central concern of the whole position seems fairly clear. It is to defend the prerogatives of "insight," "reason," "thinking" against the claims that may be made in the name of science. Science is indeed said to be an indispensable element in liberal education, chiefly because it provides the rigorous discipline which is required by the liberal arts. To say, however, that scientific method is the sole method of reaching truth is held to be going too far, since this would be equivalent to making

science a religion (p. 54). Science comes in for great emphasis, but always with the tacit understanding that our "common humanity" is a holy of holies which must not be profaned by the application of scientific method and procedures.

One further comment is in order. The classics are basic to a liberal education, not because they offer a common and consistent pattern for living—which is clearly not the case—but because they somehow put us in touch with our common humanity. It is true that they argue "like contrary winds" (p. 148); but the important thing is that despite this they have a "strong family resemblance" in that they relate so intimately to our common humanity. What this family resemblance is does not appear very clearly. It does not consist in any common body of truth; it is not anything that can be subjected to scientific tests. Apparently it means that the individual has succeeded in establishing his own private and direct pipeline to the absolute, and that this is all that matters. From the standpoint of "education for citizenship" this is serious. It can scarcely be claimed that "classical" education gives any common or general sense of direction which is more than verbiage. The adherents of this point of view differ notoriously among themselves in all important matters of social policy, including education. The student of the classics, therefore, must perforce write his own ticket, without much to go by except the opinions and prejudices which he had originally or which he acquired while in college, and with the additional disadvantage of being left with the impression that his conclusions have the sanction of reason and absolute truth.

As an aspect of a prescientific age an attitude of this kind is easily understandable. As a phenomenon of the present it is remarkable as evidence of the inertia which can be generated by habit and tradition. But it is also significant as a threat to the development of a genuinely democratic system of education. At any rate, the issue is joined. Liberal education must move in the general direction indicated by Dr. Henderson or it must take its stand on eternal truth. We take our clue as to the nature of intelligence and thinking from science or we take it from somewhere else. The choice which we make will determine the quality of our philosophy of education and our philosophy of life.

POLITICAL DICTIONARY, 1943-44

By HERMAN SCHNURER *and* GEORGE R. GEIGER

COINCIDENCE—Representative Charles A. Plumley's mail direct from the foxholes via Nash Kelvinator (see any Nash Kelvinator advertisement). The soldiers want nothing changed and will die rather than see a limit imposed on high salaries.

MR. PLUMLEY. Mr. Speaker, in the last few weeks I have traveled considerably and by request of patriotic Americans have spoken to a good many groups in Vermont and elsewhere.

Under leave heretofore granted, I am including as a composite manuscript a compendium of the speeches I have delivered:

You know as well as I do that even in victory the end for which the war is being fought could easily be lost because of the incompetency for the peace to come. It must not happen. We can win the war and lose what we are fighting for.

After all, what is the end for which the war is being fought? Let me answer the question by referring to a letter from a soldier overseas, which tells the story better than I could were I to try. He said:

"We're headed straight for the open doors of hell, and when we get inside they'll slam 'em shut and lock 'em. Maybe I'll come out alive and maybe I won't.

"I'll take that chance. I'll take it because I know, now, what I'm playing for over here. And it isn't marbles.

"I'm not fighting for the right to wait in line for my daily bread.

"I'm not using a bayonet and a knife to carve myself a hole where I'll hide in fear for the rest of my days.

"I'm not batting my life out here so anyone back there can tell me where and what and how to worship.

"I'm not outguessing madmen with machine guns in their hands for the privilege of being told what to say and when to say it.

"I'm fighting for freedom!

"I'm fighting for the things that made America the greatest place in the world to live in, that are going to keep America the greatest place in this world to live in!

"Don't anybody tell me there's no future any more in America. Don't anybody tell me there's a ceiling on my opportunity to make a million or be President.

"Don't anybody tell me there's a bridle and bit waiting for me with my name on it!

"That's what took the humanity out of the men I'm up against now. And I don't want any part of it!

"I want to come back to the same America I left behind me, where our way of living has always brought us new and better things, and always will; the America where there's clean, hard work to do, where there's freedom and justice and opportunity for all; where, if you can think and plan and act on your own, there are no limits on how high you can rise, how far you can go.

"That's what I'm fighting for.

"That's America to me, Mr. Plumley.

"Keep it that way until I come back!"

That is a pretty big order but that is just the way I feel about it and what I shall try to do. I have been fighting to keep faith with the boys abroad and the people at home and to keep America as it is.

Congressional Record, p. A4870 (October 27, 1943)

All the material in quotes, verbatim except for Mr. Plumley's name, will be found in Nash Kelvinator's advertisements in the closing months of 1943.

COMMUNISTS—Tojo's fanatical emissaries, all concentrated in New York for the purpose of preventing the general staff from sending troops to Asia.

"They do so because there are some 410,000 Communists in New York State who hold the balance of power between the Republican and Democratic parties," Col. McCormick said. "Unless they vote with the Democrats, no Democrats can be elected and unless the Democrats accept their dictation they will not vote for the Democratic candidates. Bear in mind that New York State has the largest vote in the electoral college."

Denouncing what he called America's failure to reinforce the Philippines before Japan captured the islands, Colonel McCormick asserted that "the fact is above contradiction that troops had not been sent to the Pacific in numbers to hold the Philippines, and have not been sent in sufficient numbers to recapture them and free American prisoners suffering untold tortures in Japanese prison camps, because the Communists wanted them sent elsewhere."

A.P. dispatch, February 15, 1944

DEBT, NATIONAL—Fiscal heresy, peculiar to the United States. Viewed scientifically, the debt has no connection with the war; it is solely the handiwork of economic saboteurs.

The national debt has risen from $368 to $1500 per person in the period from 1941-1944. This is the result of "large-debt thinking."

John H. Crider, *The Saturday Evening Post* (February 26, 1944), p. 21.

FEAR—The inalienable right of every free born man. It is a natural privilege which must be guarded from government meddling. *Laissez trembler, laissez crever.*

Those [freedoms] approved by the group, which is as yet unnamed, were: "Freedom from supergovernment by labor leaders; freedom from bureaucracy, red tape and wasteful spending; freedom of enterprise and individual opportunity, and freedom of State and local rights from Federal feudalism."

William Starr Meyers, history professor at Princeton University, one of the speakers, said the original "freedom from fear" was no part of governmental, particularly Federal, concern, but *was strictly an individual problem.*

A.P. dispatch, February 25, 1944

GOVERNMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL—Defunct regime, synonymous with Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Teapot Dome, refunds to deserving corporations and reduction of taxes.

Further, Mr. Martin said, the Republican party did its job well in the Twenties. "We brought America out of the wilderness into an era of expanding progress. Four times we reduced taxes. Four times we secured more revenue by that method, and during that time we reduced the national debt an average of a billion dollars a year for ten straight years. We did it before; we can do it again."

A.P. dispatch, February 13, 1944

LIBERAL—Political doctrine exemplified by the Republican Party.

"The Republican party is the liberal party in America. The New Deal is reactionary. It reaches back for centuries to old world devices for extending power and depriving people of their rights."

Governor Bricker, quoted in the *New York Times,* February 11, 1944.

MEDICINE, SOCIALIZED—A condition under which people are allowed to get sick only between 9 p.m. and 5 p.m.

WHAT DOES POLITICAL MEDICINE MEAN FOR SICK PEOPLE?

It means they must depend on a doctor who:—

Is paid by the government—presumably working eight hours per day. The emergency sickness must wait until the doctor is on the job;

May not be the doctor of their choice but the one that has been assigned by a political bureaucrat;

Cannot have a personal interest in patients who come to him because they are compelled to do so;

Is less knowing and less efficient because he must follow methods and prescribe remedies that are fixed for him by his bureaucratic superiors;

Since his job is political, is more interested in pleasing or appeasing his political bosses than he is in curing his patients.

THE QUESTION

Unless a tidal wave of protest forewarns the sponsors, this Bill or similar proposals may be enacted into law. The question to be answered is a simple one:

Do you want medical care for the sick to be provided by
BUREAUCRATS—POLITICIANS—OR BY DOCTORS?

The National Physicians Commitee for the Extension of Medical Service, Chicago, Ill., in a scientific pamphlet entitled *$3,048,000,000.00 of Political Medicine Yearly in the United States.*

NAIVETÉ—The childish belief that Wall Street is for Wall Street first and for the public last; that it ever trafficked in scarcity; that it ever indulged in deceit. The ridiculous fable that railroads ever departed from the dictates of altruism.

He [meaning Wallace] has revived the ghost stories about Wall Street, the trusts and the predatory railroads with which the Populists and the New Deal radicals frightened the credulous in two eras of our political history.

Arthur Krock, *New York Times,* February 15, 1944

SECURITY, SOCIAL—A form of debauchery permissible (in the opinion of real authorities) only to God and practiced, instead, by the New Deal.

Clarence Buddington Kelland, speaking as Republican National Committeeman for Arizona, asserted tonight that the Administration had debauched American self-respect and that national integrity was at stake in the coming Presidential election.

If Abraham Lincoln were alive today, Mr. Kelland told dinner guests here, "the thing that would arouse him to rage and denunciation would be the deliberate undermining of the American people by the New Deal Administration."

"It would be the debauching of the self-respect of our citizens," he went on. "It would be the vicious teachings of the Administration whose purpose is to destroy the self-reliance of our people and substitute for it a helpless, hapless, despicable belief that God, in the guise of the New Deal Administration in Washington, will provide."

U.P. dispatch, February 12, 1944

THE UNION—Strong and great only because the states could not have foreseen the diabolic shadow of F.D.R.

"I don't think Vermont would have ever come into the Union as the fourteenth State," he declared, "if our forefathers had known we were going to become merely puppets whose strings were to be pulled from Washington."

Congress, he asserted, was the people's only hope "to stem this tide toward centralized and administrative government."

Attorney General John D. Morris of Vermont in a speech protesting the erection of a $29,000,000 dam at West Dummerston, Vt., as an invasion of State Rights. Quoted in the *New York Times,* February 11, 1944.

SERIOUS BLUNDER ON THE RIGHT*

The Plans for a Nice, New Depression

By J. DONALD KINGSLEY

IT IS CHARACTERISTIC of the American Right that it can stand neither prosperity nor power. The boys proved this pretty well in the decade following the last war and they are belaboring the point again today, when another war has landed them in the saddle. After ten years in the political wilderness, they have emerged with the same shopworn ideas that contributed to their exile in the first place. In this, they are strikingly differentiated from their British counterparts, who have known not only how to use power for their own immediate ends, but how to retain it in the midst of social change. The British Tories possess a flexibility and a tactical brilliance totally unknown to our own less sophisticated Bourbons, which enables them to accept—and sometimes even to sponsor—the inevitable. They are in the main conservatives rather than reactionaries, and they sometimes leave off looking backward long enough to repair a social fence.

In America, on the contrary, we possess neither an organized group of conservatives nor a coherent body of conservative ideas. Our right wing is reactionary and therefore incapable of learning by experience or of adjusting its position to meet new conditions. It starts with the assumption that the Golden Age was some time in the past (whether before Roosevelt or before the Reformation makes little practical difference) and it overlooks the common experience that neither clocks nor social systems normally run backwards. For these reasons it is incapable of developing a realistic program and its policies can never lead to anything but disaster.

*A considerable part of this article originally appeared in *The New Republic* in a modified form. I felt, however, that portions of it needed expansion and I have added a considerable amount of new material. I am grateful to the Editors of *The New Republic* for their kind permission to reprint those sections first published by them.

This is unfortunate for the right wing itself; but it is doubly so for the country. For the Big Boys are once more in the saddle and you and I are riding to destruction with them. If anyone has the slightest doubt on this point, he has only to read the Baruch-Hancock *Report on War and Post-War Adjustment Policies* or to listen to Professor Schlicter extol the virtues of business planning as they appear to the Brain Trust of the Committee for Economic Development.

There was a time, of course, when all mention of economic planning was taboo in our best social circles and when the term "planner" was an epithet on a par with "bolshevik" or "long-haired professor." Those were the far-off days when the New Dealers were talking about planning for full employment, when the National Resources Planning Board was studying the problem of economic security for the common man, and when the Farm Security Administration was demonstrating what planning could do for the bottom third of our agricultural population. To be interested in planning in such dubious company was to invite investigation by the Dies Committee. Planning was definitely un-American.

All of that has now changed. Today, the New Deal planners have either been driven from the public service or have taken to their storm cellars, the National Resources Planning Board has been destroyed, the Farm Security Administration emasculated. In their places we have Senator George and his Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, Messrs. Baruch and Hancock, steeped in the wisdom of Wall Street, and a whole host of freshly minted business planners, who have joyfully taken up where the apologists for the "New Business Ethics" left off in 1929. The shift in emphasis and in personnel has understandably glamorized the planning process. It has given to it the high polish of reputability and a status unquestionably American. Mr. Alfred Sloan plans, why don't you?

At the risk of appearing ungrateful for the services rendered by these numerous and talented gentlemen, I propose to examine the character of our recent governmental planning and to suggest the possibility of some modest alterations of approach. Such suggestions are offered freely to our right-wing friends, for I am convinced that, should they continue to follow their own ideas, they will not only destroy themselves, but the rest of the country as well. We cannot stand the sort of postwar depression our reactionaries are now planning for, and they will not be able to survive it,

either. In a period of rapid social change, the intelligent conservative may perform a useful function by helping to sift the wheat from the chaff—not only in respect to what is old, but to what is new. But in such a setting, the reactionary can never play any other role than that once popularized by Marie Antoinette.

I

The business point of view toward reconversion and postwar economic policies has recently been admirably summarized by Mr. Bernard Baruch and Mr. John Hancock and we are already well on the road to implementing their ideas. The Baruch-Hancock report is not, therefore, a matter of mere academic interest. Unless its effects are quickly counteracted by what is left of the liberal forces in this country, it threatens to become the blueprint of the future, despite the ardent support accorded it by the *Daily Worker*.

The report is, on any grounds, an amazing document. It represents, more than anything else, the imposition of a set of pious hopes upon a hard core of reactionary realities. It is Victorian both in its economics and its optimism—and in its genteel refusal to call a problem a problem. Its authors speak glowingly of the "traditional American spirit of private initiative and resourcefulness" which, they hope, will make of the future "an adventure in prosperity." The picture is an appealing one, painted in the best pre-Raphaelite manner and with as little regard to the more angular realities of life. It completely overlooks the somewhat relevant fact that the American spirit has been more constant throughout the years than have our adventures in prosperity, and the spirit itself was somewhat dampened by the long years of economic depression before the war. But this is a pretty picture, nonetheless, in its luminous red, white and blue, and many people will enjoy looking at it.

Messrs. Baruch and Hancock suggest, in effect, that we leave the problem of full employment to the boundless resources of the American spirit. The suggestion can hardly be considered original, but it is put forward in this instance with more force than it used to command when uttered by the president of the N.A.M. Given the realities of American politics as they exist today, it is likely to be taken seriously, together with the suggestion that governmental intervention in the economy be restrict-

ed to the "limited" construction of public works as a means of "helping to fill the valleys of depression."

Such a position is all the more remarkable in view of the authors' unconcealed admiration for the results of governmental intervention during the war. The war, they suggest, has been a "crucible" for all of the economic systems of the world. And the American system has outproduced the rest.

This is true and it mirrors the undoubted magnificence of our present productive plant. But the economic system they are here talking about can hardly be said to reflect the "traditional American spirit of private initiative." The last time we saw the private enterprise system in operation was in 1940 (unless words are suddenly taking on a new meaning), and in that year our gross national product was little more than half what it is today and nine million people walked the streets in search of work. In the meantime, we have joined in a colossal economic experiment which has conclusively proved that public planning and governmental intervention—if executed with sufficient boldness—can produce full employment and can carry levels of production to previously unimagined heights. That is a lesson which will not be forgotten in the postwar world and which can be forgotten today only at our mortal peril. But it is one which Messrs. Baruch and Hancock have generally managed to overlook.

By no stretch of the imagination can the Baruch-Hancock report provide the basis for an adequate reconversion program. This is not to deny that many of its specific proposals are sound and useful. No one will quarrel seriously with the provisions for the speedy termination of war contracts—though in view of the present high level of corporate reserves, it is doubtful whether the problem is a pressing one so far as most prime contractors are concerned. No one, except the monopoly boys, will disagree with the general policy of disposing of government surpluses so as to lessen monopoly—though it may reasonably be doubted that this end can be achieved by the simple expedient of placing the Attorney General on the Surplus Property Policy Board, while turning publicly owned plants back to the same monopoly interests. No one will object to centering responsibility for the "human side of demobilization" in a Director of Work—though some guarantee of employment opportunities after the war might prove more encouraging to the boys at the front than the establishment of another employment service. What must make the Baruch

proposals unacceptable to progressives is the basic assumption that we are going back to something very like the "normalcy" of the 1920's.

For in broad economic terms, the report means no less than this: that we have failed to read the history of the Great Depression or to understand the meaning of our wartime prosperity. The assumptions on which it is based are precisely those which motivated Mr. Hoover when he established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and attempted to stimulate employment by pumping funds in at the top.

This is the seepage theory of economic activity. It assumes that employers create work because cash is burning holes in their pockets and that through the provision of jobs, a part of the cash seeps down to the consuming workers below. The theory is as old as Adam Smith and as out-of-date. It takes no account of the factor of effective demand or of the role of credit in a modern economy. It takes no account of restrictive economic practices or of the extent to which cartels and monopolies indulge in them. It is more unrealistic than anything Mr. Henry Wallace ever dreamt of—though the daily press insists upon calling him a dreamer and Mr. Baruch a realist.

This archaic economic theory runs like a scarlet thread through the reconversion tapestry woven by Messrs. Baruch and Hancock. It underlies their concern that contracts be settled speedily, lest we have "unemployment by audit." It underlies their suggestion for reconversion loans to industry and their consuming interest in the financial aspects of the problems we face. It leads them to neglect the crucial question of employment and to disregard the effects of badly distributed national income upon effective consumer demand.

Indeed, they fail even to recognize the existence of a problem in this area. "Enormous demands," they observe, "put aside during the war and added to p[illegible]-war demands, await satisfaction."

The observation is undoubtedly correct and it is a matter of much hopeful comment by the business planners. Yet it is a point which is only potentially relevant. Enormous demands awaited satisfaction throughout the depression years—waited and waited. That is not the problem. The problem is to devise institutional means by which those demands may be effectively met. It is to get food into the hands of those that are hungry, automobiles and radios to those who wish them, washing machines to those who have need of them. Here lies the new frontier and the

ultimate proving ground of statesmanship. In financial terms, it means getting purchasing power into the hands of the most numerous groups in the population through assuring them of jobs.

In the depression years, we all knew that this was the basic economic and political problem of our time. It will be so again, despite the nostalgic yearnings of the business planners. For in the modern machine economy, consumption is the key to production; not the volume of cash available for investment.

The Baruch report pictures a financier's heaven as it might have been had things not been as they are. For the common man, it offers only the same tired old symbols and the same discredited myths. Once more, the Right has failed to get in step with the times.

II

If the Baruch-Hancock report cannot be taken as definitive, what principles should govern national policy with the collapse of the Nazis on X-day? It is possible to answer this question broadly even though we do not know the precise conditions which will then prevail. The George Committee has assumed in its reports that war production will taper off gradually and that reconversion can thus be undertaken in a series of steps. Should this prove to be true, it will simplify the problem. But there is less reason for believing it true today than there was a few months ago.

It now appears that the transition to civilian production will be abrupt, for at least two reasons. First, there can be no relaxation in the total output of the tools of war until Germany is finally knocked out, at which time substantial cutbacks will probably be made all across the board. And secondly, we have reached the bottom of the barrel so far as manpower is concerned. Thus, even though the material situation has improved and we have small surpluses of such basic industrial metals as aluminum and some types of steel, they cannot be diverted to civilian use in any quantities because the labor is not available to process them. Mr. Nelson and other W.P.B. officials are therefore holding out little hope of any significant increase in the volume of civilian production until X-day has come and gone.

What the impact of the Nazi collapse will then be upon our military requirements is today a secret, but it will be substantial. Published esti-

mates run all the way from an over-all reduction of twenty-five per cent in war production to one of sixty-five or even seventy per cent. If we take the middle ground between these extremes, it means that on X-day or shortly thereafter, the government will contract its spending by an amount approximating the total national income in 1932. That, in anybody's arithmetic, adds up to a crisis of some proportions. It means that the first step toward restoring the civilian economy will be a broad-jump.

This is especially significant since the problems involved in demobilizing a war economy are more difficult than those encountered in its mobilization, both for economic and for psychological reasons. Reduced to essentials, economic mobilization for war is accomplished through two devices: by the negative one of withholding materials and manpower from any but essential industries or activities, and by the positive one of providing a guaranteed market for the desired types and quantities of production so that industrialists are encouraged to undertake them. Neither advice is wholly adequate alone, as we discovered to our sorrow when we tried to persuade the automobile industry to convert to war production before cutting off its supply of materials. But taken together, they provide the effective working tools for a planned economy.

In the demobilization phase the situation is different—or at least ours is likely to be so. Then we shall probably retain the negative controls over materials and manpower, for to relax them until our supplies are adequate for both war production and unrestricted civilian production would be to invite chaos and to risk losing the war against Japan. But the positive device of the guaranteed market, while clearly applicable to civilian production—as Mr. Wallace's ever-normal granary testified—can hardly be expected to appeal as a general proposition to the present Congress. Thus our controls over reconversion will be less direct and probably less effective than were those employed in converting to war production. This does not need to be the case, and I shall argue later that it should not be. But the weight of political realities today is quite obviously against the most rational approach to reconversion problems.

In the second place, psychological barriers encountered in demobilization are more troublesome than when we are preparing for war. The point is well illustrated by the extent and severity of the recent epidemic of cutback jitters. Although cutbacks in such programs as magnesium and small arms production have affected only a few plants and a few

workers and have been more than compensated by increases in other production programs, their psychological effects were immediate and far-reaching. These were quickly translated into an increased reluctance on the part of employers to undertake additional war contracts—lest they find themselves bested by competitors in the race back to civilian production—and into increased labor turnover as workers sought their own postwar security in a trek back to jobs with a peacetime future. Such behaviors are readily understandable in terms of the mores of our economy, but they constitute a problem of increasingly serious proportions. Unless means are discovered to combat them, we shall find it difficult to reconvert in a gradual and orderly manner or, having launched upon the venture, to maintain that sector of our war economy necessary to the final defeat of Japan.

It is obvious that the more orderly the reconversion process, the less drastic will be its impact upon employment. Steps should therefore be taken now to insure that as few obstacles exist to an orderly transition as possible. This means that, so far as employers are concerned, a method must be found to neutralize the competitive disadvantage which will follow from engaging in war production while competitors are capturing the civilian market. That can be done in one of two ways: either by keeping an entire industry, such as the automobile or electric refrigerator industries, in war production until there is no longer any need for any part of it in the war effort, or by concentrating civilian production in one or a few plants, permitting them to produce "Victory" models in the name of the entire industry.

The objections to the first procedure are numerous and weighty. Such a policy would maximize the shock of reconversion by concentrating it all at once and would lead to the overproduction of the wasteful instruments of war and to unnecessary delay in the production of consumers' goods. The second approach, on the contrary, would permit us to expand the civilian sector of the economy as rapidly as materials and manpower become available without the danger of our confronting another sit-down strike of capital such as hampered our conversion to war. It would also eliminate the difficulties recently encountered by the W.P.B. when it permitted a limited resumption of the manufacture of electric irons and bathtubs and undertook to allocate materials for these purposes in accordance with the proportions of the prewar market supplied by

major competitors. The result was to concentrate these expanded civilian programs in tight labor market areas where they are most likely to hamper war production.

More recently, the W.P.B. has publicly announced a change in policy. On March 9, in a letter to Senator Francis Maloney, Mr. Donald Nelson outlined the new policy to be followed in the matter of cutbacks and the resumption of civilian production. "If, without interference with the war effort," he wrote, "we can give a manufacturer in a non-critical manpower area materials and parts to resume production of things the civilian economy needs, I think it is to the public interest that we do so without waiting until another concern in a critical area is permitted to resume production. This policy may seem hard on the manufacturer in the critical area, but it would be at least an equal hardship on the manufacturer in the non-critical area if he were prevented from resuming production, just because a manufacturer in a critical area could not do so."

This general statement of policy is unchallengeable, yet it may be doubted that the problem is so simple as it implies or that the secondary effects of such a policy will be salutary. It is likely to increase the resistance of manufacturers in war centers to the extension or expansion of their war contracts and to lead them to underestimate their labor requirements in an effort to avoid the classification of their communities as critical areas. It does not strike at the basic psychological difficulty and in an economy still partly competitive its effects are inequitable.

England long ago concentrated important segments of her civilian production in a few plants and eliminated brands and trademarks for the duration. Such a step should be taken here. It would enormously simplify the reconversion process and provide a more equitable basis for the resumption of civilian production. It would, moreover, go far to assure the continuance of our war production effort on the level necessary to final victory.

During the transition period, it would also be highly advantageous if all unbranded "Victory" models for which short materials are released were produced according to standard specifications and purchased under contract by the government, just as we now do with war materials. Goods acquired in this manner could be distributed by the Procurement Division of the Treasury through normal trade channels, but at fixed prices. Such a procedure would facilitate the maximum utilization of our

resources for the satisfaction of our most urgent consumer needs and could be used to reinforce the government's price control program. It would also give us the same controls over demobilization that we exercised in the mobilization cycle.

From the standpoint of the worker, the transition phase also presents serious psychological problems. He still remembers the Great Depression—remembers it with his belly—and he has no such rosy hopes for the future as those expressed by Mr. Baruch or the slick publicists of the C.E.D. Every opinion poll has shown that, typically, he expects the wartime prosperity to fade and the old scramble for scarce jobs to begin again. As a result, he feels personally insecure and this is particularly true if he is employed in one of the huge new war babies or in an industry whose postwar future is uncertain. He is, therefore, inclined to jump at the first sign of a contraction in war production while there are still jobs available in civilian activities. He no more wants to be left holding an empty bag than does the employer, and he knows that his bag is likely to be far emptier.

It is therefore conceivable that on X-day we shall be confronted with a mass movement of workers out of war industries and war centers, which can easily assume such proportions as to jeopardize the conduct of the war against Japan. It is this possibility, among others, which many advocates of national service legislation have in mind.

But there are positive as well as negative approaches to this problem. The most important single step that could be taken would be agreement now on a postwar economic policy which would guarantee full employment and implement the happy promise of the Four Freedoms. Such an agreement would go far to eliminate that deep-rooted feeling of insecurity on the part of our industrial workers which now makes it difficult to manage the labor force on a voluntary basis. It would also provide a more stable social environment in which to undertake the serious social adjustments we confront and would lessen the likelihood of a period of widespread social unrest and bitter industrial conflict.

Why haven't we reached such an agreement before this? We know how to maintain full employment in peace as well as in war and in the long run we shall have to do so. Why, then, do we hesitate to announce such a policy today, when it would immeasurably strengthen the war effort? The answer lies once more with the myopia of our right-wing

friends. Up to now they have assumed, with Mr. Baruch, an ostrich-like position in respect to this issue or, with Mr. Alfred Sloan, have talked in terms of a postwar national income of $100 or $110 billion. Such an income level would be disastrously inadequate and would leave us with as many unemployed as we suffered at the bottom of the depression. If this is all Big Business can do, it would be well advised to cut out the full-page paeons of self-praise. The returning veterans can't eat propaganda alone and it is doubtful if they can be made even to swallow it on an empty stomach.

The business planners are, of course, playing for time and praying for a miracle. They know that they can scarcely hope to survive another depression, but the logic of their reactionary position drives them as straight toward one as it did in the 1920's. Their only hope of salvation, even on a short-lease basis, lies in renewed imperialist adventures; but the more intelligent among them know that in the long run even such ventures fail to pay out. Meanwhile, they are punting, praying, and publicly protesting their faith from the hustings. They are fertile in promises, but their necks are out.

III

The magnitude of the employment problem after X-day is sobering. In 1940, we produced more goods and services than ever before in our history. Yet in that year only 46,000,000 persons were gainfully employed and nearly nine million more were unsuccessfully seeking work. Today, when the volume of our physical output is more than fifty per cent higher (after full allowance for upward changes in the price level) about 60,000,000 persons are employed, including the more than 10,000,000 in the armed services.

To be sure, we have made heroic efforts during the war to expand our labor force and we have actually gone beyond full employment to a condition which may be termed over-employment. Thus, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has estimated that some four million wrokers will automatically disappear from the labor market when the war ends. These will include a million and a half young people who will return to school and college, about three-quarters of a million old people who have postponed their retirement as a result of the demands of the war effort, and perhaps two million women who will return to the nation's homes and

resume their duties as housewives. We would be left, then, should the war end tomorrow, with some 56,000,000 persons actively seeking employment—10,000,000 more than we managed to employ in the "good" year of 1940.

That is sufficiently staggering in itself. But it does not give the full measure of the postwar employment problem, for two reasons. First, our labor force is constantly expanding at a rate of about one per cent a year, as a result of population changes; and secondly, worker productivity is also steadily increasing. In the period from 1929 to 1940 average output per manhour increased at a rate of 2½ per cent per year and in many areas, improvement in productivity has been even more rapid during the war. We do not, therefore, have to cope with a static situation, but with one which is exceedingly dynamic. So far as the goal of full employment is concerned, we are on a treadmill and have to run forward to avoid slipping back.

It is authoritatively estimated that with a continuation of this increase in the labor force and its productivity, the capacity of our available manpower in 1946 will be 25 per cent greater than its capacity in 1940 and nearly 50 per cent greater than our actual output in 1940.[1] This conclusion is reached after making full allowance for the long-term trend toward shorter working hours and upon the very conservative assumption that the employment of women will not be permanently increased by more than a million as a result of the war. As a matter of fact, every opinion survey so far made among women war workers indicates that the overwhelming majority of them hope to stay in the labor force.

By every canon of reason, these facts should give our modern apostles of *laissez faire* the jitters. For they mean that our national income and our consumption of goods and services has to be expanded beyond anything ever dreamt of in "normal" times. Should we produce in 1946 no more than our total output in 1940, we would have 19,000,000 unemployed—certainly a sufficient number to threaten the stability of our whole social order. To provide reasonably full employment in 1946 on a forty hour week basis, our gross national product will have to be valued at about $150 billion in 1940 prices, as compared with the $97 billion value of our product in 1940.

[1] S. Morris Livingston, "Postwar Manpower and Its Capacity to Produce," *Survey of Current Business* (April, 1943), p. 10-16.

We can, of course, achieve this goal, for it is considerably less than we are actually doing today. But it is doubtful whether Mr. Baruch's "spirit of private initiative" will get us there, even with the enthusiastic cooperation of the boys in the C.E.D.

The postwar employment problem is a real one and it will not be solved by treating it cavalierly or by the publication of testimonials to American management in either *The Reader's Digest* or the *Congressional Record*. It will not be solved by letting matters take their course or by the wish-imagery of the business planners. A highly developed industrial society can secure and maintain full employment only if its people consciously set out to do so on the basis of a national program in which government must necessarily play a leading role. In England, even Mr. Churchill appears to recognize this fact. Our own conservative spokesmen, with few exceptions, are less socially literate and more reckless. Lacking in understanding and blinded by prejudice, they are engaged in pulling the social structure down around their own heads. In the process, many innocent bystanders will be injured.

The employment problems we face in the near future are of two sorts: there is, in the first place, the X-day problem of demobilizing the civilian and military personnel released by the defeat of Germany and no longer needed in the war against Japan; and there is, secondly, the longer-term problem of maintaining production and consumption levels at a height sufficient to employ our constantly expanding and increasingly productive labor force.

The X-day employment crisis will be more manageable, because it will be less severe. While we do not know the detailed military plans for dealing with Japan and cannot therefore be wholly certain of the character and scale of our production programs after the defeat of Germany, we can make some reasonable guesses. We know that we shall continue to require aircraft—particularly of the longer range type—but in substantially reduced quantities. We know that we shall continue to require shipping on an enormous scale, though it is quite likely that we shall find that we already have enough. We know that we shall continue to require high octane gasoline and huge quantities of military stores, though in both respects our requirements may be reduced. We will continue to have a demand for radar and electronic equipment. In many of these industries, therefore, the shock of the X-day cutbacks may be

largely absorbed by a reduction in the abnormally long wartime working hours.

But despite the existence of the cushion provided by the twenty per cent increase in average hours worked during the war, we face in the reconversion period serious job dislocation and temporary unemployment which may affect as many as three or four million workers. These will not be uniformly distributed either on an industrial or a geographical basis, but will be highly concentrated in certain parts of the country—notably along our coasts—and in particular industries, like those producing tanks and ordnance.

Moreover, whatever the immediate requirements of the war against Japan, no one imagines that the million and a half workers now in the nation's shipyards will long continue to build ships, for by the end of this year we shall have a merchant marine five times as large as it was before the war. Nor can the aircraft industry operate indefinitely at its present level. At the end of the war, it will probably release a million and a half workers, though only a portion of these will be displaced on X-day. That in turn will react severely upon the aluminum industry and upon numerous fabricators of parts. In these and many other industries, thousands of workers will be laid off and it is unlikely that they can be immediately absorbed into other activities, for civilian production cannot take up the slack as rapidly as war production is curtailed.

An employment gap of some dimensions cannot, therefore, be avoided during the reconversion period. All that we can hope to do is to hold unemployment to a minimum, to limit its duration, and to mitigate its consequences. The accomplishment of these ends requires a composite program, only the elements of which can be sketched here. It requires action, first of all, on the part of the W.P.B. to expand first those industries which can get going most rapidly and with the least amount of physical reconversion. Millions of war workers are today producing goods identical or similar to goods manufactured for the civilian market. This is true, for example, in war textiles, electrical supplies, communications, and agriculture. Such industries can shift immediately to peacetime production, as can many others that are today making instruments of war on the same machines and by the same methods previously employed in the manufacture of consumers' goods. As rapidly as materials and manpower become available, they should be released to such indus-

tries for the production of standardized products to meet our most urgent civilian needs.

Other industries, of which automobile manufacture is a striking example, can return to peacetime production only after extensive changes in plant layout and machine tools. In such instances, our national policy should clearly be to insist upon the production of prewar models, rather than waiting for new engineering and new tooling. In the case of the automobile industry, the production of 1942 models can be under way within four or five months after the industry ceases war production, whereas it would require almost eighteen months to get going with new models. This situation is general throughout the durable goods field and the "Victory" models of the reconversion period should therefore reproduce the fashions of 1942. By this means we will not only shorten the duration of the reconversion lay-off, but speed the release of consumers' goods as a check to inflation.

No matter how faithfully we follow such policies as these, however, we shall have to supplement them with a program of public works. On this point, even Messrs. Baruch and Hancock are in agreement. But it is likely that the "shelf" of public works suggested in their report will have to be both longer and better stocked than any available in government circles today.

At the present time, we are prepared to employ about a million men on highway repair and construction, as soon as materials and manpower are available, and the National Housing Administration has estimated that residential construction for the five years after the war can run at a rate of two million units a year. Should this prove to be the case, the peacetime building trades might absorb as many as four million men in such activities. But it is probable that no more than a million housing units a year can be built by private builders and we still have no adequate program for postwar public housing. The Congress has been making dangerously little progress in implementing any of the public works programs outlined by the National Resources Planning Board before its demise, and there is little evidence of any general understanding of the magnitude of the programs required.

In the latter respect, Dr. J. Raymond Walsh recently outlined the views of the C.I.O. before the Public Buildings and Grounds Committee of the House, suggesting the need for expenditures of $15 billion a year

on public works during the reconversion period. The figure seems modest in the light of a $30 or $40 billion contraction in war expenditures after X-day. Yet it is far in excess of anything currently contemplated and hardly squares with Mr. Baruch's concern for a rapidly reduced public debt and lower taxes.

In the course of his presentation, Dr. Walsh also urged upon the committee a broadened conception of public works, including the provision of public research institutes for the development of new industrial products and processes. The suggestion is of the utmost importance. To a constantly increasing degree, we are dependent upon technology for the maintenance and improvement of our living standards. In a machine economy, the control of technological development is as crucial as was the control of land in an agrarian society. Yet we have turned this pivotal power over to corporate enterprises which possess neither personality nor social consciousness and have then fortified them in its antisocial use through outmoded patent laws.

Significant expenditures of public funds for developmental research in industrial products and processes would strike squarely at one log-jam which has been damming up our economy. It would serve to equalize the competitive positions of large and small industry by making technological advances equally available to both, and would provide a potent weapon against monopoly by making the suppression of invention more difficult. If such a step were combined with the overdue reform of our patent laws, it would do more to smash monopolies and cartels than all the trust busting activities in history.

None of these steps will completely eliminate reconversion unemployment and we must, therefore, make adequate financial provision for the laid-off workers. In this respect, the suggestion of Mr. Clinton Golden, Vice-Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, for the payment of dismissal wages to war workers has great merit. The costs of such payments could be absorbed as legitimate charges against government contracting agencies and the payments themselves would help to carry the worker over the transition period or to pay his transportation costs to some area where work is available. In total war, the production worker is no less a soldier than the man in uniform and the arguments for dismissal wages in the one instance hold in considerable degree in the other.

More important than this, however, is early adoption of the Murray-Wagner-Dingell Bill or similar legislation. Existing state systems of unemployment compensation are totally inadequate to cope with the reconversion and postwar unemployment problem. Unless the social security system is strengthened on a national basis, thousands of workers will exhaust whatever savings they may have accumulated during the war and will be plunged deeply into debt before civilian production even gets under way. Nor will this process require as long a period as the business planners sometimes assume. It is true that individual savings are almost six times as high today as they were in 1939, but their total, including the lion's share held by the wealthy and middle-class groups, amounts to only about $500 for each person gainfully employed. The actual savings of industrial workers are probably substantially below this amount. When this fact is taken together with the sharp contraction in take-home pay which will affect all workers with the reduction in overtime hours, it reflects a condition that hardly seems ideal from the standpoint of launching the much publicized postwar boom.

IV

The demobilization of military personnel is a special problem in which questions of military requirements and national security necessarily take precedence. But, so far as possible within these limitations, plans for military demobilization must be geared into the whole reconversion process. Armed services as large as those we now possess cannot be demobilized in a haphazard manner without producing economic chaos. If we should now follow the pattern of the last war—as there is danger that we shall do—and consider that the requirements of the armed services alone govern the timing and order in which soldiers are to be released, the results will clearly be disastrous. Nor will they be much less so if we accept the recent suggestion that fathers be demobilized first, without regard to their functions in the economy.

What is clearly required is a demobilization plan based on both the continuing requirements of the armed services and the needs of the domestic economy. In respect to the latter, the Imperial German Government drew up a plan in 1917 which is suggestive. All members of the armed forces were classified into eight groups on the basis of their functional positions in the economy and it was proposed to release them

in the following order: 1) leading persons in commerce and industry, whose normal activities could serve to expand employment opportunities; 2) all heads of commercial and other concerns; 3) all independent manufacturers and farmers, regardless of their size and importance; 4) civil servants, railway employees, and teachers; 5) sailors and fishermen; 6) skilled workers; 7) unskilled workers; and 8) students and other nonproductive persons.

This approach is a sound one, although in our own economy we would need to employ somewhat different classifications and to alter the order of release. Skilled workers required in re-engineering activities would need to be much higher on the list and students might be placed among the first groups to be demobilized, since they would not add to an overextended labor force and since wartime attrition in highly trained personnel has serious implications for the future, unless rapidly made up. What is important, however, is that the requirements of reconversion be taken into account in any demobilization plans drawn up by the armed services.

In the final analysis, of course, the success of demobilization depends upon our ability to expand employment. The guarantee of reinstatement in a job, contained in the Selective Service Act, will be an empty gesture if the job is not there. And many jobs will not be there if we continue to allow the C.E.D. to usurp the public function of national economic planning, or if, with Mr. Baruch, we refuse to confront the problem at all.

The most direct approach to full employment under private ownership is that we have made during the war. Governmental purchases, under contract, of the products of our mills, factories, and farms are what transformed our stalled prewar economy into an expanding one. The technique is as applicable in peacetime as it is in war. Used as a compensatory and stabilizing device, such purchases provide a flexible means for maintaining a given level of employment and for expanding those types of production which possess the greatest utility for the greatest number of persons. Employed in peacetime, compensatory governmental purchasing would serve to underpin a consumers' market by guaranteeing employment, and with it, effective consumer demand. The distribution of the product could, therefore, be handled in most instances through normal private channels unless, as a matter of public policy, it was desired to subsidize certain groups of consumers. In the latter event, various

schemes of distribution might be employed, ranging all the way from extensions of the food stamp plan to outright gift.

At the present time, of course, the government is giving away the bulk of its purchases to that segment of the population which is in the armed services. If desired, it could do the same thing with other groups, such as school children, migratory workers, or disabled veterans. And in terms of the immediate effects upon employment levels, it would make no great difference that it was distributing alarm clocks instead of shell fuses, tractors instead of tanks, or commercial air transports instead of bombers. Of course, the wide dissemination of useful civilian goods would serve to raise the living standards of our people and thus ultimately to increase their productivity, while distribution of the instruments of war has the opposite effect. But either expedient can produce full employment and expand consumption.

That is the important point and the one upon which our reactionaries will stub their toes. We now know, beyond any reasonable doubt, how to secure and maintain employment for all of our people. We know how, under private ownership of the instruments of production, to raise our levels of consumption and to enormously improve our living standards. Having learned these lessons, it is unlikely that propaganda will cause us to forget them for long. It would, therefore, be sound policy for the President and Congress to proclaim now that we do not intend to forget them and that the maintenance of employment is a primary responsibility of democratic government.

Such an announcement would provide a realistic framework within which the business planners could blunder to their heart's content, for they would clearly know the alternatives to their own failure—and the rest of the country would clearly know them, too.

THE BEST LAID PLANS

By HENRY S. CHURCHILL

OUR CITIES ARE DECENTRALIZING, or perhaps it is better to say that they are in process of dispersion. The metropolitan areas have been growing faster than the metropolis. Some big cities have actually lost population, but the number of cities in the country has increased, and the smaller ones have grown faster than the larger. This process is not one that can be stopped by "urban rehabilitation," by which is generally meant keeping the population of the metropolitan centers from leaving those centers without loss to the financial interests of either real estate or the municipality. I submit that it cannot be done, that the forces of dispersion are technological and cannot be resisted; that the economics of urbanism will inevitably follow the technology, and that the best means of meeting the situation is to understand it and work with it.

What is this process of dispersion, and how is it going to take place? It is not going too far to say that the beginning is under way, and that it is possible to some extent, at least, to outline the future.

Several forces are at work. It is not possible to say which are primary, which secondary, for they mutually interact, and no one is possible without the other. Economic pressures are built up by technological changes, and these in turn permit new pressures, set up new social strains and stresses, and create unrest and demands for legal, political, and fiscal readjustments. These last three are always laggard, always conservative, far behind the business and industrial progress that, in our economy, is the keynote of the others. Outside these in their purely national or local aspects are world-wide coming changes in trade and international relations.

It may be well briefly to particularize some of the forces and pressures mentioned. The more important are:

Developments in power source and distribution. The internal combustion engine changed transportation and gave us first the automobile and now the airplane. Wireless distribution of power may be next, or some form of atomic energy.

Electric power changed manufacturing, both in regard to process and location. The vacuum tube and other developments in electronics are changing processes and communications.

Chemical and physio-chemical inventions may entirely alter the relationship of factory to raw material, and may develop new sources of cultivated raw materials—the soy bean and cotton are examples already in use—which will be as important as the mined raw materials. Increasing use of the light metals, and of plastics will strengthen this trend. All of these new developments tend in the direction of less space for manufacturing, less of a tie to any given location, and fewer but more highly skilled operatives.

All this makes possible the dispersion of industrial and population concentration that the bombing plane has made imperative. No large industrial city will survive World War III. Heavy artillery knocked down the walls of the city, and the heavy bomber will blow it apart. The technological processes, metallurgical, physical, and chemical that produced heavy artillery changed trade and industry, and the same will again be true. New methods of death and destruction are one with new methods of life and production.

The pressures set up by these forces will affect cities on several levels—international, national, and local. On the first, air transportation and the new markets opened by it will establish new trade and transshipment centers, and will pass over many existing ones. That "you fly north to get to the east" is something that must be kept constantly in mind. Trade with the Orient and India will increase, and the trend in this country will again be westward. The agricultural riches released by the Boulder and Bonneville dams, the opening of new mineral riches in the Rockies, the markets beyond the Pacific, all point away from the eastern seaboard with its worn-out soil and its old trade with a dying Europe.

On the national level, manufacturing will seek, in general, locations that are related to market rather than to raw material, and that allow ample room for motor transportation, both by land and by air. There already has been a general break from concentrated manufacturing centers, with their multi-story factories and warehouses, crowded streets, high taxes, and complicated building laws, to outlying areas where the one-story factory on cheap land with great parking fields is possible. It is inevitable that the residential districts for the workers will fill in the space between these factories.

The pressures at the local level become obvious. They are expansive, for one thing. They would almost seem to indicate a change in the econ-

omy of cities from reliance on manufacturing to retail trade or "business," cultural resources, and amusement. Over 50 per cent of the gainfully employed in cities are already in the "service industries." The population of the country is growing older, which means perhaps that the more densely populated parts of the cities will be mostly childless older people—those whose children have grown up. The young people, working in industry and raising their own families, will be living in the new industrial residence area. Naturally the older people will not be one hundred, or even ninety per cent of the population, but the proportion of them will increase enormously over what it is now. Already, from 1930 to 1940, the age groups have changed markedly—in cities of 10,000 and over, the group under 15 years of age has declined 12.5 per cent, the total population over 15 has increased 14.4 per cent, and the group between 55 and 70 has increased 36.5 per cent.

This increase in the age of the population will affect the city in many ways—size of dwellings for instance, and the provision of leisure time activities. Leisure is merely the opportunity to do things one wants to do for their own sake. The danger in the increase of leisure lies in people not wanting to do anything except passive pastimes, watching base ball games, or going to the movies. One can hope that eventually the utter boredom of too much of this may lead to a revival of "productive cultural activities," perhaps based on the use of small machine tools instead of handicraft, but still the production of objects of satisfaction to the maker. The arts, of course, come under this category, and so does contemplation, and making music, anything that adds to the enrichment of life.

This question of leisure may also affect the physical aspect of cities. The appreciation of architecture and spatial relationship is in a large measure a question of tempo; if you are rushed mentally by the pressure of affairs or physically by transportation, little is seen, and nothing registers, nothing matters. One does not realize how horrible our cities are until, some clear morning, there is opportunity to walk leisurely to work. The old cities were always seen by people walking; as they walked, they saw. Today we neither walk nor see nor care. I doubt whether in any of our major cities there is a single place (outside of a park) in which one can sit and look around and not be irritated by the ugliness and discord of one's surroundings. Architecture cannot be satisfactory if there

is no response, if cities are inhabited only by the blind, the careless, and the hurried.

Lastly, at the local level, there will be the greatest pressure of all—defense against warfare from the air. The destruction done to London, Rotterdam, Coventry, Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, are examples of what may happen. The only protection possible is to scatter not only the targets but also the structures within their general neighborhood. There are some "industrial designers" who foresee cities of tunnels of caves, air-conditioned, efficiently lighted, violet-rayed, sprayed with the faint nostalgic scent of gasoline fumes and pervaded by soft music and inspiring speeches from loud-speakers. Interurban communication, when physically necessary, will be either by rocket planes into the carefully blacked-out empyrean, or over roads completely built over, with glass-block walls and automatic traffic control by radio. Somehow, a dispersion pattern seems easier, although less romantic.

The immediate problems of the cities are those concerned with how to make a transition from the old pattern to the new. The process of dislocation and relocation is going to be very painful because the new patterns are not only physical but also, of course, economic. The inhabitants of Nineveh and Tyre, of Imperial Rome, of Venice and of Ankar Vat also probably found it a painful process.

Of course, many cities have survived for many hundreds of years, some of the Asiatic ones for thousands. People live and die in them, and the daily routines of life go on. Damascus comes to mind, and Patna and Samarqand, Cahors, Ghent and Vilna. Although life in components parts goes on, the cities themselves are only half alive, they survive as something outside the main current of world events. The technologies of their regions remain virtually unchanged from the ancient days, and they still serve ancient and original purposes of local trade. This is not true and cannot be true of cities whose reason for being is the industrial technology of the modern world. They must change with the techniques of industry or lose their place in the world—as Paris and London have changed, as Kiev, Pittsburgh, and Stalingrad have changed and retained their place. What is so difficult today, what makes adjustment difficult and planning imperative is the rate of change. The world of flight and electronics is upon us, and there is no time for evolution. Our future is a revolutionary one, and it must be planned revolution or it will be confusion if not chaos.

What will the new pattern be like? How will it come about? The first is easier to answer than the second.

The trends and pressures already discussed make the broad outlines of the pattern apparent: it remains only to try to give them some coherent form.

The population of metropolitan areas will continue to increase, although the central cities will not, and may even decline.

> In 1940 approximately 85 per cent of the total urban population of the United States lived in 140 metropolitan districts. The metropolitan districts of 1930 included 83 per cent of the urban population. Their population increase was somewhat greater than for the country as a whole. Between 1930 and 1940 the populations in the central cities in the metropolitan areas increased by 6.1 per cent as compared to an increase of 16.9 per cent outside the central cities. . . . Stating these figures another way, of the total metropolitan increase 54.3 per cent occurred outside the central cities; the suburban areas grew 2.8 times as rapidly as the central cities, of which 35 actually declined between 1930 and 1940.[1]

The metropolitan areas, in other words, will tend to become more uniformly inhabited. The lines of growth have always been out from the center (of even small towns and villages) along the lines of best communication—railroads, interurban trolleys, main highways with bus lines, secondary highways by private car. As the ownership of cars has increased, and bus lines have multiplied, the spaces between the older "mass transportation" routes have filled in. Factories are now locating in these "between route" areas, pulling more population to them, from the former centers. The three great industrial "flat-lands" of northern New Jersey, the Buffalo-Lackawanna-Niagara Falls sector, and the Detroit area illustrate this process to a marked degree.

What is happening, therefore, is something different from the "satellite city" concept of Ebenezer Howard, or the "poly-nucleated city" of Lewis Mumford, although it is closer to the latter. The mesh of roads, factories, towns, shopping centers, ribbon developments, garbage dumps, railroads, air fields and what-not is growing quite haphazardly and without regard for rational intercommunication, interdependent needs or coherent function. Here and there are the old nuclei—Plainfield, Rahway, Montclair—Lackawanna, the Tonawandas—Dearborn, Flint.

[1] Lorin A. Thompson, *Pencil Points* (April, 1943), p. 79.

These vast intermixed areas—New York, Northeastern New Jersey, comprise 2,514 square miles, Detroit 746—make a great laboratory for the future urban pattern. Devastation from the air will be difficult, for the industrial plants are widely scattered. What is needed is planned organization so that instead of being dreary and indeed foul waste lands, they will become fit areas in which to live, work, and play.

The three districts already mentioned, together with Philadelphia-Chester, Chicago-Gary, Pittsburgh, and a few smaller ones (Bridgeport, Connecticut is one) present the most difficult problems, because of the objectionable nature of the basic heavy indusrties, with their smoke, fumes, stench, and industrial waste. They are also necessarily serviced by railroads, which add many difficulties. Still it would be possible to make them in a larger degree better. The great plants might be isolated in the center of open areas which could serve as parking fields, helicopter fields, and recreational fields, with no residence permitted nearer than a half-mile. The same would be true of the great automotive plants, which though not objectionable in themselves are primary bombing targets. Bendix, New Jersey, and Willow Run, Michigan, already present such a set-up. Smaller plants could be treated similarly, in groups, or even singly in wooded sections for better camouflage. The non-nuisance factories would not need such isolation, and could well be scattered in residential sections. Some of these are already appearing in New Jersey, along Route U.S. 1, in the New Brunswick area. Some of the otherwise unusable land, such as that often occurring between railroads, might be intensively used for truck gardening, for the food problem for these metropolitan districts gets ever more acute. Free-ways, such as the Pulaski Skyway, will have to be developed, and the employment-residence situation brought under control if transportation is not to come to a complete impasse when normal use of automobiles is resumed. The free-ways will have to be purposeful in their destination, not mere alleviations of a sector—the Pulaski Skyway is no good because it bottlenecks at both ends, and there is no relieving or alternate route at either end to any place that is not a worse traffic jam than the bottleneck. There is no reason why these free-ways should not be built in strip parks, part of the recreational system of the area. T.V.A. has already built such, and in heavy industrial sections they are essential.

The residential areas can and should be planned openly in the best modern manner, and the example for this has also been set, not only by Radburn but by many of the Defense Housing projects, such as Bellmawr, and Winfield, New Jersey, and such as Willow Run was intended to be.

The working out of these industrial complexes is one of the most important planning jobs before us. The central cities present grave and serious economic problems, it is true, but they are existing whereas these surrounding areas are as yet potential problems. Nevertheless, if they are not taken in hand, they will provide disastrous difficulties in the future.

Making the metropolitan districts livable will accelerate the financial difficulties of the central cities, but this cannot be helped. These great cities must eventually rebuild on drastically different lines anyway. This does not mean the tearing down of everything, the abandonment of all utilities, or anything of the sort. It does mean more open planning, more play space, the consolidation of sections of the city into super-blocks, with by-passed traffic, ample schools and playgrounds, local shopping centers with proper provision for parking; through-highways built like park-ways; blocks in which public buildings and private institutions can be located in green and quiet. Business centers will also be opened up, particularly the subcenters, with ample room for parking and greater amenity in small parks and squares—in many cities this could easily be accomplished by the rational use of already vacated land. In-city manufacturing will largely be treated as part of residential business districts, possibly in belts located between the residential areas and separated from them by the free-ways or parked highways previously mentioned. A certain amount of industry which would be objectionable in such locations will, of course, have to be provided for. It can be concentrated along the lines of railroads—where a great deal of it already is.

Developments in the field of construction will also probably influence the city plan. So far most attention has been given, and development has proceeded farther, in new materials and "prefabrication" methods for the one-story dwelling. Some of the new materials will unquestionably affect the cost of multi-family dwellings also, but the great emphasis is being put on the so-called prefabricated or "packaged" house of extremely low cost. There are two things which must be given very careful consideration about this. The first, of course, is the obvious dangers that will come from uncontrolled small-lot subdivisioning. Multitudes of cheap

houses on tiny lots, "owned" by installment-plan financing are nothing but potential slums. There will be a determined effort also to develop the "house you change every five years," or ten years—the analogy of the automobile and its annual style changes is often used—because only by some such forced "repeating" of sales could a sufficiently large market be created for such an industry. However, the jalopy can be, and is, eventually run to a junk yard and scrapped; the danger with the jalopy house will be that the owner, having nothing to lose, will walk out and go elsewhere; or if he does stay and trade in the house every so often, what would the municipality get out of it? For if taxes continue to have an ad valorem base, the $898.97 house cannot be taxed enough to pay anywhere near its share of the cost of municipal services. True, the poor do not pay their share of such costs now; but the cheap prefabricated house is being much touted as a remedy for slums and as an argument against public housing. It is no such remedy, and contains the seeds of great danger unless it is recognized as a city-planning problem and proper controls are set up for it. These will have to include county—if not regional—control of subdivision planning, and should include methods of making not merely the so-called "owners" but the promoters and finance companies financially responsible to the local government for taxes and maintenance.

In the great central cities themselves any attempts at sound rehabilitation must overcome the barrier of the gridiron street system, with its excessive street area, undifferentiated as to use. The gridiron system is inordinately wasteful and inefficient except for one purpose: it is the easiest possible system for the surveyor and recorder of deeds, and theoretically makes every lot as desirable as the next one. It grew up in our speculative land-boom days, and accurately reflects a period in which the main idea of every citizen was not to live on his land but to hold it until he could sell it. Historically cities are all a series of overlays of the patterns of various economies and cultures. As we move into a new period, our cities will go through the same process—indeed some already have. Our early New England and southern towns, for example, had patterns admirably suited to their particular transportation needs, social life, and type of government of their time. As they grew, the gridiron speculative pattern was added to, or even overlaid, the older portions. Our present cities must eventually likewise develop a new system more in keeping

with present and future needs. Such a system is beginning to appear in the "super-block" and the tentative approach to the residential neighborhood as a series of super-blocks within a frame of arterial highways, freeways, or minor greenbelts which in all probability will follow existing main transportation ways, whether road or rail. The next step remains to be taken—the completely integrated neighborhood, including employment facilities as well as recreation, shopping, and schools.

How any of this is to be brought about is another question, and again presents a dilemma. The areas in need of rehabilitation and change are so large, and the land is held in so many ownerships that both power of eminent domain and very large aggregations of capital are needed in order to assemble and reconstruct. Government would seem to be the source of both, and this is generally recognized by urban developers. The difficulty is what is to be done with the land thereafter: shall it be held by government—local government presumably, not federal—and leased, or shall it be sold in very large units, or simply resold? Whichever it is, the municipality would theoretically at least retain some control over use and planning. All three methods have elements of danger. The first is attacked as "socialization of land" and presents all the difficulties associated with government bureaus and the none too savory machine politics which control most of our large cities. One need only think of Jersey City and shudder at the thought of municipal ownership of great portions of the city. The second method simply transmits these dangers to private monopolistic enterprise. It is not pleasant to contemplate great sections of our cities under the absolute domination of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, or General Motors, or the Aluminum Company of America or Bethlehem Steel or Sun Oil. The banks would be even worse, for their comprehension of civic problems stops short with immediate profits, and fails completely to comprehend what is happening to the cities in terms of trade, war, and technological revolution. Stupidity is a bad master. The third method envisages a fairly quick return to the present chaos, for it is doubtful if there is a planning commission in the country prepared or strong enough to control the situation, or indeed a city whose local government is empowered to control it even if it understood what it was all about.

Most of the proponents of urban redevelopment favor the second method, for all its heightening of the power of vast capital interests,

putting hope in continued control by the municipality for the enforcement of planning and the retention of the democratic process. The poor performance of the New York City Planning Commission in the face of the Metropolitan Life's billions is not encouraging to this point of view. If any one concern were to get control of even as little as one per cent of a city's real estate, it could and probably would set itself up as a super-government. No politician would dare stand up to it.

This is not an idle danger. The feudalistic planning and racial discrimination of Stuyvesant Town was only one example, the experience of dozens of company towns is another, and the failure of F.P.H.A. to enforce the "race, color or creed" clause of the Housing Act of 1937 is another.

It is also completely idle to think, as some planners and housers would have us think, that competent planning can assure the democratic process or the good life. The city plan of the future is inherent not in democracy, fascism, or communism, but in the technological necessities of world trade, changing industry, and aerial welfare.

If the third method could be made to work under proper controls for land use it might be a way of reinforcing the democratic process which, in theory at least, depends so much on the small man having a stake in the economic scene and a chance to participate in the government that shapes it. The great difficulty of control under this multi-ownership system has been pointed out—politically, legally, and financially it seems the most remote of the three possibilities. Perhaps it has been too lightly brushed aside in favor of the obvious "large-scale" process. Be that as it may, it seems to me it is deserving of more consideration than it has gotten from those who wish to preserve democracy. For it is only an extremist that finds solace in the vision of a world consisting only of giant cartels or an over-riding omnipotent government. History, even very recent history, proves otherwise. Tyrants and dictators come and go. Hanseatic Leagues, East India Companies, and cartels may dominate a period, but they pass on and the new ones arise from the small beginnings which they never succeed in quite stamping out. The new type of city will provide, in the neighborhood or industrial group, the opportunity for the small concern and for the local voice in government. Hans Sachs and the Guilds will not return, but there must, if we are to progress, be a source of new brothers Wright, new Henry Fords, new

Edisons—as well as the Steinmetzes nurtured by the great corporations. Likewise local government and the revolution so dear to Thomas Jefferson has always found its strength in the bazaar, the agora, the market place, or around the cracker barrel. The strength of the future must come from a similar source—the windy blasts issued in Madison Square Garden, the futile flatulence of radio "forums" will not suffice. There must be a renewed participation of all in civic affairs, and this must be encouraged and can be encouraged (although not brought about) by planning the proper physical environment for it. If the government of the people is to be for the people, it must be by the people and the cities must belong to them.

All of this is both imminent and immanent. The city planners can no longer afford to fiddle with street systems and parks; those charged with fiscal affairs of cities must look beyond the gratification of Real Estate Boards in an effort to solve the problems of rehabilitation. Housing, which has gotten the major share of attention in the past years, almost to the exclusion of everything else, is only a part of the problem as should be clear by now. It must be attacked as a whole, and not too much stress laid on how to "finance" the solution. By now we know that money in itself is not national wealth, but only a representation of it. The creation of wealth is production, and if in war we can expend nearly all we produce for destruction, in peace we can—if we will—expend as much for construction.

None of the things that are desirable in a city are impossible of achievement. The techniques of planning are not in question; there has never been a time when the techniques of any profession have not been sufficient to solve a problem in the terms of that time. It is the development of new techniques that creates new problems, not the other way around. Economic lag, legal obscurantisms, public indifference; these are the stumbling blocks. These must be overcome, so that we can progress purposefully. If we do not plan now to rebuild our cities as thoughtfully and intelligently as we can, the next war will force it on us, hastily and in confusion, and at even greater cost.

WE NOTE . . .

NEGRO EDUCATION

The familiar American Credo about the Negro has, in some ways, been upheld by Selective Service medical statistics. For example, he has good teeth, eyes, and ears, as compared with the white man. Teeth and eye defects are the two chief causes for rejection of the white draftee; for the Negro they are down in fifth and sixth places, and his ear defects—as well as his mental diseases—don't even place in the first ten causes for rejection. ("Causes of Rejection and Incidence of Defects," Selective Service Medical Statistics Bulletin, No. 2). On the other hand, syphilis is by far the leading reason for Negro rejections, whereas it doesn't rank among the top ten white ailments.

But of more importance than any credo is another item in the report. The second highest cause for Negro rejection, accounting for more than 80 out of every 1000 examined, is educational deficiency. With the white, only about 10 in a thousand are turned down for this reason. Moreover, the figures are national, not sectional. (From other sources, it may be noted that the illiteracy rate per 1000 draftees ranges from 0 in Wyoming to over 225 in Georgia —with no breakdown between white and Negro.) Perhaps this, too, is so obviously to be expected that comment is superfluous.

Yet as a possible answer to those optimists who profess to see the Negro achieving equal educational opportunities, the plain figures showing that more than eight times as many Negroes are educationally deficient as white men should be taken into account. "Education" has been the talisman that was supposed to guarantee the Negro increasing economic, political, and social equality. It doesn't seem to be working so well. Possibly a shift in these days to the concept of economic equality, to be gained via employment, is a more workable weapon for the Negro. He needs tangible results, not simply kind words.

G. R. G.

THE C.E.D.—BIG BUSINESS GOES OUT ON A LIMB?

Since Congress abolished the National Resources Planning Board and decreed that economic planning was henceforth taboo as a governmental activity, the Committee for Economic Development has had the field to itself. Robert Brady's article in this issue is an excellent analysis of the C.E.D.'s announced program. It is pretty plain that the boys have tackled something that their economic preconceptions, their habit-patterns, and their corporate connections make them pre-eminently incapable of carrying through. Neither full employment nor "free enterprise" is a likely end-product of an unco-ordinated orgy of front-office expansionist doodling.

But having said all this, it would be a mistake, I think, to write off the C.E.D. as one more piece of high-pressure flubdub, inevitably headed for futility. It is committed to desirable and measurable goals. It has some of the most vigorous and intelligent of the nation's businessmen in its councils and some very able economists on its research staff. It is quite possible that when it really confronts the problems involved in harmonizing business, technology, and "the general public welfare" it will split wide open. This, in itself, will be a portent of no mean significance. It could bring on the dissension within itself which often rings up the curtain on the last act of a ruling class. It would accelerate the rejection of laissez-faire capitalism as unworkable and ignoble by some of its own beneficiaries (the first symptoms of which are seen in such mavericks as David Cushman Coyle, Carl Dreher, and Irving H. Flamm). The alignments which might result from such a split are worth speculating about.

The majority group will undoubtedly take the path of reaction and let the general public go hang. When it finds (assuming that it doesn't know this already, part of it undoubtedly does) that there is an irreconcilable conflict between an expanding peacetime economy of balanced production and consumption and private profit monopoly capitalism, it will move toward the centralized state-economy for war and profits that we call fascism.

If it plays its cards carefully and the international political situation is helpful, there need be no abrupt break in our political-economic evolution. No mobs of postwar unemployed will inject uncertainties into the picture because things will not be allowed to reach that point. "Free enterprise" is concentrating power and profits today as never before. The obvious solution to those who find a war economy to their liking and who shrink from the imperatives of a transition to peacetime is to see to it that the war economy continues.

As a matter of fact, we already have a rough draft of such a postwar program for America. We find it in the marvel of statecraft recently tossed off by Clarence Buddington Kelland of the Republican National Committee. Let us maintain close postwar co-operation with the United Nations, says Mr. Kelland; let us also build an army, navy, and air force capable of pulverizing any part or all of the rest of the world (including the other United Nations). It has been appreciatively noted that this proposal combines internationalism and isolationism into one prize package.

Less attention is given to the fact that this proposal also ensures the indefinite continuance of a war economy. Even assuming that we wouldn't put this military colossus into active service for a decade or two, the rapid obsolescence of planes, guns, ships, and tanks would require a continuation of war production and government spending sufficient to postpone any showdown on the idle-money-idle-men characteristic of our peacetime economy.

Assuming that an internal split will develop in the business hierarchy represented by the C.E.D., what is apt to be the position of the minority group? Regardless of their initial expectations and preconceptions, those executives who tackle the postwar employment question on a fact-finding, functional basis and follow through will emerge with certain general con-

clusions: that the basic factors of production, consumption income, savings and investment, price levels, taxation, and fiscal policy must be determined and co-ordinated by national planning; that monopoly capitalism must come under public direction and control; that peacetime abundance for America is impossible without participation in international co-operation sufficiently effective to establish collective security and make unnecessary the perpetuation of gigantic rival military establishments. These are functional propositions, not moral ones, and they flow inevitably from the factual situation.

It is reasonable to suppose that the business minority which reaches some such conclusion as those outlined above will be predominantly made up of those with a background of functional executive responsibility for production, research, and labor relations rather than finance, political chicanery, and business "statesmanship." In other words, those businessmen who have been accustomed to dealing with realities should be more successful in understanding economic and social realities than those who haven't. On the face of it, this sort of a lineup looks like the new managerial elite envisaged by James Burnham. The departure from Burnham's thesis will come from the fact that these "managers" will be a minority of their class. They will be able to achieve power only by alliance with other functional groups who have a dominant stake in economic change —organized labor, small farmers (maybe), and some professional and white collar people. It is of importance to realize that such an alignment could not only achieve power but that it would provide a broad, democratic base for the new economic shape of things.

So long as the economic ruling class maintains a united front—with its control of press, radio, and, for the greater part, law and government—the democratic potential is unlikely peacefully to acquire power. But with such a split among the rulers as we have suggested, the forces working for democracy and a functional economy would coalesce naturally and things might happen in a hurry.

Every day nearer to the surrender of Germany and Japan is a day nearer to the showdown on postwar employment. The split will not be long coming and liberals and labor should be preparing to take advantage of it. When the opportunity comes for democratic reconstruction it will not linger long nor be repeated soon.

F.C.

CONTRIBUTORS

The Editors of the *Antioch Review* regard the article on romanticism by Eric Russell Bentley as one of the finest it has been their privilege to print. Mr. Bentley appeared in these pages a year ago with his "Bernard Shaw, Caesar, and Stalin." He has written for such other magazines as the *Nation, Partisan Review,* and *Accent,* and will soon publish a book, *A Century of Hero Worship.*

Those who have read ROBERT A. BRADY's *Business as a System of Power,* published last year will expect the full, thorough treatment which he here applies to the Committee for Economic Development. Associate Professor of Economics at the University of California, he has had long experience in business and government research.

CHARLES I. GLICKSBERG, who here treats of the cult of the primitive in Negro culture, has appeared twice before in the *Review* with articles on literary and aesthetic subjects.

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN, who sketches the story of Australian labor, writes that he is "implicated in *News of the Nation,* a history of the United States in the form of newspapers" just published. He is America's leading authority on Australia.

The *Antioch Review* was the first magazine to print JOSEPH ROSENFARB's military articles. His work has since been accorded the fullest praise by professional army men. His most recent book, *The Road to Tokyo,* was an expansion of "Strategy in the Pacific War," in our summer issue (1943). An attorney by profession, Mr. Rosenfarb is also author of the authoritative *National Labor Policy and How It Works.*

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